PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

manqiangrexue said:

@latenlazy @Iron Man could you 2 stop insulting each other? There was already moderation to stop this between you 2 and I don't wanna get mixed up as part of that and get banned too for continuing.

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Nope. I have decided that this manchild is too much of a turd to not treat like a turd. So long as he continues to act like a shitstain I will continue to scrub him like one. FWIW since he decided to tuck his tail and put me on ignore (thank god) maybe I won’t get anymore of his pathetic fail attempts to claw back self esteem with blind and aimless screeching so there won’t be anymore reply chains ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Sinnavuuty said:

I think I was quite clear when I said: China has one of the largest networks of air search radars and sensors...

Also, disregarding the air search radars and sensors part, let's analyze the Chinese GBAD component:

GBAD strength of PLAGF divided into:
17 AD div
8 AD bde
8 AD regt

PLAAF GBAD force divided into:
1 SAM div (3 SAM regt)
26 SAM bde

Still missing missiles:
HQ-11 - Point-defence
HQ-26 - Long Range ABM
HQ-19 - Long Range ABM
HQ-29 - SAM Long Range

Remembering that the source is the TMB 2024 which is completely out of date regarding the PLA.

Furthermore, the quantity manufactured for the US Army may have been 1,000 Patriots, but only 480 M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3
MSEs are in service, divided into eight brigades, three of them permanently based abroad.

For any country large enough like China and Russia, simply any number deployed may be insufficient to cover the entire country, even though this is not considered ideal, the air defense system, especially long range, becomes an important asset for front denial. Multilayered, long-range engagement capabilities are the basis for the consolidation of anti-access and air denial (A2/AD) bubbles along the border.

Assuming that China is in an inferior position in the war, Chinese anti-access and area denial capabilities are an asymmetric warfare strategy in which a militarily weaker state seeks to prevent or hinder an aggressor state from freely using certain areas, geographic regions or means (land, naval or air) to attack it. China, in response to the US ability to launch large-scale operations in its airspace, establishes large A2/AD exclusion zones or “bubbles” centered on long-range systems. These A2/AD bubbles allow Beijing to deny the use of airspace in these areas.

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Sinnavuuty said:

Of course!!! Let's ignore the 130+ HQ-22; 64 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 120 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21B Growler); the HQ-16C count that isn't even mentioned because TMB doesn't really have a really good PLA upgrade, among others.

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There's something else which I'd like to add.

Firstly - I believe that those foreign think tanks/agencies-sourced numbers are seriously underestimated.

Secondly - Just like in the Miscellaneous News thread - @tamsen_ikard's problem is looking at things too simplistically and have a superficial understanding of how things actually work.

Raw number of SAMs, while important, is absolutely very far from being the sole determining factor of the overall effectiveness of China's SAM capabilities.

Beyond all those aforementioned SAMs - Where are all those:
1. Stationary early warning radar and EO/IR sites,
2. Mobile search/fire control radar and EO/IR stations/vehicles,
3. AEW&C and ELINT/ECM aircrafts,
4. AEW and ELINT/EW UAVs,
5. Satellite-based EO/IR sensors (particularly for tracking supersonic and hypersonic targets),
6. AAM-armed manned fighter aircrafts,
7. AAM-armed HALE/MALE/loyal wingman-type UCAVs,
8. Gun-based/DEW-based/Counter-UAV UAV-based CIWS,
9. BACN-type communication node aircrafts/UAVs that are completely lacking from his argument, and
10. Active and passive decoys - Of which he completely choose to neglect/ignore?

All of these work together in integrated-&-distributed networks of air defense systems across multiple domains, which means the overall result and impact would be 1 + 1 >> 2 instead of just 1 + 1 = 2. No unit and no platform will ever work completely on its own unless under exceptional circumstances.

As speaking of "muh SAM TELs": Under the same integrated-&-distributed networks of air defense systems, this beast-mode WL-3 UAV can actually intercept the same number of enemy (cruise) missiles as several SAM TELs combined.



So there's that.

00CuriousObserver said:

While all this convo is ongoing, I'm gonna share something by Ayi a while ago:

How much ammunition is needed to annihilate the entire Taiwanese military?

The answer: 1,300 ballistic missiles, 1,600 cruise missiles, 10,000 Shahed drones, 3 million artillery shells and rockets, 40,000 aerial munitions, and 500,000 FPV/loitering munition drones.

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He's basing this off how much Ukraine has lost, which he assumes to be identical to how much Taiwan will lose, and what it takes to achieve Ukraine's losses.

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Looks like a month of chinese production at most.

Gloire_bb said:

It's never moot. Their point isn't being unidentifiable, their point is being numerous enough to blip around. Crating landing strips is done not to destroy them, but to achieve immediate results. Otherwise, repair or simply rearrangement starts playing in.

And frankly, even this is ROCAF's own midtier bully mentality from 1990s playing pranks on them - a funny(though arguably typical for modern world) mix of insolence and bootlickering. Taking STOL seriously in late 1980s aircraft could be done on a level beyond Sweden and even probably Russia; they just...didn't.

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I don’t think it’s realistic though. These improvised air strips can’t be too numerous, it’s just not sustainable logistically. How are planes going to refuel? There won’t be many cars on the road, so you can follow any tanker trucks around with satellite or drones. Weapon storage is also an issue. Large amounts of weapons (and ground crew) cannot be moved around easily.

manqiangrexue said:

Not really. I said that Taiwan has done many things to serve its own position including weapons acquisitions and attempting to forge international alliances but those are not regarded as harshly as a declaration of independence according to the CCP's words.

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Not that I'm an expert on Chinese geopolitical texts by any stretch of the imagination, but is there a provision of the Anti-Secession Law that warrants a military response to a declaration of independence by Taiwan? Much of what is reported in the media is either a paraphrase or interpretation of the Law, which itself seems to warn against Taiwan "splitting" from China, which could mean any number of things.

manqiangrexue said:

The CCP answered that question with a yes. And how complex that operation is is quite questionable. If the US is too scared to move, it'll be a walk in the park.

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The default assumption that a Taiwan operation would be a "walk in the park" - even without US involvement - needs to be questioned. It wasn't until the 2000s that the balance of military technology shifted from Taiwan to the mainland and the ROC to this day maintains a very potent missile and fighter force.

Iron Man said:

WTF are you even yapping about now? If LCMs and hovercraft are in the process of landing, then Taiwan has NOT in fact lost "area control" of given port city (whatever ass-pulled noobtastic garbage you mean by that, kinda like "defensive launchers" ROFLMAO), because PLAN amphibious forces like LCMs and hovercraft are literally the first waves of landing forces meant to defeat and secure an OPPOSED landing zone; they are the tip of the spear that has to locate and defeat whatever defenses remain after PLARF and PLAAF have had their turns.

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It is quite unfathomable that some still believe that the PLA would launch an operation that involves mass beach landings against a defended coastline. No. If that becomes a necessity, then you'd know that something went very awry with the initial phases of the entire operation. If the PLA deems the Taiwan coastline suitable enough for boots on the ground, then it better be sure that all significant and organized defensive and counteroffensive forces have been eliminated in the opening bombing campaign.

ACuriousPLAFan said:

There's something else which I'd like to add.

Firstly - I believe that those foreign think tanks/agencies-sourced numbers are seriously underestimated.

Secondly - Just like in the Miscellaneous News thread - @tamsen_ikard's problem is looking at things too simplistically and have a superficial understanding of how things actually work.

Raw number of SAMs, while important, is absolutely very far from being the sole determining factor of the overall effectiveness of China's SAM capabilities.

Beyond all those aforementioned SAMs - Where are all those:
1. Stationary early warning radar and EO/IR sites,
2. Mobile search/fire control radar and EO/IR stations/vehicles,
3. AEW&C and ELINT/ECM aircrafts,
4. AEW and ELINT/EW UAVs,
5. Satellite-based EO/IR sensors (particularly for tracking supersonic and hypersonic targets),
6. AAM-armed manned fighter aircrafts,
7. AAM-armed HALE/MALE/loyal wingman-type UCAVs,
8. Gun-based/DEW-based/Counter-UAV UAV-based CIWS,
9. BACN-type communication node aircrafts/UAVs that are completely lacking from his argument, and
10. Active and passive decoys - Of which he completely choose to neglect/ignore?

All of these work together in integrated-&-distributed networks of air defense systems across multiple domains, which means the overall result and impact would be 1 + 1 >> 2 instead of just 1 + 1 = 2. No unit and no platform will ever work completely on its own unless under exceptional circumstances.

As speaking of "muh SAM TELs": Under the same integrated-&-distributed networks of air defense systems, this beast-mode WL-3 UAV can actually intercept the same number of enemy (cruise) missiles as several SAM TELs combined.

View attachment 149077

So there's that.

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Even if we are to entertain a phallus-measuring contest of who has the most launchers, one needs to keep in mind that much of China's SAM capability is sea-based and increasingly so. And unlike the US or Russia, China can afford to concentrate its seaborne SAM umbrellas on its eastern coastline rather than being forced to deploy them far from home.

00CuriousObserver said:

While all this convo is ongoing, I'm gonna share something by Ayi a while ago:

How much ammunition is needed to annihilate the entire Taiwanese military?

The answer: 1,300 ballistic missiles, 1,600 cruise missiles, 10,000 Shahed drones, 3 million artillery shells and rockets, 40,000 aerial munitions, and 500,000 FPV/loitering munition drones.

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He's basing this off how much Ukraine has lost, which he assumes to be identical to how much Taiwan will lose, and what it takes to achieve Ukraine's losses.

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A surprisingly poor answer from someone like Ayi, neglecting the whole point of PGMs, informatized warfare, and systems destruction which has driven PLA modernization for several decades now. Even discounting Russian flaws of doctrine, planning, and implementation, Ukraine is geographically a far larger country with overland connections to NATO neighbors. Much of their C4ISR network is effectively inviolable for political reasons. They have strategic depth well in excess of their operational requirements, and can thereby continue fighting despite suffering heavy losses in manpower/materiel/territory. Because they have the luxury of space in which to retreat, rearm, resupply, reconstitute, recruit, etc.

None of those conditions is true for Taiwan. Continuing to fight as a coherent force (as opposed to scattered guerillas) when you have nowhere to run and nowhere to hide is a completely different story.

This concept has spurred a comprehensive reform initiative across the PLA to fully leverage the centrality of information. The PLA now believes that the “mechanism of gaining victory in war” has changed. In the past, victory was achieved by neutralizing the adversary’s material means of fighting. However, in informatized warfare, victory can be achieved by disrupting the adversary’s information means to paralyze, rather than destroy, its material capabilities. This includes targeting “leadership institutions, command and control centers, and information hubs.”11 The primary means of conducting informatized warfare is by “integrating information and firepower” through the use of reconnaissance and sensors linked by networks to long-range precision-strike munitions.12 The 2020 edition of the PLA’s SMS states, “In information warfare, the effectiveness of military power is more dependent on the application capability of information technology.”13

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To be fair, he does add the caveat of ROC armed forces resisting to the very end. But the whole point of destroying the system is to render the individual components effectively blind and isolated and helpless, even if they do elect to resist.

从中我们大概能判断，歼灭一整支台军——如果台军抵抗到底的话，大概需要什么样的弹药。

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Wrought said:

A surprisingly poor answer from someone like Ayi, neglecting the whole point of PGMs, informatized warfare, and systems destruction which has driven PLA modernization for several decades now. Even discounting Russian flaws of doctrine, planning, and implementation, Ukraine is geographically a far larger country with overland connections to NATO neighbors. Much of their C4ISR network is effectively inviolable for political reasons. They have strategic depth well in excess of their operational requirements, and can thereby continue fighting despite suffering heavy losses in manpower/materiel/territory. Because they have the luxury of space in which to retreat, rearm, resupply, reconstitute, recruit, etc.

None of those conditions is true for Taiwan. Continuing to fight as a coherent force (as opposed to scattered guerillas) when you have nowhere to run and nowhere to hide is a completely different story.

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To be fair, he does add the caveat of ROC armed forces resisting to the very end. But the whole point of destroying the system is to render the individual components effectively blind and isolated and helpless, even if they do elect to resist.

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I think he is deliberately high-balling the munitions needs to prove a point, that even if China was to fight as mediocrely as Russia, with basically Russian tactics and force structures, so basically ignoring the bulk of the progress made in the last 20 years, it still comfortably have many times the amount of munitions needed to total obliterate Taiwan’s defences.

supersnoop said:

I don’t think it’s realistic though. These improvised air strips can’t be too numerous, it’s just not sustainable logistically. How are planes going to refuel? There won’t be many cars on the road, so you can follow any tanker trucks around with satellite or drones. Weapon storage is also an issue. Large amounts of weapons (and ground crew) cannot be moved around easily.

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It is doable, and the more you are preparing for it, the better. We're talking several men(1-2 professionals), small hidden fuel/weapon dumps, trailers/furl trucks and pickups carrying weapons around. It's almost surprising how little aircraft may in fact need, when compared to aircraft designed without it in mind.

This is only stoppable though proper, absolute air dominance, after near absolute success of DEAD. Otherwise, too few long range fires, too much collateral (even relatively small rural population and overall civilian traffic is still annoyingly huge compared to small air force supply).

Sweden or former Switzerland (with literal mountain underground carriers) is ideal case studies what you can do, when you want.

But Taiwan preferred that very "others
", which just doesn't take austere basing well.

Even the local F-CK, otherwise a very reasonable design, just skipped on it: it was ultimately conceptualized in 1980s. I guess ROCAF was more worried about their glorious return to Fujian, not survival; it only became problem 2-3 decades later.

Gloire_bb said:

It is doable, and the more you are preparing for it, the better. We're talking several men(1-2 professionals), small hidden fuel/weapon dumps, trailers/furl trucks and pickups carrying weapons around. It's almost surprising how little aircraft may in fact need, when compared to aircraft designed without it in mind.

This is only stoppable though proper, absolute air dominance, after near absolute success of DEAD. Otherwise, too few long range fires, too much collateral (even relatively small rural population and overall civilian traffic is still annoyingly huge compared to small air force supply).

Sweden or former Switzerland (with literal mountain underground carriers) is ideal case studies what you can do, when you want.

But Taiwan preferred that very "others
", which just doesn't take austere basing well.

Even the local F-CK, otherwise a very reasonable design, just skipped on it: it was ultimately conceptualized in 1980s. I guess ROCAF was more worried about their glorious return to Fujian, not survival; it only became problem 2-3 decades later.

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Density of traffic works both ways. You can’t rely on massive civilian traffic to hide your logistical tail and also have clear roads for jets to land on.

If you start blocked traffic to prepare the roads for aircraft to land, you are going to quickly create massive traffic jams that are easily detected even without enemy ISR assets in range, as you can see that from just civilian traffic apps.

There are a small number of roads which are long and straight enough for jet fighter operations. The PLA can probably keep all those stretches monitories 24/7 with drones alone. Add in some AI pattern recognition overlapping unexpected traffic jams with those stretches of roads and PLA strike sites and any prep work to get roads ready for fighters will stand out like flashing flares.

Sweden made it work because of its low population density and a road network designed with such a need in mind, and even then it’s more of a theoretical capacity that has never been tested in actual real world combat operations.

If Taiwan seriously desired such a capability, it should have made a proper attempt to buy Harrier jump jets. STOVL jets would have given the PLA an actual challenge. But I guess one can’t be too harsh on the ROCAF for being caught out by the sheer speed and scale of Chinese advancement in the last 20 years. They went from decisive battle at a distance (to Taiwan) to facing PLAAF air dominance over Taiwan within a generation. By the time they realised they needed harriers, almost all harriers were retired. The only other STOVL option is the F35B, which is off limits.

In a sense, that tells you all you need to know about how committed America is to shoring up Taiwan’s defences. If they truly wanted to make Taiwan a tough nut for China, offering F35Bs would have given Chinese planners a real headache.

All of the hype and noise by the US about Taiwan increasing defence spending isn’t really about maximising Taiwan’s military capabilities, but more about profit maximisation for the USA.