PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Coalescence said:

Did the white paper demonstration really caused significant economic and social disruptions? All I remembered is their stunt being mocked and meme'd in the Chinese internet, and their movement fizzled out in just a few days.

In a Taiwan contingency, I doubt saboteurs would have a decisive effect on the success of the operations, especially after seeing how Russia is still doing alright despite these setbacks in Ukraine, and Hezbollah still being an effective threat despite the moles, targeted assassinations and sabotage to their equipment by Israel. But yes, internal security is very important, especially with the history of power struggles and defection in China.

Click to expand...

Russia got the Cronus theater attack and the Kerch Bridge attack with truck bomb. While not decisive, if Ukraine was stronger it could've used the windows opened by those attacks to inflict battlefield damage.

hilariously, the RAND corp's plan to stop russia from backstopping the PRC during an operation taiwan was to dangle european market access for their oil exports. now that they've burned that leverage permanently there's nothing left in terms of the petroleum blackmail angle.

leibowitz said:

The problem these fifth columnists create isn't in direct sabotage, but more in adversely shaping the information arena in a way that makes favorable, decisive, rapid conflict termination less likely.

Basically, any public messaging from influential members of Chinese society that makes the US/Japan/Taiwan side perceive that China might back down in the face of US escalation or continued Taiwan resistance would make escalation/resistance more likely. Hence it is critical that China present only one united front months or even years before the conflict begins - and that "soft" Chinese voices are neutralized or eliminated as rapidly as possible.

Click to expand...

Those same fifth columnists also overlap with (if not outright the same) as those white paper protesters during the Covid-19 lockdowns (and neo-liberal leaning elements), so removing those was going to need to happen in any event. In addition, if the US strikes first then all bets are off, and only total and unconditional surrender of US-aligned forces would suffice.

leibowitz said:

The problem these fifth columnists create isn't in direct sabotage, but more in adversely shaping the information arena in a way that makes favorable, decisive, rapid conflict termination less likely.

Basically, any public messaging from influential members of Chinese society that makes the US/Japan/Taiwan side perceive that China might back down in the face of US escalation or continued Taiwan resistance would make escalation/resistance more likely. Hence it is critical that China present only one united front months or even years before the conflict begins - and that "soft" Chinese voices are neutralized or eliminated as rapidly as possible.

Click to expand...

Lol you give them too much credit.

Unless it's current, high position people (say foreign minister Qin Gang), even if you some billionaire going out and saying X, it really isn't gonna matter.

So now that 2024B has quiet down a bit, I translated (with GPT) an image that I saw somewhere talking about the indicators leading up to a potential Taiwan contingency. And I'm curious in hearing what some here would say about this

(I omitted some stuff in this image with regards to "war indicator" numbers)

Miyayaya said:

So now that 2024B has quiet down a bit, I translated (with GPT) an image that I saw somewhere talking about the indicators leading up to a potential Taiwan contingency. And I'm curious in hearing what some here would say about this

(I omitted some stuff in this image with regards to "war indicator" numbers)

View attachment 137530

View attachment 137534

Click to expand...

This might be useful if the PLA was planning a surprise, unprovoked assault on the island. In a political crisis that might cause a reactionary attack, you can bet that much of the world would be entertaining, if not outright expecting, an attack.

SinoSoldier said:

This might be useful if the PLA was planning a surprise, unprovoked assault on the island. In a political crisis that might cause a reactionary attack, you can bet that much of the world would be entertaining, if not outright expecting, an attack.

Click to expand...

Then it seems like either way, there are lots of ways to expect an incoming attack

Surprise factor is still important. Perhaps normalizing the indicators above is a strategy to take

Miyayaya said:

Then it seems like either way, there are lots of ways to expect an incoming attack

Surprise factor is still important. Perhaps normalizing the indicators above is a strategy to take

Click to expand...

Taiwan et al. would be expecting or preparing for an attack in political crises and events leading up to a possible invasion, regardless of the indicators.

SinoSoldier said:

There is no Chinese equivalent of the S-500 or A-135. Rather, they use the DN-3 which seems to be more or less an equivalent to the GBI. The SC-19/DN-1 is also a GBI-type interceptor but might've been developed into the DN-3 instead.

There were also rumors of a HQ-26 (supposedly an SM-3 equivalent) and HQ-29 (PAC-3MSE equivalent) but nothing came of them. Perhaps the HQ-19 superseded their role.

So, their air defense tiers are also follows:
1. HQ-9B
2. HQ-22/HQ-9A
3. HQ-16FE
4. HQ-16A/B
5. HQ-11/HQ-17

While their missile defense tiers are:
1. DN-3
2. HQ-19
3. HQ-9B

Click to expand...

same here . i also want to know why china navy/airdefense still not equip their VLS/launcher with quad pack missile similar as RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile active radar seeker

one thing US destroyer have an rather big avantage over CN is their VLS can be quad pack with RIM-162 (~buk 50-70km AA power)

so in term of AA missile number ready to fire : china destroyer , even newest Type-055 still lack behind US arleigh burke mk3 upgrade

let alone any newer destroyer in future with more VLS cells than the current 96

the weird thing is : china use larger VLS cell than US , and biggest advantage of large VLS cell is easier to adapt quad pack missile set up

and yet china still not have it deploy at moment , what is the reason ?

can't be lack of tech/know how right ?

to make matter worst new standard of modern naval combat is : who gonna collapsed under horde of missiles first .

and US + their allied gang currently no less focus than china in this task : Mass product stealth anti-ship missile , rapid dragon ...etc

votran said:

same here . i also want to know why china navy/airdefense still not equip their VLS/launcher with quad pack missile similar as RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile active radar seeker

one thing US destroyer have an rather big avantage over CN is their VLS can be quad pack with RIM-162 (~buk 50-70km AA power)

so in term of AA missile number ready to fire : china destroyer , even newest Type-055 still lack behind US arleigh burke mk3 upgrade

let alone any newer destroyer in future with more VLS cells than the current 96

the weird thing is : china use larger VLS cell than US , and biggest advantage of large VLS cell is easier to adapt quad pack missile set up

and yet china still not have it deploy at moment , what is the reason ?

Click to expand...

The reason is that PLAN nearly never if even at all show the insides of a loaded VLS, so you can't see if they are quad packed. China has built and even clears for sale the technology for ages (decade+) though.

So it's premature and evidence less for you to claim they wouldn't mount a common technology on their VLS. PLA is just very bad (or very good, from an opsec perspective) at showing the munitions options they have. IIRC the J-20 has also never been shown with an air to ground armament.