PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

The PLA CMC has been expecting/anticipating the direct involvement of the US in the AR of Taiwan for a very long time, a sentiment which is especially amplified with the 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis, whereby a Nimitz CSG sailed right through the strait while the PLA couldn't do anything about it.

If else, why should China even bother with developing DF-17, DF-21, DF-26 and DF-27 in the first place, among many other things? And who cares whether the US really intends to jump into the fray or not? There are those loyal lackeys in the WestPac for the US to choose for sacrifice.

grulle said:

I have thought of another problem faced by China should the Taiwan conflict erupt. SHOULD China preemptively strike US bases in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines? if China DOESN'T strike US bases, then there is a possibility that the US will not join the war. but the downside is that should war erupt, US forces will be at maximum strength should the US decide to join. however, if China DOES attack US bases, then the US will definitely join the war. so this is the dilemma faced by China. should China take a chance and bet that the US doesn't join the war, thereby refraining from attacking US bases in Asia.

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Why would China randomly start beating on US because of its own civil war?

They would just cordon off the whole area and if US plans to use the internal turmoil as a chance to launch invasion, China would see it coming and prep defenses in the right spots to absorb the first US wave, followed by immediately targeting the invasion forces in their set up zones.

US has only so many places they can ready an invasion from. MSS can intercept them electronically, satellites provide accurate 24/7 coverage of US staging grounds, spies/osint can inform of readying moves such as blood banks being prepped.

America's first attack would likely consist of missiles launched from bombers, as it would be suicide mission to attempt to open by sending troops at Taiwan against fully intact Chinese defenses. No single US volley is anywhere big enough to cause signficant damage to the defense apparatus in the area, especially not when air defenses are in play.

China would have planes in the air already in order to monitor US activity. The moment after US launches, the launch platforms will immediately be hunted, while missiles target the launch platforms' home bases.

Deep sea seabed detection system. This is legit. I called it a game changer weapon system at underwater warfare. If these detection system are armed with long range torpedos combined with armed UAV, there's no need to focus on building submarines that much. In underwater, there is no defense system. All you need to do is to launch a torpedo to target the hull, then the ship will sink or rendered unusable.

ACuriousPLAFan said:

And who cares whether the US really intends to jump into the fray or not? There are those loyal lackeys in the WestPac for the US to choose for sacrifice.

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No country in the Asia Pacific would ever try and invade China without US taking the largest role in the operation.

China isn't just a little bit stronger than most of its neighbors like how Israel is in the middle east, where random countries still feasibly can challenge them if they feel like it. Throwing down against China would take no less firepower than throwing down against America, and that's before China mobilizes. You'd only do that if you have a comparable sized military backing you.

Within Asia, only SK and Japan have somewhat decent militaries. They're still just around Iran tier, and unlike the real Iran, they don't have the protection of distance, borders with friendlies and the Hormuz strait to help them resist.

None of these countries can conduct offensive ops against Chinese territory. They may be able to hold out awhile defensively against China, but that's not what they need to achieve the goal of taking over Taiwan.

Minm said:

When considering airborne landings of a few hundred men, you should also consider the possibility of local agents joining them. The MSS probably has more than a few hundred spies on the island, in particular in the military. In addition to that there are millions of mainland tourists coming every year pre pandemic. In anticipation of a war, you could easily send in a few hundred people as tourists that then hide somewhere.

We're not talking about attacking a foreign state. This is a civil war. Of course China also needs to be ready for sabotage and terrorist acts by separatists and ROC agents.

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On the same wavelengths my friend...

It's time to open up The Second Front.

Instead of looking at the Taiwan Issue in this binary symmetric way "Force on Force" , The PLA vs the separatist forces("ROC") supported by their handlers(US). I am saying(suggesting) there's another option on the table for the PRC/PLA to consider...

Proxy , The Second Front. The creation of an of irregular(paramilitary) force of Island Born Compatriots who will wage in guerrilla warfare on the Island against the non compatriot forces("ROC") on the behalf of the PRC/PLA...The PLFT ( "People's Liberation Front Of Taiwan" )

The PLFT would provide the PRC/PLA "political cover" , leverage (both militarily/politically) over the separatist. It would allow the PLA to engage/wage a war of attrition against the foreign backed separatist forces indirectly , While it's mainland Forces are kept in reverse(on the sidelines) until the optimal time to permanently retake the Island directly presents itself.

The PLFT mission(goal) would Not be to defeat the separatist forces("ROC") out right. It's sole mission is to wage a slow campaign to drain(tax) , to apply stress/pressure onto the "ROC" by Destabilizing the Security Environment. The PLFT would assist the MSS on the Island. The PLFT would be task with garnering continue support (by enlisting more compatriots on the Island to the cause) , making preparation (laying the ground) , carrying out Raids , Ambushes , Sabotage , Espionage and Assassinations. The PLFT would Not have to be a large force , it could easily accomplish these objectives with operatives operating in cells/teams spread across the Island.

The "ROC" forces would now be forced contend with an internal threat while at the same time face/off with the external threat in the PLA lurking on the horizon biding it's time to strike.

"do onto others as others do unto you"

The US is practically following the same strategy of arming(selling arms) to the non compatriots on the Island as their proxy to fight the PLA on their behalf.

how does one kill a porcupine ("ROC") inject it with a virus (PLFT)

The US track record in fighting in long , prolonged conflicts is sketchy. Especially ones that involve guerrilla insurgencies.

I say it's time to flip the script , turn the tables onto them (fight fire with fire). Take the initiative.

grulle said:

I have thought of another problem faced by China should the Taiwan conflict erupt. SHOULD China preemptively strike US bases in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines? if China DOESN'T strike US bases, then there is a possibility that the US will not join the war. but the downside is that should war erupt, US forces will be at maximum strength should the US decide to join. however, if China DOES attack US bases, then the US will definitely join the war. so this is the dilemma faced by China. should China take a chance and bet that the US doesn't join the war, thereby refraining from attacking US bases in Asia.

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A Preemptive strike on US assets is not necessary.

The threat of US intervention no longer holds up now because the PLA is No longer weak. But the PLA should plan for all contingencies including US intervention regardless.

Technically the US would need UN authorization to attack the PRC simply because the Island Of Taiwan Is Part Of The People's Republic Of China. The irony.

If a Political Solution can't be reached , Realistically it will take the US literally weeks just to mount a meaningful military response to the PLA. Even if the US wanted to respond right away it would be in vain , the US wouldn't be operating at a Full 100% Maximum Readiness Level at the start. They will be operating just below the war threshold entering in. US doctrine basically dictates that it must amass "overwhelming" force in the theatre of operation in order to achieve victory. So that will take time and by then it just might be too late , the PLA might have achieved their goals. "Fait Accompli" on the Island.

During the Desert Storm Gulf War , It took a peak Cold War Level US military literally 5IVE months to get authorization , organize a coalition , come up with a Battleplan and amasses the necessary forces in theatre to evict the Iraqis out of Kuwait. The PLA is 3-4 times(conservatively) the size of the Iraqi forces and far far more capable.

The US military is No way near it's Cold War 0ne peak levels. (Good luck with that "distributed concept" of trying to surge forces into theatre after the fact spread across an vast area)

Also the Russian Ukrainian conflict has greatly highlighted that when faced up against a neer Peer Nuclear Armed adversary the US and it's Lackeys will be less incline to engage directly militarily despite their rhetoric. The US Will seek indirect or lesser confrontational means and will try to exhaust All other options before choosing a direct confrontation with PLA in the Strait. There's huge difference between Peace Coalition/War Coalitions , sure everyone's on broad up until when live DF15/16/17/21s start flying around ( then shit gets real , real quick and folks jump ship )...So No I Don't Believe All The Hype.

grulle said:

I have thought of another problem faced by China should the Taiwan conflict erupt. SHOULD China preemptively strike US bases in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines? if China DOESN'T strike US bases, then there is a possibility that the US will not join the war. but the downside is that should war erupt, US forces will be at maximum strength should the US decide to join. however, if China DOES attack US bases, then the US will definitely join the war. so this is the dilemma faced by China. should China take a chance and bet that the US doesn't join the war, thereby refraining from attacking US bases in Asia.

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In the event of hostilities between PRC and RoC, a US strategy of simply massing its forces in neighbouring allied countries until it is ready is actually a very risky one - and potentially very dangerous for US forces. The US build-up would be concentrated in a limited number of bases, particularly with regard to Phillppines and South Korea. On a separate note, it should be noted that South Korea is strategically in a different - and strategically much more vulnerable position - than Japan and Phillippines, so it is dubious to any well-informed and objective observer that the RoK would dare join the fight. If the US builds up its strength regionally before entering the fight, it is by definition placing more and more of its expensive and irreplaceable assets within striking range of Chinese weapons. That is not an easy nor simple choice to make. This would expose the US to heavy losses if the PLAAF and PLARF chooses to strike after a huge number of additional targets are presented but before the US enters the fray. Adding to the complication, airbases in the Phillippines are not widely reinforced by concrete shelters, meaning aircrafts can be destroyed even by shrapnel instead of a direct hit. A nightmare scenario would be if relatively cheap PLARF missiles rain down on a US airfields jam-packed with expensive aircrafts, like F-35s and B-21s. A similar dynamic can be expected if Chinese ASBMs attacked US naval forces in Yokosuka or Guam. A pre-emptive strike by China towards the tail-end of a US regional build-up can be devastating.

This doesn't necessarily mean that US planners will not pursue this strategy of a forward build-up, but it is not so clear that this is an optimal strategy.

5unrise said:

In the event of hostilities between PRC and RoC, a US strategy of simply massing its forces in neighbouring allied countries until it is ready is actually a very risky one - and potentially very dangerous for US forces. The US build-up would be concentrated in a limited number of bases, particularly with regard to Phillppines and South Korea. On a separate note, it should be noted that South Korea is strategically in a different - and strategically much more vulnerable position - than Japan and Phillippines, so it is dubious to any well-informed and objective observer that the RoK would dare join the fight. If the US builds up its strength regionally before entering the fight, it is by definition placing more and more of its expensive and irreplaceable assets within striking range of Chinese weapons. That is not an easy nor simple choice to make. This would expose the US to heavy losses if the PLAAF and PLARF chooses to strike after a huge number of additional targets are presented but before the US enters the fray. Adding to the complication, airbases in the Phillippines are not widely reinforced by concrete shelters, meaning aircrafts can be destroyed even by shrapnel instead of a direct hit. A nightmare scenario would be if relatively cheap PLARF missiles rain down on a US airfields jam-packed with expensive aircrafts, like F-35s and B-21s. A similar dynamic can be expected if Chinese ASBMs attacked US naval forces in Yokosuka or Guam. A pre-emptive strike by China towards the tail-end of a US regional build-up can be devastating.

This doesn't necessarily mean that US planners will not pursue this strategy of a forward build-up, but it is not so clear that this is an optimal strategy.

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China will not launch a pre-emotive attack because of the political and diplomatic costs of such a move. The unflattering historic parallels would also be better avoided.

It would also be naive to think that the US would just cram vast amounts of military forces into the region without correspondingly increasing its defensive measures around its bases.

China does not as yet have a stealth bomber fleet. That means any alpha strike will either need to use expensive and limited ballistic and hypersonic missiles, or give the US plenty of advanced warning if swarms of cheaper but slower missiles are used instead.

So, to sum up, broader strategic considerations would go against a surprise attack. Even if China wanted to launch a surprise attack, its options are limited and cost-benefit ratios not as clear cut as many might think.

What I think China might do instead is set a massive military exclusion zone around Taiwan. When the US inevitably breach it to test China, China need to respond robustly and basically trust in that the aggressive training and arrogance of the America military will cause them to break discipline first and fire the first shot after sufficient provocation.

China may well purposefully use weak and outclassed assets like 056s or J11As to initiate this, as that will also make it more likely for the Americans to give in to their nature and shoot first when the opponent is obviously weaker. So in effect, China will gift America first blood, and use that as justification to declare war and then steamroll American forces in the region without any hint of underhanded sneakiness.

Such a move will not really cost the PLA much in terms of chances of success, because while the US forces will obvious be on top alert after such a build up and formal declaration of war, it actually wouldn’t change much in terms of overall US military alertness in the region as it’s impossible to expect that the US will be pouring all those forces into a hot war zone with the intention of entering the war and not already be at the highest possible level of alertness already.

plawolf said:

China will not launch a pre-emotive attack because of the political and diplomatic costs of such a move. The unflattering historic parallels would also be better avoided.

It would also be naive to think that the US would just cram vast amounts of military forces into the region without correspondingly increasing its defensive measures around its bases.

China does not as yet have a stealth bomber fleet. That means any alpha strike will either need to use expensive and limited ballistic and hypersonic missiles, or give the US plenty of advanced warning if swarms of cheaper but slower missiles are used instead.

So, to sum up, broader strategic considerations would go against a surprise attack. Even if China wanted to launch a surprise attack, its options are limited and cost-benefit ratios not as clear cut as many might think.

What I think China might do instead is set a massive military exclusion zone around Taiwan. When the US inevitably breach it to test China, China need to respond robustly and basically trust in that the aggressive training and arrogance of the America military will cause them to break discipline first and fire the first shot after sufficient provocation.

China may well purposefully use weak and outclassed assets like 056s or J11As to initiate this, as that will also make it more likely for the Americans to give in to their nature and shoot first when the opponent is obviously weaker. So in effect, China will gift America first blood, and use that as justification to declare war and then steamroll American forces in the region without any hint of underhanded sneakiness.

Such a move will not really cost the PLA much in terms of chances of success, because while the US forces will obvious be on top alert after such a build up and formal declaration of war, it actually wouldn’t change much in terms of overall US military alertness in the region as it’s impossible to expect that the US will be pouring all those forces into a hot war zone with the intention of entering the war and not already be at the highest possible level of alertness already.

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My post does not actually contradict any of the points you raised. I am talking about the risk and trade-offs a thoughtful US planner would have to consider before they recommend a ex-ante build-up of American assets regionally, like what Grulle is worried about. My comment is about what the US perspective in terms of risk versus rewards would look like, and how this will impact on their choice of strategy. I did not say what China may or may not do, only that the US cannot rule out China making the response that it fears the most. Although honestly, the position that China would rule out a pre-emptive strike in response to a US military build-up is not tenable in my view. If tension is elevated and the perceived reward is high enough, China may well make that choice.

5unrise said:

My post does not actually contradict any of the points you raised. I am talking about the risk and trade-offs a thoughtful US planner would have to consider before they recommend a ex-ante build-up of American assets regionally, like what Grulle is worried about. My comment is about what the US perspective in terms of risk versus rewards would look like, and how this will impact on their choice of strategy. I did not say what China may or may not do, only that the US cannot rule out China making the response that it fears the most. Although honestly, the position that China would rule out a pre-emptive strike in response to a US military build-up is not tenable in my view. If tension is elevated and the perceived reward is high enough, China may well make that choice.

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Well, isn’t the logical conclusion to the above that the US would need to recommend maximum alert levels and combat readiness for any foreword deployed forces, if the decision is made to forward deploy them? That would then in turn increase the risks and costs while also reducing the rewards of a Chinese surprise attack.

This is the fundamentals of game theory. Nothing happens in a vacuum. You making a move will trigger a counter from the opfor, so you can’t just ignore what the other side’s likely reaction and countermeasures might be when making your own choices and recommendations.

If the US crammed their forward bases to the gills with juicy targets and then actually gave everyone at those bases a weekend pass to do everything they can to recreate Pearl Harbour, do you really think PLA planners and leaders will not think that an obvious trap?

Sure, US military planners cannot discount the possibility as they would be failing in their duty if they did. But that doesn’t mean it’s going to happen either.

The reason I am ruling out a surprise attack by the PLA is because the PLA doesn’t need such a surprise attack to win. They can fight ‘fair’ and still steamroll whatever forces the US could reasonably forward deploy. That massively frees China’s hand in terms of what cards it can play and how it can play them and still win.

This higher level game is what China’s focus is on now, not mere just seeking to win the fight at all costs, but how to win it with as little costs (full spectrum, and not just militarily) and as much benefit (and not just limited to retaking Taiwan) as possible.

This is a classic example of what the meme of the US playing Checkers while China is playing Go is about.

The US mostly only thinks about short term immediate goals, because that’s how their leadership selection process selects their decision makers; while China looks to the long term and wants to make sure short term gains don’t come with unacceptable long term costs.