PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I think you have a seriously outdated view of Chinese military capabilities. All your analyses consists of what the US can do to China, while ignoring any consideration of Chinese countermeasures.

You're essentially playing chess against yourself.

I think I'm actually quite up to date with PLA capabilities, thank you very much.

I absolutely believe that during the early stages of a conflict against the US, the PLA may be capable of inflicting significant casualties to US air bases in the region and perhaps even neutralizing one or two carriers along with their requisite naval escorts as well, depending of course on the deployment strategies each side uses. (Of course, the PLA will also sustain losses in such an operation)
That is often the condition for "loss" for the US.

However, to the best of my knowledge there have been no US conflict modelling that assumes US willingness to conduct a war of attrition over many years whereby the US is willing to redeploy its global forces to the western pacific and where the US is willing to continue a multi-year long war against China.

To me, that is an unacceptable blind spot in these conflict modellings, and the above circumstances, is the scenario I have been consistently describing over the last week or so.


How is it even a game when the outcome is a forgone conclusion?
I understand, perfectly, arguing against one’s own preferences and expectations.
However, the point of research modeling is to find out what will probably occur, not to confirm predetermined outcomes.
Now, I usually don’t resort to these kinds of criticisms, however, I must say that any scenario that allows for US/allied attacks upon the Chinese mainland without China using all means of retaliation upon the US/allied mainlands, short of nuclear escalation, are not only asinine, but also mastubative. Dungeons and Dragons is an adolescent’s game!
But, play on!

You just said it yourself -- short of nuclear escalation.
The PLA simply has no capability to inflict conventional retaliation against US population/economic/industrial centers (and more importantly for this discussion, US military production centers) in the continental US, in the way that the US can do against Chinese centers on the Chinese mainland.

Of course, if one wants to consider the idea of the PLA holding the homelands of US regional allies to risk using conventional capabilities (like Japan or South Korea) then sure, that is an option, but that will merely end up exhausting PLA air and naval power and munitions reserves even more so.


That is why this exercise is important -- so that people can start to recognize the nature of the issue and projections for necessary capabilities to meet every rung of the escalation ladder can happen.


If people are uncomfortable with the idea of China losing a war of attrition against the US where the US is capable of redeploying its full global military to the western pacific during the course of a multi-year long conflict, and where the US has population and domestic resolve, then the next logical step should be to consider "what material capabilities does the PLA require to prevent this from happening".
 

james smith esq

Senior Member
Registered Member
I think I'm actually quite up to date with PLA capabilities, thank you very much.

I absolutely believe that during the early stages of a conflict against the US, the PLA may be capable of inflicting significant casualties to US air bases in the region and perhaps even neutralizing one or two carriers along with their requisite naval escorts as well, depending of course on the deployment strategies each side uses. (Of course, the PLA will also sustain losses in such an operation)
That is often the condition for "loss" for the US.

However, to the best of my knowledge there have been no US conflict modelling that assumes US willingness to conduct a war of attrition over many years whereby the US is willing to redeploy its global forces to the western pacific and where the US is willing to continue a multi-year long war against China.

To me, that is an unacceptable blind spot in these conflict modellings, and the above circumstances, is the scenario I have been consistently describing over the last week or so.




You just said it yourself -- short of nuclear escalation.
The PLA simply has no capability to inflict conventional retaliation against US population/economic/industrial centers (and more importantly for this discussion, US military production centers) in the continental US, in the way that the US can do against Chinese centers on the Chinese mainland.

Of course, if one wants to consider the idea of the PLA holding the homelands of US regional allies to risk using conventional capabilities (like Japan or South Korea) then sure, that is an option, but that will merely end up exhausting PLA air and naval power and munitions reserves even more so.


That is why this exercise is important -- so that people can start to recognize the nature of the issue and projections for necessary capabilities to meet every rung of the escalation ladder can happen.


If people are uncomfortable with the idea of China losing a war of attrition against the US where the US is capable of redeploying its full global military to the western pacific during the course of a multi-year long conflict, and where the US has population and domestic resolve, then the next logical step should be to consider "what material capabilities does the PLA require to prevent this from happening".
I guess, from your response, that you don’t consider either cyber-warfare, such tactics as destroying undersea communications cables, or destroying satellites, et c., as conventional warfare? Well, I do, and effecting those strategies would significantly hinder, if not halt, every nation’s abilities to conduct any business. Or maybe you just don’t believe that China has the capabilities to achieve such objectives?

As I’ve previously observed, incorrect usage of terminology leads to erroneous conclusions. And total war, which would, absolutely, follow any attack against the Chinese mainland would, certainly, be much more comprehensive than simply a “war of attrition”.
 

solarz

Brigadier
However, to the best of my knowledge there have been no US conflict modelling that assumes US willingness to conduct a war of attrition over many years whereby the US is willing to redeploy its global forces to the western pacific and where the US is willing to continue a multi-year long war against China.

To me, that is an unacceptable blind spot in these conflict modellings, and the above circumstances, is the scenario I have been consistently describing over the last week or so.

Theoretically, the US should have been the best prepared to handle a pandemic. We all saw how that played out.

Also theoretically, COVID was supposed to be the "Chernobyl" moment for China. After all, a highly infectious disease spreads right in the middle of a massive annual migration in one of the most densely populated countries in the world? How is that not a recipe for disaster?

What you're doing is the equivalent of seeing the above and assuming that was all there was to the story.
 

james smith esq

Senior Member
Registered Member
And, just so whom ever isn’t ignoring my posts is clear on my strategic position, I’m of the opinion that PLA isn’t yet prepared to take on the US/Allies, even in a war of limited objectives, limited solely to the Taiwan Theater, at this juncture.

In order to be so, in my estimation, they need to be able to successful search, track, and target large salvoes of US/Allied launched BGM-109 (Tomahawk), and AGM-158B (JASSM-ER) and AGM-158C (LRASM), cruise missiles from multiple vectors, out to ~500 km at ~ 85% kill rate.

If Iron Dome is a viable strategy for Israel, whom so many, here, seem to hold in such awe, then Bamboo Dome should be fine for China!
 

james smith esq

Senior Member
Registered Member
New thread along these same lines:

Why, at 59, I can beat-up a 9 year-old, but in 10 years she’ll be able to kick my ass!
In this thread, we will detail each and every organ, muscle, and bone that will play a role in my beating-up a 9 year old girl.

Should be fun!
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I guess, from your response, that you don’t consider either cyber-warfare, such tactics as destroying undersea communications cables, or destroying satellites, et c., as conventional warfare? Well, I do, and effecting those strategies would significantly hinder, if not halt, every nation’s abilities to conduct any business. Or maybe you just don’t believe that China has the capabilities to achieve such objectives?

As I’ve previously observed, incorrect usage of terminology leads to erroneous conclusions. And total war, which would, absolutely, follow any attack against the Chinese mainland would, certainly, be much more comprehensive than simply a “war of attrition”.

I do expect all of the above to happen -- and I expect that the US and China will do that to each other and their respective allies in a proportionate manner to the best of their capabilities.

However, in that kind of war of attrition (or total war, if you prefer that term), my overall conclusion remains the same -- at present, China lacks the material capability to fight a total war against the US, in which it would come out ahead.
 

supersnoop

Major
Registered Member
How is it even a game when the outcome is a forgone conclusion?
I understand, perfectly, arguing against one’s own preferences and expectations.
However, the point of research modeling is to find out what will probably occur, not to confirm predetermined outcomes.
Now, I usually don’t resort to these kinds of criticisms, however, I must say that any scenario that allows for US/allied attacks upon the Chinese mainland without China using all means of retaliation upon the US/allied mainlands, short of nuclear escalation, are not only asinine, but also mastubative. Dungeons and Dragons is an adolescent’s game!
But, play on!
No I agree, I think this line is quite played out at this point.

Taking it into another direction…

It will be interesting to see what happens with the ROC armed forces really in the next 510 years. If the US still does not relent on F-35 sales (I agree that it is due to espionage risk), then ROCAF will be hopelessly outdated.

ROCN to me is dead in the water even if the submarine program is delivered successfully. By the time it is in service it will be contending with 075 with Z-20 ASW and possibly KJ-600 ASW and Y-8Q.

If the strategic calculation is that Taiwan island is the last piece containing PLA from open access to the Pacific, I think the US has already given up to be honest. Otherwise they wouldn’t push Australia so far (base access in Japan and US/UK subs) and subsidize domestic semiconductor plants.
 
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