PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

I've been thinking about this topic a bit due to all the Taiwan incursions from the past year. This nbc article seems to indicate that US military already feels like they are unable to stop a successful Chinese invasion.

I think Japan will definitely make its air bases available to USAF in the event of a protracted war. Due to the events of the past 2 years, China is now seen more than ever as a threat to the current world order. That's how the Quad and the AUKUS came about. This really isn't about Taiwan anymore. It's about stopping a growing China. Even though China will not initiate attack on Japan. It seems like the Japanese think otherwise. Not sure why. Maybe they are concerned about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. IMO, having control of Taiwan is far more strategically important for PLAN than anything else. That gives PLAN an unobstructed access to Pacific Ocean.

The recent incursions to me seem to be a great way for PLAAF to train and sustain large aircraft group movements across long distance and into ocean. This is kind of like Gulf of Aden expeditions for PLAN. Through these incursions, they can also test out how well they can suppress Taiwanese air defense. Based on what we've seen, it doesn't take too long for ROCAF to surrender and not intercept. I would imagine these type of sustained incursions will keep getting larger and longer over the next few years and might involve the navy too. We are not at that point yet. So clearly, they are not ready for any type of invasion. Over time, you might get to a point where Taiwanese military just get completely demoralized and realize they have no hope of surviving the first days of attack. Ideally, the best case scenario for China is a Taiwan that believes it can no longer resist a unification and seeking for some type of settlement where China allows them to keep their government and way of life but can use all of their military bases and represent them internationally. Although, what happened in HK is a big red sign for Taiwan. Aside from that, I think there is greater willingness to access this in Taiwan than what Americans think. When I traveled to Taiwan several years ago, I found society there to be far closer to Southern China than HK or Singapore or maybe even North China. It was eye opening to me how many people already feel a re-unification is inevitable.

So, let's say we don't get there, what will happen? I think PLAAF will start things off with their typical incursions and war games. Very soon, they will tire out ROCAF and face limited interception. Once that happens, PLAAF can easily handle the few F-16Vs in the air and then start massive SEAD campaign and destroy most of Taiwan air defense. By then, PLAAF would already know how ROCAF handle an invasion and all the radar signatures would be recorded by EW aircraft. It would be pretty easy for J-16D and J-20s to jam/confuse a very obsolete Taiwanese air defense system and destroy them. It would also be pretty easy for the air and naval bases to be destroyed by attacking aircraft and all the missiles they have. After this, PLA would enjoy full air dominance over Taiwan. I think this will happen in the first few hours. The primary Taiwanese warships would be in danger of getting sunk by Chinese diesel submarines. All the smaller boats would be in trouble against JH-7A since they have limited air defense. After that, I think Taiwan is likely to just surrender. I read stuff where US generals think Taiwan need to do guerilla warfare against invading Chinese forces. That's just not realistic. It's far more like for a demoralized Taiwan military to just give up.

Of course, the question is what if US does still decide to come and free Taiwan. That's why I think PLA is not ready for this. They'd need to wait until they have a decisive advantage in the number of J-20s against F-35s. Another thing is the availability of H-20s. While Chinese missiles can initially take out US air bases in Guam and Okinawa. What they need is a stealth bomber that can come and drop large amount of less expensive payload to keep the air bases unusable for an extended period of time. And yes, that would apply to any air bases in Japan that might host USAF. If we end up with just a battle between USN/USMC vs PLAAF/PLAN, then China will have a very large quantitative advantage along with a host of diesel submarines awaiting carrier groups. That seems like a much friendly scenario for China. I'm not sure American commanders are willing to risk carriers like that. If PLAAF shows that it can sustain large group of aircraft operations, USN would have to be concerned that their own F-35 wing will get worn out over a few days and be unable to launch defense. PLAAF could outlast USN/USMC even if more J-20s/J-16s are lost than F-35s and super hornets.

How a potential kinetic attack might play out is very likely to be different to how many people think. If Japan, or other countries, make their facilitates available to U.S. in the event of a protracted war, China will likely strike them. The calculus is not about number of aircraft, ships or land units. That is too simplistic and doesn’t understand how China approaches conflict. I have alluded to some of this in previous briefings, with the penultimate briefing to be presented shortly.

tphuang said:

I've been thinking about this topic a bit due to all the Taiwan incursions from the past year. This nbc article seems to indicate that US military already feels like they are unable to stop a successful Chinese invasion.

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I think Japan will definitely make its air bases available to USAF in the event of a protracted war. Due to the events of the past 2 years, China is now seen more than ever as a threat to the current world order. That's how the Quad and the AUKUS came about. This really isn't about Taiwan anymore. It's about stopping a growing China. Even though China will not initiate attack on Japan. It seems like the Japanese think otherwise. Not sure why. Maybe they are concerned about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. IMO, having control of Taiwan is far more strategically important for PLAN than anything else. That gives PLAN an unobstructed access to Pacific Ocean.

The recent incursions to me seem to be a great way for PLAAF to train and sustain large aircraft group movements across long distance and into ocean. This is kind of like Gulf of Aden expeditions for PLAN. Through these incursions, they can also test out how well they can suppress Taiwanese air defense. Based on what we've seen, it doesn't take too long for ROCAF to surrender and not intercept. I would imagine these type of sustained incursions will keep getting larger and longer over the next few years and might involve the navy too. We are not at that point yet. So clearly, they are not ready for any type of invasion. Over time, you might get to a point where Taiwanese military just get completely demoralized and realize they have no hope of surviving the first days of attack. Ideally, the best case scenario for China is a Taiwan that believes it can no longer resist a unification and seeking for some type of settlement where China allows them to keep their government and way of life but can use all of their military bases and represent them internationally. Although, what happened in HK is a big red sign for Taiwan. Aside from that, I think there is greater willingness to access this in Taiwan than what Americans think. When I traveled to Taiwan several years ago, I found society there to be far closer to Southern China than HK or Singapore or maybe even North China. It was eye opening to me how many people already feel a re-unification is inevitable.

So, let's say we don't get there, what will happen? I think PLAAF will start things off with their typical incursions and war games. Very soon, they will tire out ROCAF and face limited interception. Once that happens, PLAAF can easily handle the few F-16Vs in the air and then start massive SEAD campaign and destroy most of Taiwan air defense. By then, PLAAF would already know how ROCAF handle an invasion and all the radar signatures would be recorded by EW aircraft. It would be pretty easy for J-16D and J-20s to jam/confuse a very obsolete Taiwanese air defense system and destroy them. It would also be pretty easy for the air and naval bases to be destroyed by attacking aircraft and all the missiles they have. After this, PLA would enjoy full air dominance over Taiwan. I think this will happen in the first few hours. The primary Taiwanese warships would be in danger of getting sunk by Chinese diesel submarines. All the smaller boats would be in trouble against JH-7A since they have limited air defense. After that, I think Taiwan is likely to just surrender. I read stuff where US generals think Taiwan need to do guerilla warfare against invading Chinese forces. That's just not realistic. It's far more like for a demoralized Taiwan military to just give up.

Of course, the question is what if US does still decide to come and free Taiwan. That's why I think PLA is not ready for this. They'd need to wait until they have a decisive advantage in the number of J-20s against F-35s. Another thing is the availability of H-20s. While Chinese missiles can initially take out US air bases in Guam and Okinawa. What they need is a stealth bomber that can come and drop large amount of less expensive payload to keep the air bases unusable for an extended period of time. And yes, that would apply to any air bases in Japan that might host USAF. If we end up with just a battle between USN/USMC vs PLAAF/PLAN, then China will have a very large quantitative advantage along with a host of diesel submarines awaiting carrier groups. That seems like a much friendly scenario for China. I'm not sure American commanders are willing to risk carriers like that. If PLAAF shows that it can sustain large group of aircraft operations, USN would have to be concerned that their own F-35 wing will get worn out over a few days and be unable to launch defense. PLAAF could outlast USN/USMC even if more J-20s/J-16s are lost than F-35s and super hornets.

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Great analysis, regarding air war, I’ve always wondered whether USAF F 22s and 35s that protect American bombers can have the stamina to last several days continuously over long distances given that every sortie will require mid air refueling and tankers will be relatively easy target for PLAAF’s long range missiles.

And off topic, but welcome back.

I think one thing some posters consistently underestimate is just how much economic and manufacturing strength China has.

The US is nominally the most wealthy nation on Earth, but it doesn't have even a fraction of the manufacturing capability of China.

What is "too expensive" for other nations may not be for China. What other nations have we seen build two hospitals in 10 days? What other nation is capable of mobilizing the entire nation to fight covid?

tphuang said:

They'd need to wait until they have a decisive advantage in the number of J-20s against F-35s.

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This feels like a nearly impossible order to fulfill.

The US already has something like 500 f35. And they're adding some 90 more per year.

If china would want to only match the inventory numbers, it'd take 10 years of 140 j20 production per year to achieve that. (That doesn't even take into account time needed to ramp up production to such a level) Such numbers are, however, ludicrous to expect. And even if somehow china did quickly ramp up production, who is to say the US would not increase their production too?
15 or 20 years might feel like a slightly more doable period to pull it off in.

By then the 6th generation is likely to be shaping up. Which is, realistically, the better option for china for catching up. Until then, matching US numbers is unlikely.

And any talk of *decisive advantage* in numbers is even harder to attain. Unrealistically so.

Of course this is just the inventory comparison. Local numbers are more important but those are hard to estimate, due to too many variables. Most people on this forum would not likely agree on a set of such variables either.

SAC said:

How a potential kinetic attack might play out is very likely to be different to how many people think. If Japan, or other countries, make their facilitates available to U.S. in the event of a protracted war, China will likely strike them. The calculus is not about number of aircraft, ships or land units. That is too simplistic and doesn’t understand how China approaches conflict. I have alluded to some of this in previous briefings, with the penultimate briefing to be presented shortly.

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History and international law are clear about this. Supporting one of the warring sides even just logistically makes you a party to the war. There is no scenario the US and even Japanese military bases in Japan are not attacked by China if they are used to support the US operations against China. This is true for even just refueling and intelligence too. China will likely refrain from hitting the Japanese military targets deliberately in that scenario. For example, an airbase without any US combat activity wouldn't be attacked but that's about it.

Totoro said:

This feels like a nearly impossible order to fulfill.

The US already has something like 500 f35. And they're adding some 90 more per year.

If china would want to only match the inventory numbers, it'd take 10 years of 140 j20 production per year to achieve that. (That doesn't even take into account time needed to ramp up production to such a level) Such numbers are, however, ludicrous to expect. And even if somehow china did quickly ramp up production, who is to say the US would not increase their production too?
15 or 20 years might feel like a slightly more doable period to pull it off in.

By then the 6th generation is likely to be shaping up. Which is, realistically, the better option for china for catching up. Until then, matching US numbers is unlikely.

And any talk of *decisive advantage* in numbers is even harder to attain. Unrealistically so.

Of course this is just the inventory comparison. Local numbers are more important but those are hard to estimate, due to too many variables. Most people on this forum would not likely agree on a set of such variables either.

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I don't think so.

The question is what numbers are available locally in the short term. All air bases on the first island chain, even those on second island chain are under threat. The aircraft carriers would be staying farther away for safety. All these limited the number and availability of the USAF/USN aircraft in the conflict zone.

If a protracted war looks likely, China certainly can ramp up their production of aircraft much more. CAC already has four J-20 production lines, with annual rate of about 50. They can build up more lines relatively quickly because this is no longer from 0 to 1. Besides, there will also be the production of J-35, which is very likely to start after 2025.

So China has the geographical and home-court advantage. And, what the US would be fighting against is not Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany in WWII, what being the Arsenal of Democracy. It would be fighting a country of continental size, four times of its population with a much larger industrial base than its own. And what would be the US fighting for? Democracy? Primacy? Revenge for yet another Pearl Harbor? How sustainable will be the US in this fight. I know what China would be fighting for.

I'm talking about, of course, conventional war. Let's not get into the non-conventional one for now; we have already exchange opinions on that before.

Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member James Inhofe (R-Okla.)

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that “Our commanders tell us that by 2025, the Chinese will have more fifth-generation stealth fighters on the front line than we do.” Asked for context, a spokesperson for Inhofe said the information was based on testimony provided by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s commander, now-retired Adm. Philip Davidson, during a March posture testimony.

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Pretty sure they are referring to just Pacific theater. The main question is whether or not PLAAF can take out nearby airbases in the event of a war. That's where H-20 and a VLO fighter bomber (let's call it JH-20) come in. Ballistic/Cruise missiles are probably good enough to make those air bases inoperable in the beginning, but H-20 and VLO fighter bomber are what will keep those air bases inoperable throughout a conflict. It should be a given that if Japan let's USAF use its air bases for F-22/F-35s, those air bases will get bombed. If they can do this, then F-22/F-35As are not options for US military in this case. That changes the picture quite a bit. Although, one should also note the long distance from Japan to the area around Taiwan. A F-22/35A squadron stationed in Honshu would have minimal sortie rate and CAP time vs a F-35C operated from a nearby carrier.

Let's imagine a scenario where USN sense a war is coming and stations 2 carrier group not that far from Taiwan with a third one able to assist in 2 weeks. What are the odds they can keep up the availability of F-35Cs while PLAAF just keep doing their regular incursions and not actually attacking Taiwan. If USN can keep 2 carrier groups near by at all times, they will probably have times where the carrier in place simply does not have full complement of F-35s. At best, I think PLAAF would be dealing with 60 F-35Cs from 3 carrier groups. The other factor to think about here is the availability of F-35Bs. They can operate from shorter runways or USMC LHDs from further away. Even in this case, I think it would be unlikely to see them operate from a place like Okinawa where they'd be under severe pressure. It's hard for me to see them trying to operate F-35Bs from Guam/Japan given the much shorter range of these aircraft. If USMC can deploy 2 or 3 large LHDs close to the theater, maybe they can deploy 50 F-35Bs in support. I'm not sure how many F-35Bs each LHDs can carry. Either way, F-35Bs will not be as effective as F-35Cs due to their shorter range and CAP time. So, I don't think there will be much more than 100 F-35s available in a Taiwan scenario.

by 2028, we could be looking at 400 J-20s in service (100 right now + 6 years of about 50 J-20s per year). The would be pretty numerical advantage against F-35s. J-20s are also likely to have greater range/CAP time than F-35s. We could very well see a scenario where PLAAF simply just wears out F-35s to the point that USN cannot maintain sufficient protection for its carriers.

In reality, I think the likelihood of a full blown war to be pretty small. If China really gets this strong by late 2020s. Taiwan will give up pretty quickly in an invasion. It's unlikely American public will stomach a full blown war if they have to retake Taiwan while facing a huge numerical disadvantage. I think severe economic sanctions and economical warfare are more likely.

tphuang said:

where USN sense a war is coming and stations 2 carrier group not that far from Taiwan with a third one able to assist in 2 weeks. What are the odds they can keep up the availability of F-35Cs while PLAAF just keep doing their regular incursions and not actually attacking Taiwan. If USN can keep 2 carrier groups near by at all times, they will probably have times where the carrier in place simply does not have full complement of F-35s. At best, I think PLAAF would be dealing with 60 F-35Cs from 3 carrier groups

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But why do think that China would engage the US the way the US would like to be engaged?

You talk about the PLAAF going against USN carrier-based F-35C.

I think China's plan is not the PLAAF but the PLARF. Why waste time and precious resources going for costly air-to-air combat when you can sink the carriers by using the PLARF?

tphuang said:

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The main question is whether or not PLAAF can take out nearby airbases in the event of a war. ... Ballistic/Cruise missiles are probably good enough to make those air bases inoperable in the beginning, but H-20 and VLO fighter bomber are what will keep those air bases inoperable throughout a conflict. It should be a given that if Japan let's USAF use its air bases for F-22/F-35s, those air bases will get bombed. If they can do this, then F-22/F-35As are not options for US military in this case. ... A F-22/35A squadron stationed in Honshu would have minimal sortie rate and CAP time vs a F-35C operated from a nearby carrier.

... If USN can keep 2 carrier groups near by at all times, they will probably have times where the carrier in place simply does not have full complement of F-35s. At best, I think PLAAF would be dealing with 60 F-35Cs from 3 carrier groups. ... It's hard for me to see them trying to operate F-35Bs from Guam/Japan given the much shorter range of these aircraft. If USMC can deploy 2 or 3 large LHDs close to the theater, maybe they can deploy 50 F-35Bs in support. ... So, I don't think there will be much more than 100 F-35s available in a Taiwan scenario.

by 2028, we could be looking at 400 J-20s in service (100 right now + 6 years of about 50 J-20s per year). ... We could very well see a scenario where PLAAF simply just wears out F-35s to the point that USN cannot maintain sufficient protection for its carriers.

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The main question is indeed how many bases would be operating for how long, and where, during the entire conflict. But that's a question that no single person can hope to answer. Way too many unknowns. The question goes to both sides, of course.
Just as China would be striking at US/Japanese bases and airports - the US would at the same time be striking at Chinese bases. So both sides would have some issues, to a higher or lesser degree, of getting to operate their planes from the bases optimally placed for Taiwan ops.

One of the unknowns is certainly the timeframe. If one talks about late 2020s, then for example the H-20 and the B-21 are not going to really be part of the equation yet. Only a dozen airframes might be operational. If one talks about mid 2030s, those platforms will be more plentiful, but so will many more other systems and unforeseen changes, compared to today. So even trying to talk about 2030s is really futile.

Sheer number of bomb strikes needed to keep all those airbases/airports on both sides shut down is such that it's questionable if either side would be capable of keeping more than half of those shut down during the conflict.

If one talks about Taiwan theater and the Chinese mainland coastline theaters - Chinese planes would indeed have the benefit of operating close by - which would indeed translate to somewhat higher sortie rates and longer persistence over the battlefield, in missions that require persistence.

If one talks about Chinese planes keeping those bases/airports in Japan shut down - then the situation is reversed. It's China that'd suffer worse sortie rates for those missions and worse coverage.

Indeed, distance from Osaka to southern tip of Taiwan is some 2000 km. Practical A2A combat radius with some minimal time on station (for fighter escort mission for example) of F-35A is some 1400 km (as per LM) That'd surely require one or two in-air refueling sessions somewhere over the Philippine sea. (also lengthening the route to some 2100+ km)

A longer stay mission, for some sort of CAP, is indeed going to very hard to pull off from such distances. Two in-air refuelings would likely be needed for those. The same for some strike missions.

Question of tanker availability is also debatable. Some will say there's no chance tankers could survive in Japan, others will say most tankers would get to operate daily. That all depends on how many tankers the US sends to japan, which airports are available for those in Japan, the number chinese missiles capable of reaching upper half of japan, the various air defenses US and Japan would have set up and so on.

Certainly, when it comes to very long range strike missions - China is worse off than US, as its fighter to tanker ratio is much worse. Flying the shortest route from Shanghai to Tokyo is some 1750 km. Of which some 700+ km would be overflying various ground based air defenses and radars on Japan. So, that'd be quite a problematic route to take.

As said, there's just way too many variables. Russian and NK territory is one of them. Overflying those from Jilin province would open up many more routes for China, shorten the range required and complicate matters for the US/JP air defenses. But that variable opens up the whole war to such a butterfly effect of potentially dragging both Koreas into the war, as well as possibly Russia and therefore even the EU into the war. It's a Pandora's box.

Some examples: If 50 US tankers could be successfully operating (out of some higher, nominal number) in Japan every day, servicing fighter jets - that's some 400+ F-35/22 fighter jets getting to fly a sortie with every cycle of those tankers. So, theoretically, if the entire fleet of US tankers available to Japan can, due to various reasons - battle attrition, runways shut down, maintenance - can somehow do as many as 100 sorties distributed during the day, then some 800+ F-35/22 could perform some missions over Taiwan using fairly far away bases in Japan.

Okinawa itself is easiest to keep shut down, but there are many other runways alongside the Ryukyu islands that'd be operating. Keeping all of those shut down is a matter that can't be answered. Some, sure. But all of them, all of the time? Impossible to predict.
Just as the US is unlikely to be able to keep many China's runways shut down, even along the coast. There's just so many of those. While a fair number might be shut down for long periods of time, it's impossible to predict just how many would suffer.

There's so many timeframes to choose from but let's say 2025. Around that time China might have enough in air refueling capability that if 50% of said fleet is available for missions at a given time, some 80 or so flankers might get their range extended by some 500/1000 km (one/two refuelings). China has additional issue of not being able to use their tankers too close to Ryukyu islands, as that'd be too dangerous. But using tankers near the Chinese coastline doesn't really extend the fighter's range as much.

Again that issue of dragging in other countries into the war by overflying their territory comes in question. As without that, China could not really bomb runways/bases in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, no matter its in-air-refueling fleet.

part 2 to follow