PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
I think everyone got tired of these news. We're all just waiting for the big one now.
It should be noted that, so far, the numbers appear roughly similar to those during the second half of 2024. Also, the total number of sorties around Taiwan has remained roughly the same; it's the operations that are getting closer
My (albeit rather shallow) theory is that there are two "windows". The first is around 2029/2030, with Fujian, 076, this batch of 052D/055s, and systems like KJ-3000 coming online. The second window is around 2034/2035, with next gen CRUDES, more carriers, and importantly sixth gens.
The key question imo is whether Xi will get a fifth term or not (he will be 82 in 2035). We should have a better idea in about two years
So your theory is that there are the following windows
2029/2030
2034/2035
Then we have to add the 2027 window espoused by the USA.
---
That would be a total of 3 "windows of opportunity" for the next 10 years.
To me, that actually describes a situation where with every year that passes, the military balance continues to favour China
You know that even after reunification, with every year that passes, the military balance will still continue to favour China right?
2027 should just be discarded entirely imo. It's better to just look at PLA's actual 2027 modernization goals
I have addressed this in my previous post. Yes, this is technically true to a degree, but "not all gains are equal" and there may be diminishing returns of that gain over time.
Last edited:
Yes there will eventually be diminishing returns, but not for some years yet.
My base scenario when modelling the "stock of advanced weapons in China" is the following:
Stock of Advanced Weapons in China
Base Year: Index Level
2022: 100
--- 7 year gap
2029: 200 (double the 2022 figure)
--- 6 year gap
2035: 300 (triple the 2022 figure, or 50% larger than the 2029 figure)
NB. There's a whole bunch of assumptions here like a typical 30 year lifespan, and a Chinese increase in military spending from 1.7% to a modest 2.5%, etc etc. But you get the idea.
The carriers are actually only of secondary importance. This is true of most platforms that are most valuable in a blue water context. The most useful thing they could do is probably as a fleet in being, a foil basically, to force the opposition to hold some of their naval and air force in reserve.
The most important things we should look at are really what can have the most impact operating in those environments, with shallow sea green water (where land based tactical aircraft can comfortably operate), those platforms that can cross the strait in large numbers, and those that can fire across the strait.
Most obviously are those amphibious vessels between 500 - 4000 tonnes of a number of types (LSM, LST, large LCACs, etc), basically shpe made for those type of environments and distances. Almost as obvious are the large RoRo ships and other civilian ships built to handle military equipment, and some novel platforms like those resembling Mulberry harbours. Then you have other things that are critical in maintaining local superiority of air, and sea control, as well as fire support for such an operation, such as these things to watch in no particular order:
- the number of artillery units equipped with long range MLRS (e.g. PHL-16)
- the number of land based medium range UAV in ISR and CIS roles
- the number of guided SRBM and MRBMs available to target critical military infrastructure
- the pace of fully modernizing the SSKs to block certain geographic choke points
- a large increase in the number of MPAs + fully modernized ASW helo fleet
- a large increase in the number of VLO tactical platforms that can operate over contested air space (J-35A might be critical here to provide the sufficient mass)
- the number of available ASW platforms that can be stationed to around the theatre to minimize presence of foreign subs (mainly 056A and 054A/B here)
- availability of long range SAM systems with coverage over the island
- availability of air defence destroyers on approaches to the theatre (e.g. from Okinawa or Luzon)
- land based platforms that are available to launch ASM (e.g. some H-6 variants)
- a large increase in the available AEWACs and ELINT fleet
- any a number of other things.