why does it matter that Paparo is putting a brave face out there for some thing he obviously knows is not possible?
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
- Thread starter SEAD
- Start date
Hi SDF. I've put together a compilation of Patchwork's posts/comments that I could find. I'm sharing it in this thread because much of it is relevant here, although it also includes content beyond just WESTPAC HIC.
I posted it to my Reddit profile as I couldn't think of a better place to post such a compilation. I did try sharing it on LCD but the mods there took issue with it due to Patch doxxing someone in the past. I'm not interested in the drama—just want to share quality PLA content as I think much of it is very educational.
Some of his comments in this forum are still accessible due to being quoted by others. You just need to search for them.
Anyway, enjoy and I hope you find it useful
I posted it to my Reddit profile as I couldn't think of a better place to post such a compilation. I did try sharing it on LCD but the mods there took issue with it due to Patch doxxing someone in the past. I'm not interested in the drama—just want to share quality PLA content as I think much of it is very educational.
Some of his comments in this forum are still accessible due to being quoted by others. You just need to search for them.
Anyway, enjoy and I hope you find it useful
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Someone screenshot all those articles and store them in our SDF archives! Quick!
Lmao, that acronym list must have taken some time. Nice
This is invaluable
most of these are posts from 3 years ago, assuming it takes about a year to compile studies, analysis etc. I would say they describe the facts as patchwork perceives it in around 2019. situation should have changed fairly drastically since then.
万年炎帝 outlines a possible US CONEMP for a 2028 Taiwan war, and how US forces can survive A2AD. In short, CSGs are kept at large standoffs at boundaries of DF-26 range and used as escorts for bomber sorties from Aus & CONUS, in a standoff strike focused approach. Curious what people's thoughts are for how specifically PLA can counter such a strategy.
Keeping carriers outside ASBM range is something I've seen floated by US sources too, although one believed that some naval forces might operate in the 1IC in cooperation with the island-based US Army and USMC assets, albeit with the admission that these forces will be essentially sacrificial because of China's superiority in the 1IC. On another note about the post, taking into account local politics, I think it is unlikely any such US ground forces will operate in the Ryukyus, because Japan is already positioning Type 12 ASM batteries on some of those islands. Such US forces would be in the Philippines.
I think it has both pros and cons (for the US):
Pros:
1. US can mass its firepower by striking landing PLA troops, rather than trying to hit targets everywhere (SCS + even coastal mainland) which both causes a shrink in salvo size and has escalation risks.
2. By relying solely on long-range strike assets to hit PLA troops, high-end equipment like 5th gen fighters and destroyers do not have to contend with their Chinese counterparts for the most part.
Cons:
1. US will be launching against a select number of locations at a single time, which means the PLA will have a much easier time identifying an incoming attack and them concentrating defenses against it.
2. The US is basically abandoning Taiwan to unopposed PLA bombardment. This has political costs and might raise eyebrows in military circles, as they will be "itching to fight" so to speak. US thinking about modern warfare emphasizes fighting the enemy as soon as possible, not waiting for some "decisive battle."
I think at least in theory, such a strategy weighs in China's favor. Part of the reason Russian cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure have been so successful is not salvo size, but simply that Ukraine doesn't have enough air defense assets to cover the entire country at all, let alone in meaningful numbers. In contrast, a landing beach would be very small and a very dense (temporary) air defense network could be created around it.
Apart from this, other PLA actions to counter this would best be hinged on SSNs. At least until the Taiwan ground operation has proceeded to the point where land-based fighters can begin operating from bases in Taiwan, the carriers would best be used to maintain constant coverage on the Pacific-facing side of the island. Increases in the PLAAF tanker fleet would change this calculus. If land-based fighters were sufficient to provide coverage of Taiwan itself, carriers (by this I mean Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian: not expecting Type 004s by 2028) might then be deployed to provide distant air coverage.
Something to note is that in US circles, keeping naval forces outside of ASBM range is not just a means of keeping naval forces safe, but a strategy for a "distant blockade" of China. This post is only considering how the PLA would counter that strategy as it pertains to ensuring the success of a Taiwan landing operation, not destroying US naval forces after the landing operation is over.
The counter is simple, but not easy. If the US is tacitly concedes FIC basing due to the threat of PLARF fires rendering them not viable, then it falls to PLAAF+PLAN to secure superiority or even supremacy in the air/sea domains they have vacated. At that point, PLARF has already done its job and compelled US forces to operate suboptimally from greater distances with longer transits and fewer sorties and so forth. They have created an advantage, and it falls to the other branches to exploit it.
Naturally that requires the proper aircraft and ships and so forth to achieve, which is probably why we see development of stuff like J-36 and 004 and sundry platforms designed to fight farther away from the mainland.