I never claimed that.
Helicopters will be part of the entire amphibious operation, from start to finish, which means that helicopters will necessarily be within range of small arms engagement such as MANPADS, where their suppression through preparatory air strikes is aimed at reducing and not completely eliminating this threat.
MALE drones (like BZK-005, ASN-209, WZ-6, WL-1 among others) are under the MANPADS engagement altitude. Furthermore, the impact on Ukraine is almost zero because both sides almost never use MALE drones, only now the Russians have started using MALE drones, but in previous periods, drones like Bayraktar were shot down by Russian Iglas.
In order to not have much of an impact, the PLA will need to suppress most of Taiwan's MANPADS positions and units as well as completely reduce the combat power of the ROCA, if they fail in this, Taiwan will certainly be able to inflict losses on the PLA. I won't make any claims to that effect because I'm obviously not clairvoyant, but the operational implications surrounding the operation are under these conditions.
No. Investing in MANPADs makes sense when you want to create an integrated air defense structure and layer; MANPADs are the first layer of this integrated structure.
It is worth remembering that Taiwan will be on the other side of the war, the side that will be defending. Every doctrinal manual foresees the enemy's attrition in a counter-amphibious landing operation, so in order to effectively oppose an amphibious landing, the ROC troops in charge of defense actions will seek to wear down and disorganize the PLA as much as possible. They will try to take advantage of the critical moment for the operation, hitting it with fire from the moment the troops transfer to the landing craft, as well as during the movement to the landing area, aiming to inflict heavy losses in personnel and material, which will contribute to the neutralization of this operation, before the start of ground operations. If this is not possible, the ROC ground force, as a whole, will seek to limit the beachhead and attack the PLA to destroy it. Most of these conditions will depend greatly on the surprise (from strategic to tactical) that the PLA can offer in an amphibious operation.
In order to be successful in an amphibious operation, it is necessary to achieve surprise. From marsh landings such as those that occurred in the Iran-Iraq war to large amphibious operations such as Inchon, the element of surprise was a critical factor. However, the plethora of naval assets involved, no matter how small the scale of the planned amphibious operation, and modern detection equipment, especially satellites, practically invalidate strategic surprise. However, tactical surprise will always be desirable, seeking to disguise, as much as possible, the movement of the Task Force that will carry out the amphibious assault, with some operational attraction, aiming to deceive the defender, inducing him to adopt an unfavorable course of action, as to the time and true location where an amphibious landing operation is intended to be conducted.
China has an advantage in Taiwan because I seriously doubt that the Chinese would land amphibious forces on the first day. This would be foolish on the part of the PLA commanders, considering that Taiwan could mobilize its forces and obtain numerical and even material superiority in the first few days. This is because the PLA is unlikely to put all of its effective power on land simultaneously with the ROCA units responsible for defending the coast. It will have the flexibility and combat power to contain the penetration and carry out counterattacks against the PLA amphibious brigades. Because it has strong fire support and good air defense coverage, which are essential for operations of this nature, and because it has a tactical operations center that allows the coordination of this same support and also the use of airspace, a large unit equivalent to an Army Division, integrated by at least two Large Units, seems suitable for conducting the amphibious counter-landing operation, under better conditions. It should also be considered that a Division has greater flexibility to respond to attempts to achieve tactical surprise by the enemy Amphibious Task Force that carries out a diversionary action.
China would follow a course of action of bombing to reduce the combat power of the ROCA/ROCN/ROCAF as much as possible, regardless of how long it lasts. Taking the ROCAF and ROCN out of action in particular will give the PLA much more freedom to plan and execute the amphibious operation at a later date, allowing it to carry out all preparations before and during the landing.
The big problem afterwards will continue to be the ROCA, which could still contribute to the attrition of the PLA, even after the successful landing on the beaches of Taiwan. I have already written two comments under the same logic of the ROCA's strategy around an operation to wear down the PLA's amphibious landing:
Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/china-should-worry-about-tawian-timeline-j-20-is-just-ok-fighter-pacaf-chief/ Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach, the PACAF commander, also told reporters during a media engagement Monday that China’s J-20, its most advanced fighter in production, isn’t “anything to lose...
www.sinodefenceforum.com
Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
I agree with most of what you say. But if the ROC army calculates that the beach is indefensible because of a huge air power disadvantage and all their movements tracked, then there's no point moving the tanks a few km close to the beach head where they'll be sitting ducks like what that...
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