Aha I see what you mean. Maybe the all-out incapacitation strike I mentioned earlier would have to part of the blockade then. This means the blockade would happen at the same time as PLAAF and PLARF conduct massive SEAD and standoff strikes until all ROCA's SAM units and military airports (and all ROCAF fighter jets) were put out of action....
That's not what I said, but let's take a closer look at what you said. I will be clear that first and foremost, China has many options to increase pressure on Taiwan, including military options short of invasion – limited campaigns to seize Taiwan-controlled islands off China's coast, blockades of Taiwan's ports and economic quarantines to stifle the island's commerce. Under a total incapacitation blow with a subsequent landing operation, I believe the blockade would have to be applied regardless of how the PLA begins the bombing operation. The blockade exists for a reason, to ensure the forces that execute it a certain degree of control over a certain area, with the purpose of preventing or hindering the passage of unauthorized ships and aircraft. Due to its implications for traffic in neutral countries, in principle, the blockade must be the subject of a formal declaration and, even if it is not internationally accepted, it is necessary that there are real conditions to make it effective, using the object of military force to implement, China would call this a strategic blockade in the PLA's doctrinal document, "The 2020 Science of Military Strategy."
One thing little commented on in its concept and real application would be how the US could respond to this, China using the formal declaration of blockade, would force the US to discuss China's terms and conditions before going to war, even if they could previously refuse them, it would make the discussion mandatory for Americans in trying to alienate their allies to go to war against China. Therefore, blocking as a response capability to attacks can serve as a security guarantee measure and is a considerable deterrent to any potential attacker, including providing the PLA with escalation management, and can be used effectively to inhibit or prevent for adversaries to employ their forces, being an object of containment for the Chinese.
Then you got the issues of Taiwan's own ballistic and cruise missiles, which could still target the Mainland's railway, roads, ports, airports, and other dual-use infrastructures. The massive missile and airstrikes against Taiwan would then happen while PLAN warships and aircrafts surround the Island.
This is a very real possibility, even Taiwan is ready to receive 1,000 "missiles" in 2024, but this would also depend greatly on the ROCA's initial readiness capacity at the time of the start of the conflict. In that same condition, under the terms you argued earlier, the ROCA would have full situational awareness and raise the readiness of all its combat systems before the start of the conflict, the ROCA would have enough time to do so, because to accumulate the forces necessary to For the PLA to invade Taiwan, it would take weeks and/or months, giving both Taiwan and its allies necessary reaction time to prepare. Already under a lightning preventive air-naval attack with strategic surprise and a minimum tactical surprise, this readiness of the ROCA would not be as high, thus giving the joint PLA forces enough time to disable the ROCA's support/logistics points, making it impossible for Taiwan to expected response, at worst, decreasing ROCA's responsiveness.
Now, assuming all of the ROCAF, ROCN, and cruise missile units were neutralised within the first 8 hours of conflict (if PLA were successful), and the Island of Formosa becomes fully surrounded by PLAN vessels whilst Taipei still refuses to surrender albeit lacking all offensive means to fight back? By this time hundreds of thousands of both guided and unguided ordnances have been dropped on Taiwan with roughly 30,000+ ROC military and 10,000+ civilian deaths (yes, in just 8 hours...
I still have doubts that these Taiwanese cruise missiles are being aimed at PLA combat systems. Yourself said that they can target dual-use infrastructure, such as railways, roads, ports and airports, as well as other compensating dual-use targets. ROCA simply does not have any chance in a war of attrition with the PLA, the best initiative that ROCA can offer its allies is to attack these dual-use infrastructures, even as a way of pressuring mainland Chinese society to demand alternative solutions to the CCP around the invasion, I would even say that the ROCA would try to attack the Three Gorges Dam, knowing that this was a compensator target. The fact that they refuse to surrender means absolutely nothing, because what is at stake here is not Taiwan, but the entry of the allied cavalry into the conflict, the PLA would need to disable the ROCA, anyway, this will have to be done mandatorily, considering the invasion in a week or just the air-naval blockade, the difference is whether Taiwan will have to be invaded before reinforcements arrive or after the situation stabilizes around its allies, with the PLA dissuading or militarily denying aid Taiwan's ally.
Now you have a situation where the Taiwanese population become more determined to fight. The PLARF's conventional missiles units are running low on ammo (all DF-11s, 15s, and 16s expended). The PLARF's fighter and bomber units need to regroup in airports deep inside China to avoid surprise attacks against their former airports...
You are considering that China would be in a reactive situation in this scenario. There is no way for the West to hide the game of whether or not they will intervene against China, even if they manage to do that, there is no way to hide all the military preparation and accumulation of forces, at this stage, the PLA would be much more active attacking these concentration points , wherever you are in Japan/Korea/Singapore or any other country in the Pacific, in addition, I find the idea of the PLA running out of ammunition to be incoherent, considering that 1 year earlier, the Chinese would probably multiply the production of ammunition and missiles, I believe that This is a fantasy scenario, I'm not the one saying that, but analysts who estimate how to predict the moment that China will attack, one of the points aimed at knowing the approximate moment of the invasion is precisely a period of 6 months to 1 year before with a huge increase in armaments production.
Another thing, in your scenario in which you describe an operation to conquer Taiwan in a week, in this scenario it would be even worse, because the accumulation of forces and troop concentrations on the coast would all be subject to observation, by any means. , giving enough time for all of Taiwan's allies to prepare simultaneously like China, this way, when the AR begins, these concentrations and distributions of Taiwan's allies would already be ready or almost completed to intervene in favor of their ally. Under a lightning naval air blockade, the interval would be in a matter of days or even hours, but here the AR would have already started, with the Chinese mobilizing at the same time that the West also carried out its mobilizations, the difference is that China would be accompanying all this accumulation, while attacking the ROCA with the naval air blockade.
For Xi and CMC sitting in the Western Hill's command bunker, should they just declare that they have "taught the Taiwanese separatists a lesson" and call off subsequent military operations? Or proceed and risk WWIII with most of the PLAN and PLAAF risk being annihilated, while transports vessels sunk with their tanks and thousands of marines onboard?
The day this happens, in any alternative scenario, nuclear warheads would already be flying back and forth simultaneously.
I don't the CMC having any good options anyway. The most China could achieve is to bomb Taiwan back to the stone age, so Taiwan no longer has the economic, industrial, and military might to pursue political independence (but it still does not prevent Taiwan from unilaterally declaring independence ...
The CMC has many options, there is no ideal option, this will largely depend on the geostrategic situation at the time. A campaign to take over islands controlled by Taiwan, naval blockade of ports, quarantine to suffocate the island, among others - what I still have doubts about is the crisis management system, the formation of a National Security Council system could be interesting for China, I still don't know if they have an adequate system in place given the complex conditions surrounding the AR. However, as things progress, I believe that PR is an increasingly distant desire, at least as long as the US is still fully present in the Western Pacific, just complete the US's recent actions, opening bases in the Philippines with the opportunity to expand further.
