Hostomel wasn't even that bad whatsoever. They failed their objective, but they didn't get all slaughtered or whatever.
In the end, Russians held Hostomel until they decided to withdraw from Kiev.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
Hostomel wasn't even that bad whatsoever. They failed their objective, but they didn't get all slaughtered or whatever.
In the end, Russians held Hostomel until they decided to withdraw from Kiev.
War would not be over even if US lands forces in Taiwan. The Ukraine war didn't end with Russia landing forces in Hostomel. The war would only end once there is enough conventional destruction towards either US or China that one of them threaten nuclear ultimatum.
Rapid strike and interdiction is China’s initial strategy, but if they need to fall back, they still have strategic depth and industry to go on.
China definitely requires all the strategic depth which extends from her coastline that she could muster in order to hold enemies at standoff distances and buy time for her military buildup to progress.
Hence, it would be prudent for the PLA to firstly work towards flooding the entirety of the 1IC belt (i.e. waters within the 1IC) with as many things that can effectively shield the mainland as possible, thus making the 1IC belt into effectively a Chinese lake. Once this shield belt has been firmly established and secured, then the PLA should proceed with pushing the shield into the 2IC belt (i.e. waters between 1IC and 2IC).
This would require multiple types of platforms and assets that can form unified, comprehensive, effective and resilient networks of aerial, naval and undersea-denial shield belts which extends from the Chinese coastline and into the WestPac. AEW(&C), ELINT, SIGINT, ECM and ECCM, DEW-AD, AAM-AD, SAM-AD, ASW, USW and logistical support manned and unmanned assets etc are crucial.
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I'd actually argue that now is specifically the time that a new revolutionary path is needed not simply for China's sake but for a new sustainable global future, because capitalism as it right now (i.e., late-stage capitalism) fundamentally is a path towards self-destruction to whomever embraces it, so a new methodology is necessary anyways.
in general terms, whenever you rely on airborne forces to be the door-kicker, you are going to fail or suffer huge casualties. but when your airborne is simply a nice to have, meaning that you can still succeed without them, but perhaps at a lesser scale, then they will deliver results. one value of airborne forces in Taiwan would be rapid delivery of forces once the defenders are already on their backheel. the breakthrough would have already happened, beachhead secured, you want a thousand infantrymen right away to speed up the pace of the battle? drop some paratroopers in there to get your numbers and sow some chaos and confusion within enemy ranks. if you are asking for the paratroopers to take the beach so your armor can roll in unopposed? you are sending men to their death.
JC wept ...
Airmobile forces are there to help ensure the success of your amphib landing.
They maraud the rear areas and function as block forces at key nodes to prevent OPFOR bringing force to bear on the beachheads - thereby giving your landing forces more time to secure their landing. Time (and buying time) is everything here.
They are very much integral to any beach landing. Not to land on the beaches but behind ... for purposes sketched above. They are very much part of the CONOPS of the 3 countries I have trained with (and practically every other I have read of)
Yes, it is very high risk - high reward stuff. If the main body doesn't do their job, these guys are up the creek without a paddle. But that's the life of every mil unit that is tasked to and trains to operate behind lines ...
As for the harerbrained scheme of using airmobile troops as a means to get "a thousand infantryman right away" ... seriously? Issues of interoperability comes to mind. Not to mention lack of organic TO&E to front a push or exploit a breakthrough. As Steve Jobs said ... "You're
If your Amphib task force commander cannot get enough troops on the ground on subsequent waves of the landing ... he should be relieved of command already. For that matter, if he can't get troops on the ground, the he should really really worry about his abilities to get supplies on the ground before he starts thinking about sowing "chaos and confusion" with a "breakthrough" ... If there's one thing I learnt from being part of a RDF brigade - it's one thing to get your boots on the ground, it's another altogether to keep them supplied and functional.
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Desperate attempts by USA
You kind of touched on something here(for me)...when you brought up The Battle Of Hostomel Airport.
Did anyone find it a funny coincidence over the summer that a mock Air Assault(cough...photo opp demo) on Taoyuan International Airport was performed.
I don't know what the exact scenario details were for the mock assault on the Taoyuan Airport but from the short footage that was released , the mock assault featured a rapid air assault insertion of "PLA RED FORCES" supported by escorting Attack Helicopters providing air cover. Basically in the same vain the Russian assault on Hostomel Airport was reportedly said to have played out.
The similarities pretty much ended there...From what I understand the Russian assault on Hostomel Airport was basically a seize and hold operation. A rapid air assault Insertion by helicopter escorted by attack/gunship helicopters in multiple waves. Rumor has it that later additional VDV troops on IL76s were to be transport as reinforcement in further waves but they were aborted...( Yes I skip some things but that's it in a nutshell )
The Taoyuan Airport is about 5-10+ km in some places from the coast/Strait , so I could envision a possible scenario where once Air/Sea Control had been achieved/established by the PLAAF/PLAN , It's possible that the PLA could perform a similar operation that required a rapid air assault to capture and hold the Taoyuan Airport...
"An air insertion of about 300+ PLAAF/PLANM Heliborne troops involving a mix of about 30+ assault helicopter transports escorted by attack helicopters taking off from several Type 075s attached to a PLAN Task Group stationed several kms off the coast. With GL2s onsite providing fire support , WZ10s ECM/EW support"...Its not out of the realm of possibilities.
The Russian battleplan wasn't that bad , poor intelligence(underestimating your enemy) and poor execution(failure to secure air supremacy) is what bit them in the arse.
During the US invasion of Panama ("Just Cause") , US forces seized the Rio Hato Airport. On the day of the operation the Americans ran into some issues too. Two F117s would miss their marks(targets) go figure , NORIEGA would be tipped off about the pending invasion and the PDF Garrison guarding the airport would be put on full alert. Unknown to the Americans two Ranger Units would paradrop low onto the airfield while taking heavy fire. Lucky the Americans once on the ground they were able overtake the PDF , Of course the two AC130s , two AH64s and two M/AH6s flying overhead had nothing to with it...L0L
The Battle of Crete is a very interesting case , in my opinion.
The Battleplan was pretty solid (from the German standpoint) , the operation would start with a intense air bombardment of Island followed by the landing of about "20,000+" paratroopers(by glider/air transports) to seize about 6/7 airfields ports in phases(waves).
The commentary criticism(flak) of the mission tends to squarely focus on the two problems that arose (before the operation and during the first phase/wave). 0ne German Intelligence estimated that the British had a Garrison of about 5,000 troops on the Island with "moderate defenses" , but were wrong. The British had incepted and broken German codes losing "element of surprise". The British quickly reinforced their Garrison to about "40,000+" strong and set up heavy defenses exactly where the Germans were to land/paradrop...that's why secured lines and good intelligence gathering capabilities are essential to any operation.
Two , the Germans suffered major equipment failures and made the tactical error to drop a large majority of their paratroopers unarmed separated from all their weapons(dropped in separate canisters). Resulting in high casualties and further delays...had the Germans practiced a dry run they might have caught these two fatal flaws head of time , practice does sometimes make perfect.
Despite all of these early blunders the Germans still managed to take the island from a well defended enemy who knew they were coming and outnumbered them 2-1.
First I am a Big advocate(fan) for the use of Airborne Forces and for their continued expansion(modernization)/indoctrination into the PLA's overall war planning.
I would say Airborne/Air Assault is a recent development in warfare ( meaning man's first method of warfare was conducted on land first , sea next ...air the 20th century) So it's a recent development for the PLA.
The PLA Airborne/Air Assault Forces introduces a third dimension to the battlefield. It's the third piece to a 3D Chess Board(land/sea/air).
If coastal/beach defensives can't be taken out in a timely manner...Why allow the operation to stall , Why force the issue , try to land onto those beaches , when the beaches themselves can be bypassed all together by Air Insertion further inland if applicable?..
Insertion by air allows the PLA to access areas Fast/Quickly that would be inaccessible to other PLA sea/grounds units. It allows PLA to go over the top("vertical") of the enemy. This is the exact reason why many top tier armies of the world continue to deploy them. The benefits out weight the risks. But Risk are generally High.
Airborne Forces are an "elite" force ("special reserve") that should be used during special circumstances to take very specific military objectives. So Yes Just because you have the capability doesn't necessarily mean it's the right tool/action. Planning any airborne/air assault is no Easy Task By No Means. A certain level(degree) of risk/failure Is involved but that's with any military operation. To conduct a successful Airborne/Air Assault it takes Ingenuity , GOOD INTELLIGENCE , Training(constantly)/Logistics , Air Control/Support and Timing. It requires military planners to be Bold("creative") in every aspect. So PLA military Planners Must Not Be Discourage to undertake such operations should a optimal opportunity present itself.
When the decision is made , I Do believe the PLA/PLAAF Airborne Corps Will Play a Key Role in the retaking of the Island Of Taiwan in some form or another. Whether its in the opening hours or middle stages of the campaign performing Heliborne drops to seize/secure(hold) choke points or airbridges(airfields). Airborne landings to reinforce and resupply. Or just Misdirection , paradrops behind enemy to cause confusion and chaos. The PLAAF Airborne Corps will Play A Role.
I suspect the head of regional government front runner William Lai is going to be really quiet for the next little while after declaring independence a few weeks ago.
If AR started tomorrow in this environment, would US be in any position to give sustained military support? In the many discussions with the current balance of power, US difference making is dependent on the full force of the US military and allies being available to defeat the PLA.
However, I would think right at this current point in time, I don't think it would be the case.
If AR started tomorrow in this environment, would US be in any position to give sustained military support? In the many discussions with the current balance of power, US difference making is dependent on the full force of the US military and allies being available to defeat the PLA.
However, I would think right at this current point in time, I don't think it would be the case.