PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
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Regardless of how we view the state of US fortification, my point is that there is only one possibility that could potentially lead to war over Taiwan, and that is a Taiwan declaration of secession. Such a declaration can only happen with inducement or acquiescence from the US.

Therefore, there are only two possibilities: either the US induces TI after fully preparing for war with China, or they induce TI without the necessary war preparation.

In the latter case, it would indicate that the US does not intend to engage China in direct conflict, and therefore China should not launch a preemptive attack.

In the former case, China should simply not launch AR at all, instead blockading the island indefinitely until the US is forced to drawdown.

Well, the question of how China should respond to the variety of conditions in which the US may seek to induce or provoke TI, is something I prefer to avoid because there's so many permutations of it that deserve their own unique answers.

But if you agree that at this stage there is no evidence that the US has decided to initiate or provoke a conflict with China, and that preparedness is different to intent, then I have no disagreement with you.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
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Yeah, giving a loitering suicide drone a SDB-2 type guidance system isn't going to keep it cheap. That's one way to drastically increase costs.

From what I can see, the cost of a Shaheed with SDB-2 guidance would jump from $20K to $100K, based on the US experience with SDBs.

But you only sprinkle a few of these into a large swarm, because the odds of them being hit are pretty low. The vast majority of the Shaheeds would be a basic $20K version with Inertial, GPS and optical guidance.

And $100K for a Shaheed with autonomous detection and targeting of mobile targets is still pretty low. Remember the Iron Dome and Stingers are missiles which are still going to be slightly more expensive.

And let's suppose all the Shaheeds are equipped with expensive SDB-2 guidance. The cost advantage in the previous example against a SPAAG drops from 9x to 1.8x
This is still advantageous.



My overall point is that loitering drones should not be seen as a weapon which is both mass producible at low cost and also highly viable against a modern and prepared enemy that has networked sensors operating alongside low cost interception methods like SPAAG, low cost SAMs, and comprehensive EW.

Yes, loitering drones can help with the overall SEAD/DEAD effort, but you still need to look at the system of system balance of fires and countermeasures, and in the original context it was raised it was implied it would be used to force the defenders to use higher end SAMs against them and my point is that lower cost measures would be part of a layered defense to target the lower cost and kinematically weak weapons like loitering drones.

And I've countered with scenarios which show [SPAAG, low cost SAMs and comprehensive EW] simply do not work in an arms race.

You call for the use of low-cost SAMs. But there is no such thing as a Western low-cost SAM when they are at least 5x more expensive than a $20K Shaheed. All Western SAMs are actually high cost when compared to a Shaheed.

So if you want to reserve your SAMs, then you're reliant on gun-based systems.

1. That means relying on Shaheeds to close to within 2km. But some of these will be providing detailed targeting/imaging for other systems or DEAD aircraft. And some of these Shaheed will be directly targeting said Gun/SAM systems. The point is that you don't know which Shaheeds in a swarm are which type.
2. How many gun-systems would you need, if they have a range of 2km?
3. If Shaheeds are systematically destroying the soft, fixed infrastructure like fuel, electricity, water and telecoms infrastructure

My point is that any SPAAG or SAM defence is much higher cost than a Shaheed swarm.

Let's say a $15 Mn SPAAG manages an absolutely incredible feat of shooting down 100 Shaheeds, but then the next Shaheed kills the SPAAG. The cost of Shaheeds is still 5x less than the SPAAG.
 

AndrewS

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And where will the 10,000s of very expensive, low-observable, EW resistant, standoff-range missiles needed to do this come from? You don't just have to saturate China's entire coastal air defense system, you also need to then actually get enough fires through on top of that to deal meaningful damage to the entire country's ability to make war. I doubt even China itself has this kind of war production capability.

Even public-facing, highly politicized war games from think tanks with comically optimistic assumptions still have the US depleting its entire standoff supply within two weeks of only targeting PLAN vessels and maybe a handful of coastal airbases if that. The US does not have the capability to impose meaningful attrition on mainland infrastructure and war production through conventional means.

I get a figure of at least 5000 aimpoints in Taiwan.
Extrapolate this to China, then you end up with 300K aimpoints.
And the vast majority of these Chinese aimpoints will be in the Chinese interior.
 

aqh

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The US is going to massively expand missile defence in Guam.
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Imo this shows that they won't be able to get new bases from allies. They wouldn't go all in if they had more bases in the pipeline - it would be a waste of money. Guam is clearly going to be the US military central system in west pac and will be almost certainly defended by Aegies destroyers. The PLA needs many more fires to saturate this base.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

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This is where I absolutely disagree, if any thing the past 30+ years of observing American foreign policy actions makes that very clear that nothing less would ever stop the US from actively attacking and undermining anybody who refuses to obey their political and economic dominance over the global system, which is why no peace is really possible until that system fails. China is far closer to US 1941 than the US itself is (if anything the US is closer to 1941 Japan), and has the means to carry that out, but in any event as things have played out the way I've initially hypothesized, time will prove my point.
And how is China going to force the US to surrender unconditionally? Invade CONUS directly?

Do you know how illogical and unfeasible that sounds? Let alone the size of nuclear arsenal of which the US possesses.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
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Unless I misunderstand something, even H20s would not be able to hit CONUS and return. I do not believe China is even seeking to build conventional capabilities that hold CONUS at risk. Too unrealistic. Only nuclear and cyber.
As long as the US refrains from attacking targets within mainland China in a Pacific War 2.0, then China has little reasons to attack targets within CONUS either.

But if Murican missiles do land on mainland Chinese soil, then it is only appropriate for Chinese missiles to land on mainland Murican soil (i.e. CONUS) as well - Whether that be conventional warheads or nuclear warheads.

However, it should be stressed that (key) targets located on Hawaii, Alaska and western CONUS should be prioritized than (key) targets situated elsewhere in times of Pacific War 2.0. Unless the defensive capabilities of the US and Canada have been severely degraded, China is very unlikely to get close to blow up that USAF Plant 4 (one of the F-35 assembly lines) in Fort Worth, Texas, for instance.

~~~

In the meantime, speaking of conducting conventional strikes against targets in Hawaii, Alaska and western CONUS from China by air, there are three conditions which must be met:
#1 - Strategic bombers that are capable of travelling very long distances;
#2 - Mid-route refueling support; and most importantly
#3 - Ultra long-range standoff missile for land attack and/or anti-ship roles.

For capability #1, that would be the much-anticipated H-20 for the PLAAF.

It has been widely assumed that the H-20 has a broadly similar performance profile as the B-2 Spirit, which has a range of ~6000 nautical miles (~11100 kilometers) without refueling, and ~10000 nautical miles (~18500 kilometers) with one refueling.

Assuming that the effective combat radius of the H-20 is one-third of its one-way range with substantial payloads onboard:
1. ~3700 kilometers without refueling; and
2. ~6100 kilometers with one refueling, which relates to capability #2.

With the H-20s based in Wuhan:
1. A ~3700-kilometer effective combat radius is enough to cover pretty much the entire 1IC and most of the entire 2IC (including Guam, but not Papua New Guinea); while
2. A ~6100-kilometer effective combat radius is enough to cover much of the 2.5IC (including Wake and Papua New Guinea, but not Midway), and right up to the middle of the Aleutians.

Yet, in order to strike targets in Hawaii, Alaska and western CONUS, capabilities #2 and #3 are must-haves, apart from moving the H-20's basing location to somewhere in northeastern China. From now onwards, we'll use the city of Changchun instead of Wuhan.

Speaking of capability #2 - China does have the great help of Russia. More specifically, Russia offers the PLAAF H-20s with two great options:
1. Land at friendly Russian air bases in the Russian Far East to refuel, and/or
2. Conduct mid-air refueling with the YY-20A/Bs based in the Russian Far East while overflying the Russian Far East and/or the Sea of Okhotsk (which would require friendly airspace-control support by the Russian Air Force and the Russian Navy) -
While en-route to conduct long-range strike missions against targets in Hawaii, Alaska and western CONUS.

With capabilities #1 and #2 settled, let's move onto the most important of all - Capability #3.

Of course, dropping guided bombs onto targets from 10s or 100+ kilometers away is certainly much desirable in terms of costs and strike bandwidth than launching missiles from 1000+ or 2000+ kilometers away. However, strike missions today and into the future conducted in highly-contested airspaces typically employ standoff missiles that are launched from standoff distances, in order to enhance the survivability of understandably-expensive strike platforms (including the H-20).

For this case, China does have the KD-20 (air-launched variant of the CJ-10), which has a strike range of ~2000-2500 kilometers. If the KD-20s can be adapted for the H-20s, this would increase the effective strike range of the H-20s to ~8100-8600 kilometers. This essentially puts Anchorage and Oahu within the effective strike range of the H-20s armed with KD-20s, of which the KD-20s will be launched while flying high above the Bering Sea or the NorthPac.

Doing so would also minimize the chances of the H-20s being exposed to direct enemy interception efforts by fighters stationed in Japan, Alaska and the Aleutians through avoiding the need to venture close to or enter enemy-controlled airspaces in order to release strike payloads.

Meanwhile, in order to expand the H-20's effective strike range even further in order to cover western CONUS, standoff missiles with even longer strike ranges (~4000+ kilometers) are definitely required.

~~~

In a nutshell, expeditionary conventional strikes against targets on the EastPac side and the western CONUS are definitely possible for China, as long as all three of the aforementioned capabilities are met.
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Speaking of capability #2 - China does have the great help of Russia. More specifically, Russia offers the PLAAF H-20s with two great options:
1. Land at friendly Russian air bases in the Russian Far East to refuel, and/or
2. Conduct mid-air refueling with the YY-20A/Bs based in the Russian Far East while overflying the Russian Far East and/or the Sea of Okhotsk (which would require friendly airspace-control support by the Russian Air Force and the Russian Navy) -
While en-route to conduct long-range strike missions against targets in Hawaii, Alaska and western CONUS.

I think the use of Russian bases in a stretch too far.

Plus H-20s targeting Western CONUS is too far as well. Hawaii and Alaska yes.

But for Western CONUS, submarines are the realistic option.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
The US is going to massively expand missile defence in Guam.
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Imo this shows that they won't be able to get new bases from allies. They wouldn't go all in if they had more bases in the pipeline - it would be a waste of money. Guam is clearly going to be the US military central system in west pac and will be almost certainly defended by Aegies destroyers. The PLA needs many more fires to saturate this base.

If you read the article, AEGIS ashore is one element of the overall Guam air defence, rather than AEGIS destroyers
 

Inque

New Member
Registered Member
It's often said that an invasion of Taiwan would make D-Day look like child's play. Is there any truth to this? D-Day involved landing over 150,000 troops. Does China have the logistical ability to replicate this? Are 150,000 troops even sufficient to take Taiwan?
 

Michaelsinodef

Senior Member
Registered Member
It's often said that an invasion of Taiwan would make D-Day look like child's play. Is there any truth to this? D-Day involved landing over 150,000 troops. Does China have the logistical ability to replicate this? Are 150,000 troops even sufficient to take Taiwan?
No, the PLA doesn't need to land 150k troops on the very first day or initial few days lol.

Not to mention, the preliminary work of attacking will be carried out by the PLAAF, PLAN and PLARF which would destroy a lot of the resistance that would exist, making the landing much, much easier.
 
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