1. They didn't attempt a shootdown or anything in response to multiple west side MALE drones and fighters flying right up to their airspace. What are they really gonna do about the east side in international waters?
2. They aren't Russia or North Korea which have actually shot down and captured enemy ships and planes that violate their borders. Taiwan didn't respond to a FPV drone in their own base or a ballistic missile overflight.
This current discussion is in a situation of active wartime/conflict, not during peacetime, see #9952 and then #9972.
But we don't need to track Taiwan's population, we need to track military systems trying to be sneaky. They're not tied to population - they may avoid it, they may pay no attention to it, they may actively use it as human shields.
Current trend v drones is either 'big' systems(which are indeed observable, though there are options) or 'small' options, including ambush/loitering SAMs or drones. Both can be launched from who knows where, they have literally zero launch footprint ... and depending on solutions, they may have near zero detectable profile after launch. This is area where i think we should stop, as it will turn discussion into advices.
Basically, IMHO, reliable tracking of Taiwanese systems from slant observation is function of peacetime sloopiness. It will be more complicated between opening of hostilities and until there's firm and final DEAD. Peacetime military can not survive long enough and be destroyed at their quarters anyways - but this is indeed hopium. It's better to assume opponent doing his homework.
I agree with your thinking, but I also think you're focusing on the "continuous AEWC over Taiwan" part too much in terms of the way that the PLA would act against similar Shahed/Harpy pattern drones from Taiwan.
Obviously it would of course be multilayered.
In early wartime:
- Strike known caches/sites/launch positions of such drones (acknowledging that they are relatively mobile and low profile, but we are assuming pre-war PLA strategic intelligence has done its job)
- Surveil the majority of Taiwan's northern, western and southern approaches with overlapping direct LOS AEWC which will also enable some degree of coverage to the eastern side airspace of Taiwan (with only minor small valleys of lack of coverage due to obstruction of the centre ridge), to enable tracking of any launched Shahed/Harpy pattern drones early on in their flight profile (as well as other relevant aerial targets of course) alongside other air and naval and ground long range sensors, to cue and provide tracks for assets that can do interception of said drones in their midcourse flight
- Assets cued by above will contribute to midcourse flight interception, thinning the salvos.
- Closer in defenses will be cued to defend against whatever is left.
In later wartime, as ROC IADS is degraded, the above defense strategy would of course be complemented by:
- Ongoing close in MALE/HALE UAVs providing ISR and early detection of launches and detection of popup targets and to eliminate such launchers that emerge.
- Further identification and degradation of remaining Shahed/Harpy caches as well as their identified preferred launch vehicle types.
Given the above and the overall balance of fires and ISR (and accompanying air, sea and missile forces), it's not hugely controversial to say that the ROC military probably wouldn't be able to launch very large coordinated salvos of Shahed/Harpy pattern drones beyond maybe the early phases of a conflict, and even those large salvos would be facing a fairly well equipped air defense picture at their midcourse and terminal flight profile phases.
As far as areas to work on for the PLA in terms of countering Shahed/Harpy pattern drones, the existing GBAD efforts like HQ-15 with its gun and small SAMs are a major step in the right direction for ground based assets, and proliferation of such systems (and even similar systems like 625, HQ-13) in a networked manner makes sense.
Aerial assets is slightly different, as there would be a requirement for a weapon similar to APKWS which enables carriage of a large magazine capacity, low cost, anti-air weapon against low performance systems. A PLA equivalent to APKWS, or say an air launched version of the small SAM of HQ-15, could be a solution, and is not technically challenging but would require procurement and recognize that fixed wing aircraft would need this as part of their mission.
Giving naval vessels a more economic counter Shahed/Harpy system would be common sense too -- e.g.: a pair of HQ-15 turrets (with the 35mm gun and the small SAMs and FCRs) amidships of 055s and 052Ds could be a robust way of giving a much more economical way of dealing with such threats rather than having to waste a HQ-10 or let alone a HQ-16 or HQ-9, and to have something more than only a gun CIWS and main DP gun as the counter air systems with "greater magazine size".
