Hi everyone. I'm a white American here who is curious about Chinese culture and military strategy. Recently, I read
by scholar Harlan Ullman arguing that the PLA is unable to take Taiwan given its current capacity, nor will they be in the foreseeable future. I'll quote the relevant part of
in full,
The three-to-one ratio apparently refers to a common ratio taught in military schools. The author explains,
I'm curious what people here have to say about this article. I asked a friend who knew more about PLA strategy and they said something like "simple ratios are totally obsolete in modern warfare." But I never went to a military academy, so I'm completely clueless here.
It is complete bullshit.
Taiwan does not have anything close to 450,000 troops. The actual number from the Taiwan MOD, is around 180,000 total service personnel across all three branches. The army has about half of that, at slightly less than 100,000. Among those, only about 35,000 are organized into 7 armor or mechanized infantry brigades, which are the "proper" army. Another 30,000 are in 6 brigades of light infantry made up of mainly new recruits. These are the "cannon fodders" who are suppose to "delay" the PLA until the proper army arrives. The remainder are in non-combatant roles.
Mountains. Yes, Taiwan has big mountains. The problem is: no one lives there and the strategically important cities are all located on flat plains right next to the coast. It doesn't matter if there are guerrilla fighters left in the mountains. China can spend years systemically cleaning them out if necessary. Guerrilla never win wars on their own. And of course, the Taiwan military never trained for guerrilla warfare and has no operating procedures on operating as a guerrilla.
Land zones. This is the biggest myth out there. Taiwan has bad landing zone on the EAST COAST, facing the Pacific. The west coast facing China are mostly flat land. The northwestern half of Taiwan has nice beaches suitable for landing both people and vehicles. The southwestern half has fish ponds and rice paddies unsuitable for vehicles but are still fine for people.
Transport. Doctrinally, it's an open secret that the PLA plans on using civilian vessels to augments naval ships following the initial assault, after which the PLA should have an intact port or have engineers build a makeshift pier. Chinese merchant marine is immense and can be commandeered in wartime. The available PLAN amphibious force are meant for the initial landing, not for transporting the entire force.
And of course, the article completely ignored the PLAAF, PLAN and PLARF, not to mention the 1.5 million strong PAP.
Comparison with a nonexistent WWII invasion plan is nonsensical.