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PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
On a slightly different note, the current Iran conflict has had me thinking about the Japanese nuclear strategy.
To date, my understanding was that Japan was a ‘turnkey’ nuclear power, in that it doesn’t currently have a bomb, but does have sufficient enriched uranium, an advanced ballistics programme, and the technical expertise to assemble a bomb in a relatively short space of time.
That also seemed to be the Iranian approach (albeit with somewhat less enrichment). However it appears that enrichment was set back in the Midnight Hammer first strike, and so far they’ve been unable to convert what they have to a functioning bomb while under fire.
If China were to succeed in a Taiwan/Pacific conflict, it would likely result in the US being forced out of the region, which in turn may precipitate a Japanese dash for the bomb in the rebalancing.
Given that, should China be factoring in strikes to disarm the Japanese nuclear programme for any Pacific war planning? Is that already a consideration? Or is a nuclear armed Japan in the aftermath not a concern?
Apologies if this cuts too close to ‘nukes’ discussion. To be clear, I’m asking asking about nuclear programmes, not actual use of nuclear weapons in the conflict.
To date, my understanding was that Japan was a ‘turnkey’ nuclear power, in that it doesn’t currently have a bomb, but does have sufficient enriched uranium, an advanced ballistics programme, and the technical expertise to assemble a bomb in a relatively short space of time.
That also seemed to be the Iranian approach (albeit with somewhat less enrichment). However it appears that enrichment was set back in the Midnight Hammer first strike, and so far they’ve been unable to convert what they have to a functioning bomb while under fire.
If China were to succeed in a Taiwan/Pacific conflict, it would likely result in the US being forced out of the region, which in turn may precipitate a Japanese dash for the bomb in the rebalancing.
Given that, should China be factoring in strikes to disarm the Japanese nuclear programme for any Pacific war planning? Is that already a consideration? Or is a nuclear armed Japan in the aftermath not a concern?
Apologies if this cuts too close to ‘nukes’ discussion. To be clear, I’m asking asking about nuclear programmes, not actual use of nuclear weapons in the conflict.
“Turnkey” is not as turnkey as it sounds. Even if you have all the components ready you still need to conduct both missile testing and nuclear detonation testing to make sure everything works properly. You aren’t building up a stockpile before you know for sure your device design isn’t prone to being a dud. The moment any of that testing happens Japan is all but announcing they are trying to speed run to a nuke, which will trigger a geopolitical response from China and the Koreas. So long as China is committed to preventing Japan from getting a nuke by all means necessary Japan isn’t getting a nuke. China’s ability to respond at the moment Japan initiates a test is too prompt, and won’t even involve tail risk of conflagration to regional war if the US is no longer part of the Asia Pacific theater. People should stop handwringing about nuclear Japan scenarios.
Middle East conflict is pulling US assets, including THAAD and Patriot systems, away from East Asia. Given that US forces in Japan and Korea will likely be pulled into a Taiwan contingency, this is great news for a Taiwan contingency as depleting as many East Asia-based US interceptors, missiles, artillery, etc... would reduce US combat readiness for a Taiwan scenario.
China can do the funniest thing right after these air defence batteries are done being transferred.
Message to the Japanese Side: Retreating to its Belligerent and Militarist Past Leads Nowhere but Self-destruction
Question: According to reports, Japan has recently started to field long-range missiles capable of attacking enemy bases. The shooting range of the missile is approximately 1000 kilometers, covering the coastal areas of neighboring countries, and its deployment will be completed within this month. What is your comment on this?
Jiang Bin: For some time now, right-wing forces in Japan have made frequent moves to accelerate remilitarization, including the push to amend the pacifist Constitution, expediting revisions to the three national security documents, and the attempt to alter the three non-nuclear principles. Now, with the planned fielding of long-range offensive weapons whose range far exceeds its territorial boundaries, Japan has completely stripped away its pretense of "exclusively defense-oriented" principle, "passive defense" strategy and "self-defense" policy. This speaks volumes about the neo-militarism in Japan, which has become more than just a perilous tendency, but a very real threat that may wreak havoc to regional peace and security. Let me make it clear to the Japanese side: retreating to its belligerent and militarist past leads nowhere but self-destruction. Should the Japanese side dares to use force to violate China's sovereignty and security, it will only meet a head-on blow and suffer a greater and inevitable defeat.
A few lessons learned from the US Iran and Russia Ukraine conflict, and what I think PLA procurement could improve on.
Existing lessons:
1. Iran's successful strike doctrine. When you need to deliver munitions to contested, distant airspace, drones and ballistic missiles are the way to go. They can also trade well with air defense.
2. What Iran lacks is the ability to defend against missiles, deny airspace and strike distant sea targets. China doesn't have that problem. China has an IADS even stronger than Russia's and J-10, J-16, J-20 to deny airspace.
3. Both Israel and Russia have demonstrated strategic effect using strike fighter airframes like F-15E, Su-34 and Mig-31 launching advanced munitions. Russian strategic bombers have been put on the backburner. US is using B-52s and B-1s but they're just launching standoff cruise missiles. There's little they're doing that a F-15E or F-18E/F can't do.
All of China's strategies have been validated. However, China has a few blind spots that must be addressed:
1. Shahed and FPV copies and counter Shahed and FPV tools need to be tested and integrated with doctrine. Poor Saudi and UAE defense doesn't look good for China.
2. Unmanned surface drones need to be tested and integrated.
3. Radar cued, IR terminal guided SAMs must be built for ambushes against LO targets and in case of radar knockout.
Existing lessons:
1. Iran's successful strike doctrine. When you need to deliver munitions to contested, distant airspace, drones and ballistic missiles are the way to go. They can also trade well with air defense.
2. What Iran lacks is the ability to defend against missiles, deny airspace and strike distant sea targets. China doesn't have that problem. China has an IADS even stronger than Russia's and J-10, J-16, J-20 to deny airspace.
3. Both Israel and Russia have demonstrated strategic effect using strike fighter airframes like F-15E, Su-34 and Mig-31 launching advanced munitions. Russian strategic bombers have been put on the backburner. US is using B-52s and B-1s but they're just launching standoff cruise missiles. There's little they're doing that a F-15E or F-18E/F can't do.
All of China's strategies have been validated. However, China has a few blind spots that must be addressed:
1. Shahed and FPV copies and counter Shahed and FPV tools need to be tested and integrated with doctrine. Poor Saudi and UAE defense doesn't look good for China.
2. Unmanned surface drones need to be tested and integrated.
3. Radar cued, IR terminal guided SAMs must be built for ambushes against LO targets and in case of radar knockout.
I think a key lesson above all is that, at the end of the day, you can't rely on an air-only strategy. At some point you have to send in ground troops to fully pacify an opponent's base of operations and finish the fight.
Addendum: therefore, do not start the fight at all unless and until you are ready, willing, and able to send in ground troops of sufficient quantity and quality to pacify all areas that your opponent(s) control.
This may explains why
1. China hasn't made any kinetic moves on Taiwan yet, despite some people saying that a blockade would be easy, because a blockade by sea or air will be insufficient and ground troops will have to be sent in, and that's going to be a lot of causalities, and
2. China got really angry when Japan said that it may participate militarily in a Taiwan strait contingency, because it drastically expands the land area that the PLA will need to pacify to fully resolve a Taiwan contingency in China's favor
I'd expect the field of action to be at no less a scale than the old WWII Pacific theater for all intents and purposes, but the drone tech for ground units massively expedites scaleability of said forces in a much shorter time frame than training up new troops, plus automated resupply ships and aerial drones would make sustainability of any such fielded force much easier to boot. That's why I say the advent of both ground as well as aerial combat drones to be a true game changer of strategic scale.