PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Brainsuker said:

I don't know, but I think H-20 should be more strategic purpose than tactical one. If it can bring nuclear missiles inside it's body, it can penetrate Japanese and South Korean air defense platforms, and aim to Tokyo and Seoul. Also threat Manila to think twice before they agree to join the war in US side. Because with H-20 stealth capability, it can strike Tokyo, Seoul and Manila from any where outside China own territory. It can even strike Japan from eastward, strike Manila from SCS or even turn around from Russia territory / north Korea to reach Japan and South Korea from the location that they are not aware off.

With that, China can decrease the chance of Japan, S. Korea, Philippine, etc from doing dangerous adventure that can harm China intention to unite Taiwan.

And yes, I know that Dong Feng can also do the job. But think about it. Dong Feng will be very likely to launched from China mainland. And you know what, I'm sure that all US and their alliance air defense weapons will face toward China. But if China has something that bring more calculation to the table, it can change the things around East Asia.

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To be clear, I'm not stating that anti-shipping will be H-20's primary role, but rather that anti shipping will probably be one of the missions that H-20 will have given to it by virtue of being a modern bomber.
For the anti ship mission, H-20s would be more important at distances beyond the first island chain rather than at the first island chain.

I want to steelman my argument as much as possible. The argument being that USAF and USN will not possess the capability and balance of forces required to operate within the 1IC by projected PLA forces from 2030. As such I want the best possible arguments supporting the idea that the USN and USAF will be able to operate within the 1IC by 2030.

From what I understand the only way the USN and USAF will have a serious presence within the 1IC is if the PLA is many times worse than we thought, the Type 09V isn't procured before 2030 and the US has gotten like 30 distributed HAS bases around the 1IC and 2IC.

Does anyone else have any ideas as to how USAF & USN could operate within 1IC?

Due to attrition on bases and ASBMs holding CVNs at risk forcing them further away China will almost certainly imo have a lot more sorties over the contested battle space than the US. And due to the current Chinese warship build-up which by 2030 would mean that local Chinese destroyers/cruisers/frigates ships will nearly equal global US ones as well as land based long ranged strike options with a superior offboard ISTAR information environment (the PLA by then will have if they do not already possess information superiority/ nearing supremacy) VLO bombers and more sorties as previously mentioned means that the USN would be suicidal to put their ships in the 1IC other than Virginias.

aqh said:

I want to steelman my argument as much as possible. The argument being that USAF and USN will not possess the capability and balance of forces required to operate within the 1IC by projected PLA forces from 2030. As such I want the best possible arguments supporting the idea that the USN and USAF will be able to operate within the 1IC by 2030.

From what I understand the only way the USN and USAF will have a serious presence within the 1IC is if the PLA is many times worse than we thought, the Type 09V isn't procured before 2030 and the US has gotten like 30 distributed HAS bases around the 1IC and 2IC.

Does anyone else have any ideas as to how USAF & USN could operate within 1IC?

Due to attrition on bases and ASBMs holding CVNs at risk forcing them further away China will almost certainly imo have a lot more sorties over the contested battle space than the US. And due to the current Chinese warship build-up which by 2030 would mean that local Chinese destroyers/cruisers/frigates ships will nearly equal global US ones as well as land based long ranged strike options with a superior offboard ISTAR information environment (the PLA by then will have if they do not already possess information superiority/ nearing supremacy) VLO bombers and more sorties as previously mentioned means that the USN would be suicidal to put their ships in the 1IC other than Virginias.

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You are expanding your question too much.

Your original question was about how H-20s could operate in an anti ship role against naval forces operating at 1IC distances.
My answer is that at the present time and into the foreseeable future, the capabilities that H-20 is expected to field are unlikely to provide decisive changes to the PLA's ability to field anti-ship fires at 1IC distances in the northern and eastern (and also southeastern) directions of the 1IC at the system of systems level.

Instead, if we want to talk about the most impactful way in which H-20s could contribute to the PLA's the anti-ship role, it would be at greater distances (between 1IC and 2IC, and perhaps 1IC in the southern direction).



As for the rest, I have no comment.

FairAndUnbiased said:

Depends on missile range. Even 500 km missiles maybe too short legged for hitting CBGs with a subsonic unstealthy bomber and 1000 km missiles will have limited quantity and payload. A H-20 can approach within 300-500 km safely.

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@aqh is referring to targets within the FIC, which is right in front of China's doorstep.

Range is much less of a concern for the H-20s within the FIC, meaning that the H-20s can carry a much larger payload.

Of course, the southern reaches of the SCS is rather far from Hainan, but the H-20s can still refuel mid-air in the northern regions of the SCS, which should still be relatively safe with land-based SAM+CAP cover from Hainan, alongside SAM cover from PLAN warships around Sanya.

The H20 situation that you have described Blitzo makes perfect sense. Honestly my original idea of the H20s being suitable for cleaning up the 1IC is probably doable with H6s under the Chinese coast SAM umbrella shooting off YJ 21s.

The H20 will make life hard for the USN in the 2IC so long as the PLA procures a sufficient amount of long ranged PGMs

aqh said:

I want to steelman my argument as much as possible. The argument being that USAF and USN will not possess the capability and balance of forces required to operate within the 1IC by projected PLA forces from 2030. As such I want the best possible arguments supporting the idea that the USN and USAF will be able to operate within the 1IC by 2030.

From what I understand the only way the USN and USAF will have a serious presence within the 1IC is if the PLA is many times worse than we thought, the Type 09V isn't procured before 2030 and the US has gotten like 30 distributed HAS bases around the 1IC and 2IC.

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I don't see even 30 distributed HAS airbases as enough for the US to operate within the First Island Chain.

Currently we're looking about 2000 Chinese combat aircraft including 200+ stealth fighters located across 150+ airbases over China.

By 2030, I'm expecting this to grow to 3000 Chinese combat aircraft with 1000 stealth fighters. And for them to be supported by relevant ISR, tanker aircraft etc. As mentioned previously, I think it was a huge strategic mistake for the US to ditch engagement for containment, as a Chinese military buildup is one of the logical consequences.

Plus remember that US bases in the First Island Chain somehow have to be resupplied, whilst the seaports and airports are under attack. And if we take the example of Japan which is a small but densely populated island with no natural resources that has to import oil and food. In comparison, China is the same size as the continental USA and can be self-sufficient in most respects, plus China shares many land borders where some trade can continue. So Japan would collapse from a blockade long before China does.

Yes I completely agree. I was just trying to construct a scenario where the US would actually be able to compete with China in the1IC. I don't believe that is possible but I want to hear some counter arguments

aqh said:

Yes I completely agree. I was just trying to construct a scenario where the US would actually be able to compete with China in the1IC. I don't believe that is possible but I want to hear some counter arguments

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I'm interested with your constructed scenario. If you don't mind to share your thought. I also think about making a wargame between us member about Taiwan crisis if it is ever happen.

By "constructed scenario" do you mean my idea of what the balance of forces will look like by 2030?

aqh said:

Yes I completely agree. I was just trying to construct a scenario where the US would actually be able to compete with China in the1IC. I don't believe that is possible but I want to hear some counter arguments

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Realistically it's going to be a very steep uphill battle to invade China. War is down to economics and logistics, a country with smaller economy that's thousands of miles away from the other country just isn't going to have much chances of succeeding.

The USSR had the same problem in the cold war. Ultimately, their threats to invade west Germany were just that, threats. What would actually have happened if they had tried? I'm pretty sure they would have been bogged down and defeated.

And the USSR had way more military might stacked up in Europe vis a vis US than what US has stacked up in Asia vis a vis China now.

So if US invades Taiwan, it would only really happen because an insane nationalist who is completely out of touch with reality takes leadership in America. It would be a war with many lost on China's side, but far more bloodier for the invaders, and one that would almost certainly lead to their complete defeat.

What more cunning US leaders might do that could give them an advantage (like you asked for, a scenario where US can contest equally with China militarily), would be to start targeting Chinese aligned countries and only engage China in proxy wars. China doesn't have as many points as US has when it comes to deploying troops overseas, and it's likely that most of the PLA will be at home.

If you look at the extreme end, an invasion of Iran would be an area where the PLA would be much more even with the US forces. China would likely also not be able to fully mobilize just for a proxy war, whereas an attack on the home territories will lead to a full mobilization.