Why not? I think after the Russia-Ukraine war, everyone will take China’s threat seriously and China should honour that threat if necessary
The US did in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
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The US did in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Well, that's a whole other kettle of fish, because you now have to start thinking about where the red line is.
For the nation making the ultimatum -- in this case China -- your ultimatum is more credible if your red line is well defined and clear, and if your ability to carry out your threats are credible.
Otherwise, the other side will simply choose to salami slice away at your position.
So, which territories and nations in the western pacific would China be willing to go to war over to prevent weapons from being placed on them?
What type of weapons, and how many weapons will they be willing to go to war over to prevent being emplaced?
What extent of war will China be willing to conduct, in terms of scale and threshold?
There are certain issues where China is naturally willing to go to war over, all the way up to the nuclear threshold.
Taiwan of course is one that goes without saying, and is one that everybody agrees on.
But if you want to say "China will issue ultimatums to prevent US from emplacing weapons in the western pacific" you need to define what that means and the geopolitical rationale of it from China's perspective.
The US was able to win in the Cuban missile crisis for a few reasons, but the two most significant factors was that they had the military capabilities and means to carry out its mission and quarantine around Cuba (and the nuclear capabilities to back it up) -- but they also had a clear and well defined red line that they wanted the USSR to back away from.
What would China's red line be, and would they have the means to enforce it if the US tests them?
It is kinda hard to come up with the red line when the said weapons don’t exist yet
it all depends on the capabilities of American hypersonic weapons that can strike Chinese targets and the threat perception of the Chinese leadership. I think it is too soon to know
While I rarely give FOX news much attention, I ran across this article that makes a few salient points that are valid regardless of who the messenger is:
While these are fairly general statements, but we have to consider a case that after an initial high intensity phase, the conflict devolves in to a game of attrition with depleted navel and air assets on both sides over the course of months and years.
While these are fairly general statements, but we have to consider a case that after an initial high intensity phase, the conflict devolves in to a game of attrition with depleted navel and air assets on both sides over the course of months and years.
It is kinda hard to come up with the red line when the said weapons don’t exist yet
it all depends on the capabilities of American hypersonic weapons that can strike Chinese targets and the threat perception of the Chinese leadership. I think it is too soon to know
Well, considering the discussion is how China should prepare for the prospect of the US frontloading the western pacific with long range strike weapons, I think those red lines had better start to be considered.
The reason I have phrased my replies as so, is that I think from the Chinese leadership's point of view, all of the politicking and diplomacy that they can try to aim to do in the future will not replace the demands for developing weapons systems and doctrine to account for the threat that is described.
Given the timescale of weapons development and force generation, it means that as of right now, the only reasonable position to take is to consider a prospect where the US has successfully frontloaded the western pacific with long range strike weapons, and to consider what types of systems and capabilities the PLA would require to achieve their geopolitical goals in that context.
That's actually something which has been considered in one of the other threads about the topic, earlier this year.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
Yukiolweipqled51 has been permanently banned under the auspices of the established precedent demonstrated by other moderators in the past, that I am now naming the "sleepystudent amendment". Carry on.
www.sinodefenceforum.com
You're assuming the US has the industrial capacity to produce long range strike weapons in a quantity that would be necessary to alter the balance of power in the western pacific. How long do you estimate it would take to procure these long range strike weapons?
Throughout this previous discussion over the last few pages there was never a number of long range strike weapons that has been floated.
I think there's kind of a problem.
Which is that since we're basically only talking about what the US could be fielding in the future (5-10 years or more).
But what about China and the PLA??
For one we can already glimpse at some developments, but one I think is very crucial is that of computing and AI, in which we got various articles sourcing papers on say AI helping saltelites locate carriers, AI helping hypersonics to hit moving targets etc.
I honestly expect the complexity as well as the strength of various reconnaissance systems to increase, but also stuff like hypersonic weapons (they might very well be able to target slower moving planes like AEW) and air defense (whether it be bigger network of say airborne drones or balloons with anti-air/anti-missiles or better accuracy and efficiency of various existing air defense systems from bigger missiles, down to stuff like CIWS and the likes).
Which is that since we're basically only talking about what the US could be fielding in the future (5-10 years or more).
But what about China and the PLA??
For one we can already glimpse at some developments, but one I think is very crucial is that of computing and AI, in which we got various articles sourcing papers on say AI helping saltelites locate carriers, AI helping hypersonics to hit moving targets etc.
I honestly expect the complexity as well as the strength of various reconnaissance systems to increase, but also stuff like hypersonic weapons (they might very well be able to target slower moving planes like AEW) and air defense (whether it be bigger network of say airborne drones or balloons with anti-air/anti-missiles or better accuracy and efficiency of various existing air defense systems from bigger missiles, down to stuff like CIWS and the likes).
Remember that if the US wants to front-load strike forces in the Western Pacific, these forces will be vulnerable to being wiped out in a surprise first strike. Plus the US is reliant on basing these forces mainly on non-US territory.
If any red lines are crossed, I expect the Chinese response would be:
1. targeted economic sanctions like we saw with the response to THAAD in Korea and the Chinese fishermen that Japan arrested. China is large enough to impose such sanctions at little cost to itself and it may even work out as a net economic positive for China if it results in more domestic production instead of imports.
2. or an increased military or paramilitary training tempo, designed to exhaust the opposing side's aircraft and ships, like we see in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with Japan.
And given the prevailing view that China could become far larger than the US (from an economic and military perspective) in the coming decades, it makes more sense for countries to hedge against this scenario rather than go completely with the US and host offensive missiles and aircraft. And from the Chinese perspective, China should be content with neutrality from their neighbours because if China grows to become 3x larger than the USA and spends more on the military, there is no way that the US can maintain a credible military posture in the Western Pacific. The other thing to note is the current generation of Chinese leaders were forged through the experiences of the Cultural Revolution. But they will eventually be replaced with a softer 80s generation and then an even softer generation who grew up as millenials.
Anyway, so I expect any US long-range weapons would be confined to operating from a limited number of bases (eg. Guam, Wake Island, Alaska, Australia, Hawaii) and naval platforms. That reduces potential numbers of US offensive weapons substantially. It also increases the range requirements for US weapons to hit China and therefore the cost of such weapons.
My gut tells me the likely number of long-range US weapons, platforms and bases would be manageable for China.
The main thing would be for China to:
1. double-down on its hypersonic/ballistic missile programme targeting any US forces within the 1st and 2nd Island Chains
2. also work on systems to extend the defence perimeter to 5000-6000km from China. That would be through introducing systems like the H-20 stealth bomber, SS(G)Ns and longer-ranged missiles. That means bases in Wake, Alaska and Northern Australia are now in range. It also means the Suez Canal, Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea could be covered. The Persian Gulf can already be covered with the DF-26.
3. focus on smaller, distributed weapons systems (like large numbers of simple low-cost UCAVs)
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