PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

[FairAndUnbiased]

Near=over? Of course they'll get shoot down, that's within island airspace.
But no, you don't need to bring SAMs over to shot down MALE - not only they're there in the first place, you don't need big SAMs within LOS for the job. Especially in uninterrupted peacetime sensory network.
Basically it'll do nothing but provoke hostilities in a rather strange manner(obvious wronggul act getting drones destroyed); there are better ways to start a conflict.

1. They didn't attempt a shootdown or anything in response to multiple west side MALE drones and fighters flying right up to their airspace. What are they really gonna do about the east side in international waters?

2. They aren't Russia or North Korea which have actually shot down and captured enemy ships and planes that violate their borders. Taiwan didn't respond to a FPV drone in their own base or a ballistic missile overflight.

 

[AndrewS]

（1）continuous AWACS coverage is difficult, unless done from space. The problem with Space is of course that in direct high end combat, space itself is a target, and LEO AMTI(important, vulnerable and expensive) is first candidate for personal attention. I am also a bit sceptical how well 1st installments of this tech will really be able to detect small low altitude targets.
For air: Taiwan is a big island with big shadow zone established by central mountains(shadows) and cities, as well as SAM threat and EW interference. Drones are also small, low RCS targets flying over clutter.
My take is you'll need to have ~2 KJ-3000 class aircraft on orbits behind Taiwan to really make the air picture there crystal clear. This isn't possible at the moment. It's also dangerous. KJ-500As can work as a substitute, but they're are troublesome from multiple points of view for the task. KJ-600...count me sceptical for effeciency of maritime LB AEW for the specific task over land.
（2）
Yes, but drone swarms don't quite counter other launches this way ... drone swarms are also attritable.
（3）
Yes, though to be fair it won't take too long to come up with drones fighting back. It already happened, but got delayed by starlink adventures over Ukraine. It's going to be straighforward within next few years, but going down the line situation will shift.

Ukraine actually has strategic depth, so the Russians have no air cover or airborne surveillance over the vast majority of Ukrainian territory. Ukraine can also resupply and maintain an industry to produce defensive systems, but Taiwan will be blockaded and cut off

In comparison, over 80% of Taiwan's population (and presumably industry/military) is within 30km of a thin coastal strip facing China. And all of Taiwan can be reached with 100km ranged glide bombs launched safely offshore. These distances also allow for constant surveillance.

This means that every Taiwanese system used to defend against Shaheeds can be attacked. And they have to reveal themselves when defending.

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We also now see Shaheeds powered by small jet engines, which aren't expensive. Speed increases to 500km/h which negates many defensive measures.

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Also consider that with control of the air, China will also start deploying its own $1000 drones over Taiwan. So targeting will be down to the level of individual soldiers located on Taiwan.

 

[Gloire_bb]

Ukraine actually has strategic depth, so the Russians have no air cover or airborne surveillance over the vast majority of Ukrainian territory.

In comparison, over 80% of Taiwan's population (and presumably industry/military) is within 30km of a thin coastal strip facing China. All of Taiwan can be reached with 100km ranged glide bombs launched safely offshore. These distances also allow for constant surveillance

This means that every Taiwanese system used to defend against Shaheeds can be attacked. And they have to reveal themselves when defending.

But we don't need to track Taiwan's population, we need to track military systems trying to be sneaky. They're not tied to population - they may avoid it, they may pay no attention to it, they may actively use it as human shields.
Current trend v drones is either 'big' systems(which are indeed observable, though there are options) or 'small' options, including ambush/loitering SAMs or drones. Both can be launched from who knows where, they have literally zero launch footprint ... and depending on solutions, they may have near zero detectable profile after launch. This is area where i think we should stop, as it will turn discussion into advices.

Basically, IMHO, reliable tracking of Taiwanese systems from slant observation is function of peacetime sloopiness. It will be more complicated between opening of hostilities and until there's firm and final DEAD. Peacetime military can not survive long enough and be destroyed at their quarters anyways - but this is indeed hopium. It's better to assume opponent doing his homework, even when at heart you don't expect him to. Caution is a rewarded trait for a planner risking someone else's lives.

 

[Blitzo]

1. They didn't attempt a shootdown or anything in response to multiple west side MALE drones and fighters flying right up to their airspace. What are they really gonna do about the east side in international waters?

2. They aren't Russia or North Korea which have actually shot down and captured enemy ships and planes that violate their borders. Taiwan didn't respond to a FPV drone in their own base or a ballistic missile overflight.

This current discussion is in a situation of active wartime/conflict, not during peacetime, see #9952 and then #9972.

But we don't need to track Taiwan's population, we need to track military systems trying to be sneaky. They're not tied to population - they may avoid it, they may pay no attention to it, they may actively use it as human shields.
Current trend v drones is either 'big' systems(which are indeed observable, though there are options) or 'small' options, including ambush/loitering SAMs or drones. Both can be launched from who knows where, they have literally zero launch footprint ... and depending on solutions, they may have near zero detectable profile after launch. This is area where i think we should stop, as it will turn discussion into advices.

Basically, IMHO, reliable tracking of Taiwanese systems from slant observation is function of peacetime sloopiness. It will be more complicated between opening of hostilities and until there's firm and final DEAD. Peacetime military can not survive long enough and be destroyed at their quarters anyways - but this is indeed hopium. It's better to assume opponent doing his homework.

I agree with your thinking, but I also think you're focusing on the "continuous AEWC over Taiwan" part too much in terms of the way that the PLA would act against similar Shahed/Harpy pattern drones from Taiwan.
Obviously it would of course be multilayered.
In early wartime:
- Strike known caches/sites/launch positions of such drones (acknowledging that they are relatively mobile and low profile, but we are assuming pre-war PLA strategic intelligence has done its job)
- Surveil the majority of Taiwan's northern, western and southern approaches with overlapping direct LOS AEWC which will also enable some degree of coverage to the eastern side airspace of Taiwan (with only minor small valleys of lack of coverage due to obstruction of the centre ridge), to enable tracking of any launched Shahed/Harpy pattern drones early on in their flight profile (as well as other relevant aerial targets of course) alongside other air and naval and ground long range sensors, to cue and provide tracks for assets that can do interception of said drones in their midcourse flight
- Assets cued by above will contribute to midcourse flight interception, thinning the salvos.
- Closer in defenses will be cued to defend against whatever is left.

In later wartime, as ROC IADS is degraded, the above defense strategy would of course be complemented by:
- Ongoing close in MALE/HALE UAVs providing ISR and early detection of launches and detection of popup targets and to eliminate such launchers that emerge.
- Further identification and degradation of remaining Shahed/Harpy caches as well as their identified preferred launch vehicle types.


Given the above and the overall balance of fires and ISR (and accompanying air, sea and missile forces), it's not hugely controversial to say that the ROC military probably wouldn't be able to launch very large coordinated salvos of Shahed/Harpy pattern drones beyond maybe the early phases of a conflict, and even those large salvos would be facing a fairly well equipped air defense picture at their midcourse and terminal flight profile phases.


As far as areas to work on for the PLA in terms of countering Shahed/Harpy pattern drones, the existing GBAD efforts like HQ-15 with its gun and small SAMs are a major step in the right direction for ground based assets, and proliferation of such systems (and even similar systems like 625, HQ-13) in a networked manner makes sense.

Aerial assets is slightly different, as there would be a requirement for a weapon similar to APKWS which enables carriage of a large magazine capacity, low cost, anti-air weapon against low performance systems. A PLA equivalent to APKWS, or say an air launched version of the small SAM of HQ-15, could be a solution, and is not technically challenging but would require procurement and recognize that fixed wing aircraft would need this as part of their mission.

Giving naval vessels a more economic counter Shahed/Harpy system would be common sense too -- e.g.: a pair of HQ-15 turrets (with the 35mm gun and the small SAMs and FCRs) amidships of 055s and 052Ds could be a robust way of giving a much more economical way of dealing with such threats rather than having to waste a HQ-10 or let alone a HQ-16 or HQ-9, and to have something more than only a gun CIWS and main DP gun as the counter air systems with "greater magazine size".

 

[Gloire_bb]

Given the above and the overall balance of fires and ISR (and accompanying air, sea and missile forces), it's not hugely controversial to say that the ROC military probably wouldn't be able to launch very large coordinated salvos of Shahed/Harpy pattern drones beyond maybe the early phases of a conflict, and even those large salvos would be facing a fairly well equipped air defense picture at their midcourse and terminal flight profile phases.

That's likely, though honestly hard to be 100% sure. Shahed footprint can be high if nation doesn't cares(Russia doing fvckyou fixed fortified droneports, which cost more to bomb than to operate). It also can be very low (Ukraine/Hamas/Iraqi resistance, launching drone beds or individual drones from random fields or effectively....anywhere).

Militaries of the world often try to dissapoint our faith in humanity, but positivist approach assumes that humans can learn from others. It's for example visible how Iranian launches were highest in the beginning(as were their losses), then launches(and launcher losses) fallen to the bottom, then launches started growing without corresponding increase in launcher losses.
Why? Initial Epsteinian sortie surge winded out, MALEs took significant attrition(at this point Israeli/US ISR attrition is significant - for Israel it's substantial period, for CENTCOM - they need to pull in resources from other theaters).
Granted, part of it is rather dated approach to stand in observation (vulnerable MALEs). But those are objective factors, and Iranian lesson(of how an underdog can fight even when its air defenses are absolutely technologically suppressed) won't be missed by Taiwan.

Yes, of course Iran is order of magnitude larger than Taiwan. Taiwan has its own advantages, however, beginning from favourable ecosystem(tropical rainforest - mountaines - settlements - remote islands), having actual air force, unsanctioned economy and likely willing allies. It isn't black and white.

Same is true for PLA, which will also be learning from the middle east. And net result of all the differences(place, opponents, different point of learning from contemporary warfare) will likely be different equilibrum from either Ukraine or Iran. Will it be in Chinese favor?
Likely and hopefully, but this is a race of adaption, rather than set deal of guaranteed superiority...

 

[Blitzo]

That's likely, though honestly hard to be 100% sure. Shahed footprint can be high if nation doesn't cares(Russia doing fvckyou fixed fortified droneports, which cost more to bomb than to operate). It also can be very low (Ukraine/Hamas/Iraqi resistance, launching drone beds or individual drones from random fields or effectively....anywhere).

Militaries of the world often try to dissapoint our faith in humanity, but positivist approach assumes that humans can learn from others. It's for example visible how Iranian launches were highest in the beginning(as were their losses), then launches(and launcher losses) fallen to the bottom, then launches started growing without corresponding increase in launcher losses.
Why? Initial Epsteinian sortie surge winded out, MALEs took significant attrition(at this point Israeli/US ISR attrition is significant - for Israel it's substantial period, for CENTCOM - they need to pull in resources from other theaters).
Granted, part of it is rather dated approach to stand in observation (vulnerable MALEs). But those are objective factors, and Iranian lesson(of how an underdog can fight even when its air defenses are absolutely technologically suppressed) won't be missed by Taiwan.

Yes, of course Iran is order of magnitude larger than Taiwan. Taiwan has its own advantages, however, beginning from favourable ecosystem(tropical rainforest - mountaines - settlements - remote islands), having actual air force, unsanctioned economy and likely willing allies. It isn't black and white.

Same is true for PLA, which will also be learning from the middle east. And net result of all the differences(place, opponents, different point of learning from contemporary warfare) will likely be different equilibrum from either Ukraine or Iran. Will it be in Chinese favor?
Likely and hopefully, but this is a race of adaption, rather than set deal of guaranteed superiority...

Yes, it is hard to be "100%" sure, but unless we are greatly misreading the competency of each side's capabilities and dispositions, it is also quite far from the "who knows, it's a tossup" that you are conveying in regards to the topic of "how viable is it for ROC to use Shahed/Harpy drones in a persistent manner like Russia and Iran have been".
The huge difference in geographic size, the difference in geographic isolation, the difference in geographical distance, and the difference in relevant fieldable capabilities (not just tactical fighters, but also naval forces, GBAD, AEW&C, ISR, EW, and relevant in theater fires), are balances which significantly work against Taiwan's favour, relative to say Iran or Russia when contending in their respective scenarios.
(The difference in geography itself cannot be understated, the size of Taiwan versus Iran versus Russia or Ukraine makes any comparison between them almost entirely moot to the point that a comparison is probably less useful than considering them on their own merits)

Taiwan's possession of an actual air force is arguably a net drag on their capabilities given their short lifespan, and the economic situation and "willing allies" is irrelevant to the actual discussion of the "Taiwan Shahed/Harpy strategy" because if their economy and willing allies remain a relevant factor in a Taiwan conflict then there are way bigger fish to fry anyhow.

All of which is to say, in context of their respective balance of forces and geographical dispositions, the prospect faced by Taiwan in using a Shahed/Harpy strategy versus the PRC, is far less viable than that of Iran using the strategy versus US/Israel/GCC, or that of Russia vs Ukraine.


That said, perhaps myself and others are a bit presumptuous -- I assumed over the many years of this scenario being gamed out, that you are accepting that in event of a Taiwan conflict that the ROCAF, ROCN would essentially cease to exist by day 2-3 (if not earlier) with the bulk of ROC IADS being degraded by day 4-5, in context of multi-domain PLA overmatch in qualitative and quantitative manners.
To be clear, it is in that above context and presumed balance of power that I am discussing the prospect of the whole "Taiwan Shahed/Harpy strategy" in. If you are going into this with different operating assumptions, then as always it is those upstream assumptions which matter the most.

 

[Ringsword]

What is the point of seizing the main Japanese Islands? There are no natural resources and have a hostile population. Taking them over means you are responsible for the welfare of the inhabitants. Just deindustrialize the place, smash all infrastructure and leave them be.

The "Finlandization" of Japan is more realistic with ONLY a coast guard no JMSDF/offensive weapons of any of any type-we'll have to see what happens and hopefully a golden opportunity for China presents itself.

 

[Ringsword]

“Turnkey” is not as turnkey as it sounds. Even if you have all the components ready you still need to conduct both missile testing and nuclear detonation testing to make sure everything works properly. You aren’t building up a stockpile before you know for sure your device design isn’t prone to being a dud. The moment any of that testing happens Japan is all but announcing they are trying to speed run to a nuke, which will trigger a geopolitical response from China and the Koreas. So long as China is committed to preventing Japan from getting a nuke by all means necessary Japan isn’t getting a nuke. China’s ability to respond at the moment Japan initiates a test is too prompt, and won’t even involve tail risk of conflagration to regional war if the US is no longer part of the Asia Pacific theater. People should stop handwringing about nuclear Japan scenarios.

Have you/we considered that USA just might give the Japanese a totally reliable warhead design -W-XX series that they can build as long as they have plutonium?First strike time by PLARF

 

[latenlazy]

Have you/we considered that USA just might give the Japanese a totally reliable warhead design -W-XX series that they can build as long as they have plutonium?First strike time by PLARF

By that same token Russia and China could just give Cuba and Mexico nukes. If the US wants to break the nuclear taboo the long run consequences aren’t good for US interests. They don’t care about Japan so much that they’d welcome a world where their own neighborhood will be filled with nuclear threats. China also somewhat regrets helping Pakistan with nukes.

Either way though even a proven hand me down design would require testing to demonstrate successful assembly. There’s, again, no situation where Japan can reach the threshold without throwing up red flags well before they have enough of an arsenal for deterrence.

 

[montyp165]

That's likely, though honestly hard to be 100% sure. Shahed footprint can be high if nation doesn't cares(Russia doing fvckyou fixed fortified droneports, which cost more to bomb than to operate). It also can be very low (Ukraine/Hamas/Iraqi resistance, launching drone beds or individual drones from random fields or effectively....anywhere).

Militaries of the world often try to dissapoint our faith in humanity, but positivist approach assumes that humans can learn from others. It's for example visible how Iranian launches were highest in the beginning(as were their losses), then launches(and launcher losses) fallen to the bottom, then launches started growing without corresponding increase in launcher losses.
Why? Initial Epsteinian sortie surge winded out, MALEs took significant attrition(at this point Israeli/US ISR attrition is significant - for Israel it's substantial period, for CENTCOM - they need to pull in resources from other theaters).
Granted, part of it is rather dated approach to stand in observation (vulnerable MALEs). But those are objective factors, and Iranian lesson(of how an underdog can fight even when its air defenses are absolutely technologically suppressed) won't be missed by Taiwan.

Yes, of course Iran is order of magnitude larger than Taiwan. Taiwan has its own advantages, however, beginning from favourable ecosystem(tropical rainforest - mountaines - settlements - remote islands), having actual air force, unsanctioned economy and likely willing allies. It isn't black and white.

Same is true for PLA, which will also be learning from the middle east. And net result of all the differences(place, opponents, different point of learning from contemporary warfare) will likely be different equilibrum from either Ukraine or Iran. Will it be in Chinese favor?
Likely and hopefully, but this is a race of adaption, rather than set deal of guaranteed superiority...

As I've mentioned before, the moment full scale hostilities break out it will be a fight for unconditional surrender regarding the entirety of the US aligned political order in the Pacific, which is why arguments over concepts of incomplete military superiority over Taiwan is utterly erroneous to the actual prosecution of combat operations, because at that point it's total mobilization/due or die against said grouping. This not only involves securing Taiwan island but also entails the means of advancing across the Pacific towards the continental US, which is why the old Pacific island battlefields such as Iwo Jima, Kwajalein et al will be major points of contention in the ensuing conflict.