PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

GOODTREE

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Also I doubt only propaganda can make the already established infiltrators/moles turn around. Those people are doing either out of nationalist reasons or because they're infiltrated by China.
I doubt very much that people inspired by nationalism hold much power that can be wielded, and most of them are probably KMTers.


Back to the thread, has anyone wondered what kind of measures China would take internally, especially to deal with the repercussions of the brutality of the war.
 

SunlitZelkova

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Back to the thread, has anyone wondered what kind of measures China would take internally, especially to deal with the repercussions of the brutality of the war.

None, in my opinion. PLA is nowadays a much more professional force. Considering Taiwan is unlikely to hold out for long, it is questionable it would ever need to conduct a large scale draft like Russia did in Summer 2022. Taiwan's strike assets are too small to cause any damage to morale (let alone much physical damage) by hitting civilian targets on the mainland.

If there was to be any unrest due to the war, it might be because of economic damage caused indirectly by the war (*hypothetical* example: severe decline in trade with US). However, it should be noted that Russia, which was fairly interconnected with the West prior to February 2022, took such damage and is more or less fine despite having taken little to no measures to alleviate this danger previously.

In contrast, China is actively trying to eliminate foreign dependence in every sector of the economy. Not only would economic damage be *relatively* limited, but any unrest would probably be sporadic. Although the PSP, MSS, PAP would need to have higher vigilance, they probably would not need to do anything they aren't already doing right now.

Looking at it from another perspective, the anti-war movement in the supposedly free world, especially the United States, comprised a tiny portion of the populations of each country involved in that invasion. If that is what happens in the US when it invades a sovereign nation, resistance to war in China when it is seizing an island whose formal name is literally (Republic of) China is unlikely to bring about any moral qualms in mainland citizens, at least not any to the extent that huge numbers of people would actually go out and protest the conflict.

If by "internally [in China]" you mean in Taiwan after it is a practical part of China again, that's another question but it might be outside the scope of the thread.
 

ismellcopium

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Registered Member
If there was to be any unrest due to the war, it might be because of economic damage caused indirectly by the war (*hypothetical* example: severe decline in trade with US). However, it should be noted that Russia, which was fairly interconnected with the West prior to February 2022, took such damage and is more or less fine despite having taken little to no measures to alleviate this danger previously.
Russia could only get by fine because it had a far larger China to bail it out economically, so this doesn't apply to China (also it still remains to be seen just how fine they'll be over the longer term). However, the importance of trade with the US is also greatly exaggerated in China's case. The US would suffer much greater harm to its economy than China in a trade falling-out, because while China merely loses some exports (a relatively small portion) the US loses much of the inputs to its economy it'd be unable to replace.
 

GOODTREE

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None, in my opinion. PLA is nowadays a much more professional force. Considering Taiwan is unlikely to hold out for long, it is questionable it would ever need to conduct a large scale draft like Russia did in Summer 2022. Taiwan's strike assets are too small to cause any damage to morale (let alone much physical damage) by hitting civilian targets on the mainland.

If there was to be any unrest due to the war, it might be because of economic damage caused indirectly by the war (*hypothetical* example: severe decline in trade with US). However, it should be noted that Russia, which was fairly interconnected with the West prior to February 2022, took such damage and is more or less fine despite having taken little to no measures to alleviate this danger previously.

In contrast, China is actively trying to eliminate foreign dependence in every sector of the economy. Not only would economic damage be *relatively* limited, but any unrest would probably be sporadic. Although the PSP, MSS, PAP would need to have higher vigilance, they probably would not need to do anything they aren't already doing right now.

Looking at it from another perspective, the anti-war movement in the supposedly free world, especially the United States, comprised a tiny portion of the populations of each country involved in that invasion. If that is what happens in the US when it invades a sovereign nation, resistance to war in China when it is seizing an island whose formal name is literally (Republic of) China is unlikely to bring about any moral qualms in mainland citizens, at least not any to the extent that huge numbers of people would actually go out and protest the conflict.

If by "internally [in China]" you mean in Taiwan after it is a practical part of China again, that's another question but it might be outside the scope of the thread.
Thanks for the answer. I agree with you, I've never thought that the anti-war movement can actually stop a war, the only thing that can stop it is the realities of war with all of its losing factors, or the high cost of inputs beyond the fruits of victory. Even the Vietnam War, where the anti-war movement made a lot of noise, it wasn't the anti-war movement that ultimately prompted the US military to end the war.
I'm also not too worried that the decision to liberate Taiwan as an act will have any impact on the majority (99%?) of the Chinese people. The People's Republic of China has complete legality.
The only thing I'm really worried about is whether or not some means can be employed to divert the public's attention away from the war and maintain civilian daily life production. Whether any propaganda war can be waged against Taiwan, making it possible to reduce PLA combat losses or to complete control of targeted areas/people ahead of schedule.
No, my “internally [in China]” scenario here does not include Taiwan, but only civilians/companies in mainland China.
 

HardBall

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These barges are not meant to seize bridgeheads.
For that, you will still be relying on dedicated amphibious landing crafts (LCU,LST/LCAC analogues).
As such, the "few" beaches that the PLAN can land on, are still limited what can be handled by the lowest common demonitor - whichever element that might be.

The biggest difference between specialised amphibious landing assets capable of assault operations are the speed at which they can disgorge their load. By contrast, these barges will probably take hours to set up.

As per the article, they are meant to act as a interface for non-specialised landing ships to utilise beachheads to unload follow on waves - NOT the assault wave. The historical example given is that of the Mulberry harbours used in Normandy. These are for much later in the operational phase when the beachhead has not only been seized but expanded.



The biggest danger for this area is the threat of artillery, given the range/accuracy of modern MLRS and lack of operational depth to push a bridgehead perimeter past such risks. CRAM assets will need to be close to the actual beach which means the best employment of CRAM defence will be landed assets.

Air defence umbrella will otoh be, as you mentioned, capably provided by the amphib fleet itself and land air.

As far as I can understand the TRA and SAMDT, Green and Orchid islands off the east coast are not included in any defence agreement. Seems like very useful locations to capture early on in the conflict, especially if the main landings would be in the south.

If Green and Orchid would be early lightly defended toargets (and perhaps eventually some unmanned locations in the Pascadores), then it would make a lot of sense to set up mobile docking facilities just after the initial wave, and can be kept operational for the duration of the campaign.
 

Heliox

Junior Member
Registered Member
As far as I can understand the TRA and SAMDT, Green and Orchid islands off the east coast are not included in any defence agreement. Seems like very useful locations to capture early on in the conflict, especially if the main landings would be in the south.

If Green and Orchid would be early lightly defended toargets (and perhaps eventually some unmanned locations in the Pascadores), then it would make a lot of sense to set up mobile docking facilities just after the initial wave, and can be kept operational for the duration of the campaign.

A prime objective of a seaborne invasion is to capture port facilities.
Sustained supply of POL and ammo is beyond the ability of tactical assets like LST/LCAC/Helos once mechanised divisions start landing in follow on waves.

Barring capturing an actual port, Mulberry-like structures such as the subject of this discussion, allow for a makeshift "port" to be set up on a controlled objective to facilitate high(er) volumes of ship-shore transfers.

Without these,
  • Standard, deep(er) draft cargo vessels cannot approach the beach to disgorge their cargo - limiting the vessels available to provide log support to your Type 71-75s, which already have a prime role of spear pointing the landings.
  • Whatever cargo gets disembarked at the beach, the beach will need prepping as well. The bulk of logistics transports are wheeled trucks with lower trafficability across sandy beaches than your tracked or 8x8 assault elements.
A ship-shore roadway won't take much longer but willbe much more accessible and have handle higher volumes.

What would be the point of setting up makeshift port facilities on Green/Orchid island? It is neither a source of supply nor is there a main thrust to support (seeing that there is no land bridge to the main land which is the be-all, end-all in this instance)
 

HardBall

New Member
Registered Member
A prime objective of a seaborne invasion is to capture port facilities.
Sustained supply of POL and ammo is beyond the ability of tactical assets like LST/LCAC/Helos once mechanised divisions start landing in follow on waves.

Barring capturing an actual port, Mulberry-like structures such as the subject of this discussion, allow for a makeshift "port" to be set up on a controlled objective to facilitate high(er) volumes of ship-shore transfers.

Without these,
  • Standard, deep(er) draft cargo vessels cannot approach the beach to disgorge their cargo - limiting the vessels available to provide log support to your Type 71-75s, which already have a prime role of spear pointing the landings.
  • Whatever cargo gets disembarked at the beach, the beach will need prepping as well. The bulk of logistics transports are wheeled trucks with lower trafficability across sandy beaches than your tracked or 8x8 assault elements.
A ship-shore roadway won't take much longer but willbe much more accessible and have handle higher volumes.

What would be the point of setting up makeshift port facilities on Green/Orchid island? It is neither a source of supply nor is there a main thrust to support (seeing that there is no land bridge to the main land which is the be-all, end-all in this instance)


For outlying islands, in most types of these large scale operations, would be for providing fire support, especially tube artillery that cannot reach from further afield; and also to some extent a greater variety of rocket artillery.

The Green / Orchid island locations (as well as some of Pascadores) seem also to be ideally placed for more short ranged A2AD (by short ranged, I mean range of SRBM), especially for tactical air defence and ASCM batteries that would help deter the approach of any outside amphibious force / reinforcement / supply from that direction. The sites can also be prepared in a few days, if you can spare some engineering resources, to set up austere fields that can support tactical drones that can either do ISR or CIS.

If they are undefended, and would not trigger any defense pact, seem like no brainers as initial gray zone moves.
 

siegecrossbow

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The campaign began in November 974 and proceeded favorably for the Song. The Yangtze River was overcome with a floating bridge built across from Caishiji. Song forces crossed the waterway and secured a bridgehead. Outside Caishiji an army of 20,000 Jiangnan troops was defeated by Cao Bin.
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Song forces continued to advance and reached the outskirts of Jinling in March 975. No defensive preparations were made by Li Yu. Both he and his court officials foolishly felt existing fortifications were adequate enough to keep the Song at bay. Starting in April the capital was put under siege by Cao Bin.
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supersnoop

Major
Registered Member
I just have a quick go through on the current inventory of fighter jets in ROC Airforce. The numbers below may not be 100% accurate since they are from Wikipedia.

Total number of aircraft =>577
Total number of fighter jets =>431 before accounting for total retirement of F-5E and F-5F which were to be retired in 2024.
Total number of fighter jets less F-5E/F = 388

Of the 388 fighter jets, only 66 are modern F-16C/D block 70, the rest are:-
F-CK-1 => 129 aircraft of more than 25 years old
F-16A/B => 140 aircraft of more than 20-25 years old.
Mirage 2000-5 => 53 aircraft of more than 25 years old

Surface to Air missiles systems (under air force command) are:-
Patriot 2 and 3 => 9 systems with 386 missiles.
Sky Bow II => 6 systems with unknown number of missiles
Sky Bow III =. 12 systems with unknown number of missiles.
AIM-7 Sparrow/ RIM-7 => 500+ missiles under the Skyguard system.

Main air base is at Hualien at the East coast of the island where the latest F-16C/D are assumed to be based.

So, if AR starts, ROC fighter jets' life span will last not more than a few days if they flew. Or they may stay until end of war in the mountain caves in Hualien airbase.

If PLA will to launch more than 5,000 drones, they should be able to deplete or destroy practically all SAMs. Of course PLA has other weapons like ARM, long range rockets, short range ballastic missies etc to deal with the SAM sites.

PLAAF should be able to gain air control all over Taiwan within a day or 2.
If you think number of planes are an issue, they only have 200-400 AIM-120C. Most of these are located in the US…
 

lcloo

Captain
Penghu islands is a must to be taken in initial phase of AR. Magong 马公 is a small city of 60,000+ populations, it has an airport and seaport. It is also a ROC military outpost/naval base which can threaten PRC ships in Taiwan straits.

Islands on the East coast side (Lue Dao/ Green island, Lan Dao/ Orchid island, the islands off Su Ao ROC naval base and others) needs to be taken as well initially because you don't want ROC forces and infiltrators/Special forces from foreign countries to set up covert listening posts there.

A blockade on Taiwan island is not completed if these islands are not taken by PLA/PLAN.
 
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