PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Bltizo said:

I want to offer an observation -- you seem very focused on the invasion of Taiwan as if it is a natural end point of a conflict. That is reasonable, and a Taiwan contingency is what this thread has been always about.
But I think you need to consider the actions afterwards.
The recovery of Taiwan means nothing if China is unable to:
1. Deter the US from intervening militarily, OR
2. Defeat the US intervention force to make them materially capable of conducting the intervention they wish to do

Click to expand...

Bltizo said:

So, circling back to your question -- "is it possible for PLA to some how concentrate its ASW/AAW/ASuW capability to create a relatively safe passage for its amphibious forces to cross the strait, and resupply it as needed?"

My answer: sure it is possible. But such a strategy poses no way to defeat the US military's ability to continue to pursue a western pacific conflict against China under a state where the US possesses the resolve to continue a long duration high intensity conflict against China.

Click to expand...

Like i said, given current balance of power, i see the only realistic trigger to any military action is tw declare independence, leaving China no choice - i think you watch China long enough to understand there is literally no choice for any government if they dont want immediate collapse

If i have read you correctly, in case of US intervention, your view is no matter PLA continue their invasion of tw or not, eventually the war will become one of attrition, and the result will not be good for China

If above is a correct reading, then the only possible political silver lining in this inevitable disaster (forced to take military action + defeat in war of attrition) is the fact that tw is recovered. With that silver lining, the government will survive, without it, all hell breaks loose

So even if China is not able to deter/defeat US intervention, somehow manage to recover tw is crucial to the regime survival. But if like you said, PLA busy fighting its life and suspend invasion, the end result will still be defeat but without getting tw, which is just far worse.

again, none of these options are good at all but it is not like they have a choice.

Bltizo said:

What you are describing is a defensive strategy.
Such a strategy can achieve specific aims (such as, maybe allowing China to successfully invade Taiwan). In a general high intensity conflict, depending on the correlation of forces, a defensive strategy could even help to chip away at the enemy's forces until you have built up a sufficient force of your own to conduct a sweeping counter attack.

BUT -- it all depends on the existing correlation/balance of forces.

Click to expand...

i agree it all depends on the existing correlation/balance of forces, i would like to get your feedback on the likely air units commit to this region from both sides, my view is like the following

China side:
(if frontline A2A units from ETC/STC/CTC are committed, and strike units from entire PLA are committed)
11*J10 AB
9*J16/J11B/Su35 AB
1*J20 AB
9*JH-7a AB
3*Su-30MKK AB
7*H6k/j/n regiments
5*H6h/m regiments

So in total: 24*J20 + 300*J10 + 72*J16 + 120*J11b +24* Su-35 + 210*JH-7a + 60*Su-30MKK + 110*H6k/j/n + 80*H6m/h
(24*gen5 fighters+ 520*gen4 fighters + 270*tactical strikers + 190* regional bombers)


US side:
(i am excluding all training/evaluation/ANG units, also excluding F15 units in Europe given Russia, also excluding F16 units considering the range needed in westpac)
7*F22 squadrons (2 in Alaska, 1 in Hawaii, 4 in CONTUS)
5*F35a squadrons (2 in Alaska, 3 in CONTUS)
2*F15c/d squadrons (2 in Japan)
7*F15e squadrons (7 in CONTUS)
4*F35b squadrons
1*F35c squadrons
4*F18e/f CVW minus 1 squadron
5*B52 squadrons
2*B2 squadrons
4*B1b squadrons

So in total: 140*F22 + 100*F35a + 180*F15c/d/e + 180*F18e/f + 10*F35c + 40*F35b + 48*B52 + 28*B1b + 13*B2
(290*gen5 fighters+360*gen4 fighters+89*strategic bombers)

Does this look right to you?

AndrewS said:

The issue is that the context is an air-sea attrition campaign lasting months/years. Just like how China can concentrate its superior firepower on weak points in the 1st Island Chain, the US can currently do the same to key targets in mainland China.

Click to expand...

It can't. The reality is that to actually hit targets in interior China they'd need to actually tank up over China and China is gigantic. If China has any functioning air defense, they can't tank up over China. They need to hit SAM sites and airbases with cruise missiles first. I examined this problem and showed they can't do it successfully.

Remember their cruise missiles stockpile isn't even enough to destroy SAM site candidates and airbases in a tiny slice of Southeast China. Without that though, bringing strike planes would be suicidal.

The opponents of my theory, and they can correct me if I'm wrong, accept the fact that current stockpiles of cruise missiles cannot defeat PLA air defenses alone, not even counting the PLAN or getting launchers taken out by the PLARF. They say that's OK, you only need to suppress a narrow corridor to take out critical subcomponent factories.

The whole idea of hitting a single factory with a critical subcomponent is completely unrealistic. You'd have to know what component it is, what supplier it is, that factory would have to be within reach, and that is just knowing what to hit. They still have to actually get through air defense and if the factory is too far inland they can try tanking up over China lol.

But yes, opening a Korea front would work. It would be like the Soviet Army opening a front in Germany in response to airstrikes on St. Petersburg.

Strategic escalation will not work at this time, see my analysis in the strategic weapons thread.

FairAndUnbiased said:

It can't. The reality is that to actually hit targets in interior China they'd need to actually tank up over China and China is gigantic. If China has any functioning air defense, they can't tank up over China. They need to hit SAM sites and airbases with cruise missiles first. I examined this problem and showed they can't do it successfully.

Remember their cruise missiles stockpile isn't even enough to destroy SAM site candidates and airbases in a tiny slice of Southeast China. Without that though, bringing strike planes would be suicidal.

The opponents of my theory, and they can correct me if I'm wrong, accept the fact that current stockpiles of cruise missiles cannot defeat PLA air defenses alone, not even counting the PLAN or getting launchers taken out by the PLARF. They say that's OK, you only need to suppress a narrow corridor to take out critical subcomponent factories.

The whole idea of hitting a single factory with a critical subcomponent is completely unrealistic. You'd have to know what component it is, what supplier it is, that factory would have to be within reach, and that is just knowing what to hit. They still have to actually get through air defense and if the factory is too far inland they can try tanking up over China lol.

But yes, opening a Korea front would work. It would be like the Soviet Army opening a front in Germany in response to airstrikes on St. Petersburg.

Strategic escalation will not work at this time, see my analysis in the strategic weapons thread.

Click to expand...

The issue is that the US can massively ramp up production of long-range missiles if we are talking about a long war of attrition eg. JASSM-XR (1900km range) or the hypersonic missile (3000km range).

Plus many targets are within 800km of the coast, like all the shipyards and many of the aircraft corps.

And there are likely only a handful of military grade semiconductor fabs.

AndrewS said:

If there is a war of attrition, Korea as a battlefield is relevant.

Why would China limit itself to a naval-air war which favours the US?

The Korean peninsula is essentially an extension of mainland China. A land war in Korea would force the US Army to fight the Chinese Army. And North Korea faces the prospect of economic collapse if China loses.

At worst, it ends up as another stalemate. At best, China conquers South Korea and ends up with bases right next to Japan.

If we go with a 3-12 month timeframe, I suspect a war of attrition in Korea would favour China and that the US would run out of soldiers and equipment first.

Click to expand...

For such an attrition war lasting years, America will have to intern camp its own population ahead of time... in a total war between US and China, how long until America supply chain (non military) completely breakdown? within months it would suffer internal collapse even if it beat China at war... so it would need to find a pretext to do an artitifical shutdown of American society for all to shelter in place... if covid was any indication, good luck with that. 200 million Americans have guns and the racial divide will be the spark. this isnt the 1950s anymore where US had its own manufacturing base and 50% of the worlds GDP... it would be a Pyrrhic victory for America at best, at worst all life on earth goes extinct, and do people think Russia would just stand on the sidelines

AndrewS said:

The issue is that the US can massively ramp up production of long-range missiles if we are talking about a long war of attrition eg. JASSM-XR (1900km range) or the hypersonic missile (3000km range).

Plus many targets are within 800km of the coast, like all the shipyards and many of the aircraft corps.

And there are likely only a handful of military grade semiconductor fabs.

Click to expand...

Chengdu and Xian both have fabs and and are thousands of km inland.

Military grade chips are simpler than leading edge chips. They're typically built on 180 nm processes for instance, for hardening. More fabs can handle them than civilian fabs.

Their hypersonic missile failed every test.

Their production rate of Tomahawks was about 300 per year. Their stockpile is 4000. Remember they had to use 59 Tomahawks to suppress a Syrian air base for just a few hours.

They planned to acquire 4500 back in 2005 but stuck to hundreds.

Again this is just the pure air defense side. In reality many launch platforms would be hit on the ground or at sea by PLAN and PLARF or intercepted at sea by PLAN air defense ships.

Then you get to economics and politics such as hyperinflation at home, Russian escalation, Korea, etc.

AndrewS said:

If there is a war of attrition, Korea as a battlefield is relevant.

Why would China limit itself to a naval-air war which favours the US?

The Korean peninsula is essentially an extension of mainland China. A land war in Korea would force the US Army to fight the Chinese Army. And North Korea faces the prospect of economic collapse if China loses.

At worst, it ends up as another stalemate. At best, China conquers South Korea and ends up with bases right next to Japan.

If we go with a 3-12 month timeframe, I suspect a war of attrition in Korea would favour China and that the US would run out of soldiers and equipment first.

Click to expand...

So now you are saying in a war of attrition China should open up a Korean front on land to engage the US?

- That would be a great idea, if China's air forces in such a conflict was not already so stretched to provide cover for the southern and eastern fronts, making PLA ground forces having to contend with ROCAF and USAF forces with threadbare air cover at best.
- It would also be a great idea, if like in the original Korean war the US and its allies also chose to not actually conduct strikes in China proper, allowing China to have a somewhat robust logistics network and staging ground.
- That would also be a great idea, if the South Korean Army and US ground forces stationed in Korea were not actually very formidable and advanced in their own right?


Which, in other words, is a terrible idea.

foxmulder said:

Blitz you assume too much. I am not even Chinese. I am very much comfortable to discuss and aware where China is weaker.

However, your take on history is very selective. Everyone with basic history knowledge and average reasoning can see tactically speaking Korean and Vietnamese wars are different than a possible over straight confrontation *but* strategically they are the same and they are tons of learnings.

Click to expand...

I never made any claim about your ethnicity.

Okay, I am going to explain to you why the Korean war and Vietnam war were absolutely very very different to the way in which any US-China war over Taiwan would be.
There are basically two major reasons:

1. Strikes to the production and logistics depths
2. The nature of the conflict and conditions for victory
3. The potential of the adversary

1: In both the Korean war and Vietnam war, the US was not able to conduct proper strikes into the production and logistical depths of their enemies.
In Korea, the US was not allowed to conduct strikes into China. In Vietnam, the US was also not allowed to conduct strikes into China. However, in a US-China war, the US most certainly will be conducting strikes into China to strike at production and logistical depths of China, both things that the US was not willing to do in Korea and Vietnam.
2: The Korean war and Vietnam war were primarily a contest of ground forces, and the conditions of victory in both of those wars was poorly defined, especially in Vietnam. Furthermore, the maturity of air power in the Korean war and Vietnam war was far less mature and far less integrated than it is now in US TTP. However, in a US-China war, such a conflict would be primarily air-naval in nature (US strengths), and the conditions of victory can be much better defined.
AndrewS suggested that a land front can be opened up in Korea on the peninsula to draw the US into a war of attrition on land. This is a terrible idea because all you will be doing is sending PLA Army units to suffer from US and South Korean air attacks because the PLAAF will be too busy in China's eastern and southern approaches providing their services there, not to mention further straining the country's internal wartime transport and logistics because you are now forced to move entire group armies to reinforce the korean theater.
3: the Korean war and the Vietnam war were ultimately the US fighting against proxies of the other rival superpower of the time, the USSR. In a US-China war, China is the rival superpower. That is to say, if the US enters the conflict, then the US will not be fighting this as a proxy war, it will be throwing everything they have.

foxmulder said:

When you think what China and USA can bring to this theater, military balance is not much afar from each other. When you think how long can China and USA sustain a war effort China is favorite with its 1) proximity, 2) production prowess, 3) willingness to accept loses.

USA already lost wars to China. I can easily see it is losing another.

Click to expand...

China is not a favourite because:
1) proximity of the combat theater to China means that China has nowhere to retreat to, and its production facilities, major command nodes, are all right there, within a thousand kilometers of the theater of combat.
2) Chinese production prowess means nothing if their proximity to the combat theater allows them to be degraded
3) China may be willing to accept losses, but what if the US is also willing to accept losses? Hoping that the enemy's resolve will break before your own resolve, is a terrible strategic assumption.

caohailiang said:

Like i said, given current balance of power, i see the only realistic trigger to any military action is tw declare independence, leaving China no choice - i think you watch China long enough to understand there is literally no choice for any government if they dont want immediate collapse

If i have read you correctly, in case of US intervention, your view is no matter PLA continue their invasion of tw or not, eventually the war will become one of attrition, and the result will not be good for China

If above is a correct reading, then the only possible political silver lining in this inevitable disaster (forced to take military action + defeat in war of attrition) is the fact that tw is recovered. With that silver lining, the government will survive, without it, all hell breaks loose

So even if China is not able to deter/defeat US intervention, somehow manage to recover tw is crucial to the regime survival. But if like you said, PLA busy fighting its life and suspend invasion, the end result will still be defeat but without getting tw, which is just far worse.

again, none of these options are good at all but it is not like they have a choice.

Click to expand...

No, you are reading me entirely wrongly.

In a US-China conflict (arising from Taiwan declaring independence and China carrying out a Taiwan invasion and US intervening), with the PLA of today:

A. (What you suggest) If China tries to first take back Taiwan (i.e.: concentrate their defenses to invade Taiwan), the result will be a definite war of attrition where China will definitely lose -- i.e.: this includes that any forces China has on Taiwan would be gradually destroyed, cut off from resupply, and thus ultimately annihilated. That is to say, the outcome of a conflict whereby China manages to "successfully invade Taiwan" initially, still results in them not only losing the overall war, but also in losing Taiwan. There is no silver lining here.

B. If China pauses a Taiwan invasion to try and instead first use its forces to counter a US intervention (contest air and sea control in the western pacific), then they have a chance that they might be able to successfully cause enough losses to the US, for China to have a little bit of breathing room and to return to the Taiwan invasion without threat of constant US attacks (in the initial phase), and in turn preventing the US from carrying out an immediate intervention. If they are lucky, and that's a big if, the PLA counter strike against US intervention might be enough to materially destroy sufficient US air and naval capabilities such that they may simply not have the material capabilities to resume an intervention against China without substantial cost.

In other words, putting it simply, of those two choices:

Choice A: means abandoning any strategic an operational initiative, and means conceding any capability to contest air and sea control against the US. Any successful PLA invasion of Taiwan in the early phase will be short lived, because as the war drags into one of attrition, the PLA ability to resupply and fortify Taiwan will be degraded and will collapse and likely lead to the PLA occupation dissolving. The outcome is where a PLA loss of Taiwan is guaranteed and where a PLA loss of the war is also virtually guaranteed.

Choice B: means putting the Taiwan invasion on hold for a period of weeks or months, to allow the PLA to focus first to counter a US intervention and try to destroy or degrade a significant portion of the US air-naval forces in the western pacific, to allow the PLA to resume a Taiwan invasion without being harassed by US forces in the region, and to possibly achieve sufficient damage to US air and naval capabilities that they are unable to resume a conflict with China in the western pacific in immediate short order. The outcome is one where the PLA may have a chance of not having to fight a war of attrition against the US (and in turn losing the war and losing Taiwan).


Both Choice A and Choice B are not ideal options, but between the two, I think Choice B is by far the better one, because it provides the PLA with strategic and operational initiative and it also helps them by at least having a chance of attaining a degree of air and sea control and a chance of significantly hindering US capability to wage war.

Choice A only makes sense, if and only if, there is sufficient reason to believe that US resolve to wage war against China is lost if China manages to "successfully invade Taiwan". However, if there is reason to believe that the US will continue waging war against China even after China manages to "successfully invade Taiwan" -- then Choice A is a bad one, and less preferable than Choice B.

caohailiang said:

i agree it all depends on the existing correlation/balance of forces, i would like to get your feedback on the likely air units commit to this region from both sides, my view is like the following

China side:
(if frontline A2A units from ETC/STC/CTC are committed, and strike units from entire PLA are committed)
11*J10 AB
9*J16/J11B/Su35 AB
1*J20 AB
9*JH-7a AB
3*Su-30MKK AB
7*H6k/j/n regiments
5*H6h/m regiments

So in total: 24*J20 + 300*J10 + 72*J16 + 120*J11b +24* Su-35 + 210*JH-7a + 60*Su-30MKK + 110*H6k/j/n + 80*H6m/h
(24*gen5 fighters+ 520*gen4 fighters + 270*tactical strikers + 190* regional bombers)


US side:
(i am excluding all training/evaluation/ANG units, also excluding F15 units in Europe given Russia, also excluding F16 units considering the range needed in westpac)
7*F22 squadrons (2 in Alaska, 1 in Hawaii, 4 in CONTUS)
5*F35a squadrons (2 in Alaska, 3 in CONTUS)
2*F15c/d squadrons (2 in Japan)
7*F15e squadrons (7 in CONTUS)
4*F35b squadrons
1*F35c squadrons
4*F18e/f CVW minus 1 squadron
5*B52 squadrons
2*B2 squadrons
4*B1b squadrons

So in total: 140*F22 + 100*F35a + 180*F15c/d/e + 180*F18e/f + 10*F35c + 40*F35b + 48*B52 + 28*B1b + 13*B2
(290*gen5 fighters+360*gen4 fighters+89*strategic bombers)

Does this look right to you?

Click to expand...

There are a range of potential loadouts, but sure that looks plausible as one of them.

AndrewS said:

1. Declare mainland China off-limits to US attack and subject to a tit-for-tat response against the US homeland, leading all the way up to MAD.

Click to expand...

China currently does not have the capability to go tit for tat against the continental US. it doesn't have MAD parity. not in quantity nor delivery platform's quality. US would gladly call china's bluff and continue the war of attrition like Bltizo described, because even when it comes to nuclear exchange the US would still have an advantage, for now.

AndrewS said:

2. China actually increases military spending from its current demilitarised level (1.7% of GDP) to a moderate 2.5%. This significantly accelerates the day when China has a larger naval-air conventional and nuclear military force.

Click to expand...

not sure if china has committed to this, if not, they should. but even if they do it today, it will take multiple decades before a force that's on par with the US in terms of quantity and quality can be built up. so china needs to be very careful about not being dragged into any war, willingly or not, in the coming decades.

AndrewS said:

3. China could open up new theatres such as the Korean peninsula, where I think China can win a war of attrition against the USA.

Click to expand...

that's a terrible idea. if the PLAN or AF can't fight against the US in a war of attrition in the westpac front, how can they provide enough support for PLA army on another front?

ecaedus said:

China currently does not have the capability to go tit for tat against the continental US. it doesn't have MAD parity. not in quantity nor delivery platform's quality. US would gladly call china's bluff and continue the war of attrition like Bltizo described, because even when it comes to nuclear exchange the US would still have an advantage, for now.


not sure if china has committed to this, if not, they should. but even if they do it today, it will take multiple decades before a force that's on par with the US in terms of quantity and quality can be built up. so china needs to be very careful about not being dragged into any war, willingly or not, in the coming decades.


that's a terrible idea. if the PLAN or AF can't fight against the US in a war of attrition in the westpac front, how can they provide enough support for PLA army on another front?

Click to expand...

1. Well, according to unilateral estimates anyhow which are always gross underestimates because they say it doesn't exist if it isn't photographed by their guys, leading to hilarious situations like saying DF-41 doesn't exist in September 2019 then seeing 16x DF-41s roll in the parade 1 month later.

I've done an actual estimate on here before, they're undercounting by ~2x. 700 deployed warheads vs. 1300 deployed warheads is a much smaller gap.

2. Well the thing is China simply needs to have the ability to inflict great and permanent harm to not get dragged into a war. You can't stop the other side from declaring war on you. That's their decision. If they declare war you have 2 options, resist or surrender. Surrendering means your population gets sent to camps or displaced, the victor plunders your land of all resources and your country gets colonized for hundreds of years, you may be familiar with such an outcome. Resistance means you can extract concessions and the more you resist and more pain you inflict the more concessions you extract.

Bltizo said:

So now you are saying in a war of attrition China should open up a Korean front on land to engage the US?

- That would be a great idea, if China's air forces in such a conflict was not already so stretched to provide cover for the southern and eastern fronts, making PLA ground forces having to contend with ROCAF and USAF forces with threadbare air cover at best.

Click to expand...

Korea is essentially an extension of the Eastern Front towards Japan. But instead of long-range missions between Japan and China over the East China Sea, where both sides struggle to reach each other's bases, Korean and Chinese bases would be close enough for each other to be attacked frequently. Even if the Chinese side loaded up on SAMs, then yes, Chinese casualties would still be bad.

But it will still be a war of attrition that the US cannot credibly win, because they are unable to conquer and occupy even the Northeastern provinces of China. In such a scenario, you would end up with a Vietnam-style quagmire.

Bltizo said:

- It would also be a great idea, if like in the original Korean war the US and its allies also chose to not actually conduct strikes in China proper, allowing China to have a somewhat robust logistics network and staging ground.

Click to expand...

Korea and the US face a similar issue. If they want to reinforce Korea, they will have to use ships and planes, whilst China can rely on the road network which is far less vulnerable.

Bltizo said:

- That would also be a great idea, if the South Korean Army and US ground forces stationed in Korea were not actually very formidable and advanced in their own right?

Click to expand...

Yes, but I see Korea as roughly the equivalent of 2 or 3 Taiwans, plus the US forces.
So it is manageable for the Chinese Army.