PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Alaska was profitable, providing fur. Russian fur traders were so important in what are now the states of Washington and Oregon that in the beginning of the 19th century Russian was the lingua franca between the local Native American tribes. But in view of the development of the US west coast, where the US had taken two-third of Mexico in a war not twenty years before it made more sense to sell the area to the US rather than wait for it to be taken in war.

Kurt said:

No, the Russians would be selling their own citizens in the Far East and their most important Pacific harbour.
Alaska was sold because the tzar was cash strapped and this lack of cash endangered the existence of his gouvernment while Alaska was only claimed, but hardly settled or explored nor profitable (the gold was found later).

Concerning the "Tibet, Tienanmen Square, and Taiwan" thorns. Are all self-inflicted except Taiwan. If you can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen. Similarly there's bias on "the West", Africa or the Middle East in China, that's how we construct easy to grasp concepts of the world. Of course, these do contain many wrongs, but "who is without guilt may throw the first stone."

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If you have no business to be in the kitchen in the first place, then stay the heck out of it. How does Tibet is self-inflicted when china has already resolved that issue in the late 1950s? It's only when a few Hollywood idiots decided to make the Dalai Lama as the cute cult figure for the "Free Tibet" cause, so they can force feed the world their "values". Tienanmen Square has many history to it, it's strange when it comes to challenging the CCP power the west likes to picked on the 1989 one to enforce their ways upon others again.

delft said:

Alaska was profitable, providing fur. Russian fur traders were so important in what are now the states of Washington and Oregon that in the beginning of the 19th century Russian was the lingua franca between the local Native American tribes. But in view of the development of the US west coast, where the US had taken two-third of Mexico in a war not twenty years before it made more sense to sell the area to the US rather than wait for it to be taken in war.

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I don't think Mexico wanted to sell the land in the first place. It was the infamous Manifest Destiny that made the Southwest a part of the US after the war. So it was a war of conquest, there by everybody has the right to do the same, no matter the politics and time frame (even today).

Gentlemen, I fail to see how much of the latest posts have much if anything to do with PLAN tactics or strategy.

The fat pilot may have been a little pre-occupied with all the holiday festivities, but it's hard to not see him make another appearence here if the discussion remains so off topic and dangerously close to being about politics.

I would stop here if I were you, cos when the fat pilot returns, I predict he may be less jolly and forgiving than before, as he would be on a diet to shed the holiday weight to fit in his already cramped cockpit.

Back to naval strategy, I stand by my word that the Taiwan issue is the continuation of the civil war because it poses a systemic challenge to the authorities on the mainland (and has nothing to do with any territorial reunification).
This threat is mainly cultural and therefore impossible to control. The upside for the mainland rulers is the visible economic boom that creates support or at least acceptance of their rule and thus negates a significant current political challenge.
However, for any booming economy a significant and compareably long economic depression seems inevitable according to current experience. A strong antagonistic Taiwan could tip the balance under such conditions and pose an out of proportion political threat. At least this could be expected from a Taiwan leadership with equal capabilities as the current mainland rulers after their long march.
So mainland China must empty the systemic threat and the best options are open doors for economic cooperation without imported political concepts, pressure against any formal independance claims and kindling a strong feeling of nationalism on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This nationalism will be the enduring legacy because it allows to unite without much debate on a constitution. I consider current buy-ins into the Taiwanese media by mainland companies as serving the goal of heightened national awareness of Chinese identity. Hacker attacks for the rights of Chinese in South East Asian countries like Indonesia serve the same idea by providing a common base on national feelings about an identity to be proud of. The economic cooperation offers stellar chances for the Taiwanese elites, but binds their income to mainland politics, so important elite support for positions counter mainland interests are muted. (It's hard to make somebody understand something if his salary depends on not understanding it. English proverb) Most important these politics can gain traction among Taiwanese officers and scientists with sever effects on defenseability of the island.

From a military perspective any mainland attempt for a quick territorial occupation of the island is futile. The repercussions through naval mines in littoral waters negate all significant military transport capability from the mainalnd to the island and will shut down most current trade routes for both parties. Any continued Taiwanese resistance with even limited outside support and no open US intervention could force the Chinese mainland into an unsustainable economic situation with resulting political risks.
Connecting the South Asian Chinese string of pearls to the mainland's infrastructure could ease these economic repercussions and force the US into an excessive list of conflicts, while Taiwan will most certainly have all their naval trade blocked for the duration of hostilities. The string of pearls is vulnerable to Indian attempts to maintain their regional power status in South Asia and reset the borders China had forced them to accept. So it's natural that current Chinese naval blue water buildup is directed towards maintaining their freedom of movement in the Indian Ocean and directly compares future Indian carrier capability.
So the Taiwan Strait issue is an affair embedded among many smouldering regional conflicts and difficult to extract and solve on its own.

Re-unification is based on the concept of one country two systems, see the position of Hong Kong. No problem there. RoC independence would not be recognized by any significant country in the world.
So the only objection to re-unification is the wish of the US to hem in PLAN. That needs the cooperation of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. In time the US will be forced to remove its armed forces from Japan and South Korea, while all countries of East and South Asia will integrate their economies. There is not anymore a profit to be won from occupying part or all of another country as there was for Germany and France to fight over Alsace-Lorraine in former centuries so countries need not find allies to prevent this happening.

No problem with the system in Hong Kong? It was certainly not as bad as many communist bashers wanted you to believe, but Hong Kong has certainly not become as "free" as a totally seperate system might make them. Furthermore Hong Kong liberty is meant to slowly expire, creating a countdown mentally of adaption. I'm not sure that would sit well with all influential Taiwanese factions.

Back to the two country two systems, I do consider that the best outcome, although the mainland does have the capability to prepare for different contingencies, although any forced attempt for change in East Asia is pretty pointless from a military naval perspective (except for Korea). Perhaps Germany can provide a role model for "re"unification (we did that plenty of times) by giving Taiwan a position similar to Bavaria in the German Empire. They had their own communication agencies, military, some laws and they were allowed to have own consulates within the German Empire's consulates. The modern offspring is the "Freistaat" concept, adopted by many other German countries/nations within our federation, who are at liberty to reserve own special rights and voluntary join the German federation.

Concerning a pan-East Asian alliance, reminds me a bit of the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere in ambition. If such a power really unites it will certainly be difficult to oppose, whatever ambition it has.
In my opinion unifaction will be more limited to economic issues with direct and verifiable positive effects for everybody's live in the region. Real political unions are a whole lot more difficult to master. At least, I hope they won't develop the idea that war can be as much fun as some American politicians think.

Altogether there's really little the PLAN can strategically contribute to these developments in the Strait. Whenever they go "kinetic" (new buzzword), they inevitably screw everything up (because of geography and it's hard to change that). Perhaps waiting for natural disasters with ready help to deliver is the best PLAN strategy to contribute to any positive progress.

No problem with the system in Hong Kong? It was certainly not as bad as many communist bashers wanted you to believe, but Hong Kong has certainly not become as "free" as a totally seperate system might make them. Furthermore Hong Kong liberty is meant to slowly expire, creating a countdown mentally of adaption. I'm not sure that would sit well with all influential Taiwanese factions.

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I disagree. You're referring to the promise that China will allow HK to keep the British Basic Law for 50 years after reunification. But the trend, however slowly, has been to grant (or allow HK to implement) more democratic powers. Universal suffrage is right around the corner. That's more democracy than HK had under the British. Fifty years is a long time, who knows what the mainland will look like by then. For all intents and purposes, fifty years of HK independence is enough time to guarantee their economic system indefinitely. China likes Hong Kong the way it is, why would it change it? The only thing, I believe, that could change Beijing's opinion of HK is if HK or its residents played a major role in trying to overthrow the government and Beijing cracked down hard, fearing it could no longer trust HK.

The Japanese co-prosperity sphere consisted of Japan as the military and economic super power and a number of East Asian and South Asian countries, that were colonies of UK, France, the US and The Netherlands, and Thailand ( then Siam ) and China, which were in a slightly better position. The position of countries like India and Iran, to take just two examples, will, when they become members, be incomparably stronger within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.This will be a less unequal partnership than say NATO and within it the military cooperation will be vastly less important. When the US forces disappear from Japan and South Korea these countries too might become members of SCO. Re-unification of Korea will then just be a matter of time.

Mr T said:

Imagine that there was a civil war in the UK, which spilled into Ireland with the losing faction ousting the Dublin authorities. You wouldn't say that the the UK government could annex Ireland because it was controlled by a party to the UK civil war, would you? I know that China argues Taiwan was historically part of its territory, but Ireland also used to be part of the UK.?

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You're analogy is fatally flawed there. That would become the losing side in the British civil war going to Northern Ireland, not Ireland proper (no one disputes that the RoC ruled Taiwan after 1945 as part of China).