PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
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The bolded part is partly true, but it needs to be more specific.
I am saying that the current SK military and US forces in Korea will be capable of defeating what the PLA are able to deploy as an offensive into the Korean peninsula, in the context of when the entire PLA is already engaged in a high intensity western pacific air-naval-missile conflict with the US overall.
I already described this in the very post you quoted, here:
"In other words, the PLA will not be able to provide much if any air cover and air defenses and strike/fires support to their ground forces in a Korea conflict, meaning you are essentially putting them at the mercy of US and SK air power in the region, and yes, South Korea does have a fairly potent air force, and both South Korea and US Forces Korea, are very capable on the ground with their armies as well."
If this was a straight up fight of ground armies, in a situation where neither the PLA nor SK/US had air superiority over the other, then the PLA can probably put up a very good fight and incur significant losses with the forces they could reasonably deploy.
However, this scenario is not a "straight up fight of ground armies" -- instead it would be a situation where the PLA Army is sent to conduct an offensive where the rest of the air force and navy and the rest of the nation's air defenses are prioritized elsewhere in South China Sea and East China Sea and China's capital and other important industry regions, where the US will be probing for weak spots to conduct targeted strikes in China's depths, meaning whatever forces China deploys to Korea will have harassed logistics lines as well as suffer from threadbare air cover and IADS to begin with.
Such a force, against the SK Army and Air Force, and US forces in Korea, would be outmatched by the combination of their ground forces and more importantly by their air power, and be unable to carry out the "attritional warfare" that previous posters described in a manner that would be advantageous to China.
Okay so everything will go according to US plans and wishes.
The nature of warfare is that you cannot ensure wishes and plans go the way you want, but you can prepare your forces and capabilities in the way that even if are unlucky on the given time, you are still able to complete your missions.
The current balance of power between China and the US in terms of total capabilities/materiel, and in terms of prepositioning of forces and ability to deploy forces, is one where the PLA has far less margin for error than the US does.
I truly endorse that people accept this as a fact, so that it can allow for more clear headed future procurement planning and prediction from our point of view.
I already read what you wrote. I just want you to break down your claims with more details.
You said: "the PLA will not be able to provide much if any air cover and air defenses and strike/fires support to their ground forces in a Korea conflict". Please elaborate on this.
I presume you have certainly done a lot of research and built models and simulations to support your points. I just want to know more about the detail. For example, give me some numbers. If it involves classified information, then you don't have to say anything. I am just curious, that's all.
This seems to be entirely off topic with the point of my post. If you don't think procuring just 20 aircraft a year is sad, then I guess there is no problem here for Russia.
Back to the main topic. I'm not sure why people are suddenly wanting to attack Korea also? Is China looking for more friends or enemies? That would be even worse idea than agitating Japanese by taking those islands. Are people just looking for more war?
If China is looking to come out of this with a functioning Taiwan and not treated like a pariah nation, then it's best to keep the function localized and resolve it as quickly as possible. The only way it can ensure that is by having enough military assets and surrounding nations staying neutral. Invading land outside of Taiwan will only push more countries to support America and expend precious military assets.
Since PLA has a direct hotline with US military command and probably the Japanese one, I think it's extremely important they make it clear to both America and Japan (and vice versa) what are the consequences if America sends carrier groups or Japan allows USAF operation in its bases/airports or if America wants an all out war. And also with Australia. I assume US military will also make it clear to PLA what are the consequences if China attacks Taiwan, if it attack other countries, if it attack US bases in the Pacific, if it tries to attack Hawaii or continental USA.
I understand this is a military forum, but the future war will not only be fought in the battlefield. The ability to sustain a conflict goes beyond number of trained soldiers and weapons you have left. The affect of war coverage/media would have a huge effect on the willingness of public to access continued war. I already mentioned financial war, supply chain collapse, fuel export collapse and hyperinflation as other reasons for stopping the conflict.
I think it's important to note that we are only having this conversation because pla has improved so much. Having more 5th gen aircraft on the theater than us and its allies change the equation. Having long range stealth bombers change the situation. Having operational anti ship ballistic missile changes things. Having more advanced diesel subs change the equation. Having capable carriers with air wing pushes things out. I don't think they are capable of confronting us carrier group on complete open water. Their nuclear subs are not capable enough. So they just need to keep us carrier groups far out enough where the air wing cannot escort bombers into Chinese air space.
It's my bad, I apologize. I saw Bltizo's earlier post on what I presume to be a analysis on a possible war between China and the US/SK in the Peninsula, that's why I asked about it, wishing to hear more details about it. That's it. I don't think there is a lot of people in this thread suggesting that "China wants to attack South Korea" here.
If this is an unpopular topic, I will stop right now.
It went from comparing the Korean War to something and then someone suggested if it becomes a war of attirition then China should invade South Korea to push out the Americans to threaten bases in Japan. Seems like a pretty stupid idea to me to expand logistics/resources but apparently people thought it was a good idea.
"Please elaborate on this"
"Give me some numbers"
So, do you want to me literally give you the entire way in which I would expect the PLAAF and PLAN and PLARF to be deployed during a western pacific conflict arising from a PLA invasion of Taiwan, as well as the way in which USAF and USN forces would be deployed, and the forces PLAAF and PLARF forces the PLA would have to support a Korean War operation?
Do you also expect me to come up with the variety of plausible timings in which the various main players would conduct offensive and defensive actions, in addition to the above, and to justify all of them?
I can't do so to that level of detail, I don't have the time and I don't have the patience to do so (unless someone wants to pay me to do it, I suppose, and I'll be charging competitive rates).
But sure, I'll give you the cliffnotes version.
- I expect 3/4s of the PLAs tactical fighter force and their corresponding force multipliers (AEW&C, EW/ECM, ELINT/SIGINT) to be deployed to the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands and 80% of the PLA's bomber force deployed/operating in support of missions in those respective theaters and areas of responsibility. That leaves 1/3rd (at most) of the PLA's remaining tactical fighter force to complete the rest of its missions, including but not limited to -- supporting this idiotic Korean ground offensive, but also to keep a sufficient force in play to deter India on the western approach and conducting an air defense mission in central China.
- I expect 3/4s of the PLARF's SRBM force to have been deployed in support of a Taiwan contingency/invasion (that would have already occurred at this point), and virtually all of the PLARF's IRBM force deployed in support of strikes against US positions in the western pacific (Guam, but also air bases in Japan, and of course most importantly the AShBMs against US carriers).
- I expect the vast majority of the PLAN to be deployed in the Eastern and Southern Theaters in support of the overall western pacific conflict. A token force would remain in the North.
- I expect PLA IADS forces to be redeployed and frontloaded to areas in the Eastern and Southern Theaters as well as to protect Beijing.
- I expect a significant of portion of PLA amphibious capable units to have been redeployed at readiness to the Eastern Theater Command at inland staging locations to be in site for a potential Taiwan amphibious crossing that might occur at any time over the following months or year, pending the outcome of the initial stages of a western pacific conflict with the US.
So, based on all that, the remaining forces that the PLA have left in terms of PLAAF, PLARF, PLAN, IADS are the ones that they will have to support any sort of PLA ground force that they deploy to conduct an attack on the Korean peninsula, and this is keeping in mind that all of the above redeployments to the Eastern and Western Theater Commands will have taken up substantial capacity for China's internal transport network (even before we talk about any potential US strikes against China's transport infrastructure).
Of course, the PLA could certainly try to deploy more of the PLAAF and PLARF and IADS in support of a Korea operation -- but that means substantially weakening their ability to carry out operations in the much more important theater of the western pacific air-naval-missile conflict.
Frankly I am in awe that you are asking me to even elaborate on this.
Perhaps you should first state your position to let me know if I should even spend time on this -- with the PLA's current overall forces, how well do you think they would fare against the US in a western pacific air-naval-missile conflict to begin with, and based on that, how many air and missile forces do you think they would have to spare to support an offensive into Korea at the same time?
Look, if you are genuinely interested, let me give you my distilled position on this suggestion of "carrying out an offensive against Korea simultaneously as a western pacific conflict against the US is occurring for the purposes of trying to start a new front and carry out a war of attrition":
It is stupid, and would cause China to lose the war faster.
If my arguments and logic is worth anything to people who read my writing, then they would be able to take that conclusion and start to do some legwork and use some effort to understand how that conclusion is reached (it isn't difficult, and I've basically already explained the principles out to people repeatedly).
This entire discussion about a war of attrition can be settled if people just recognize that in general, the idea of the PLA waging a war of attrition against the US arising from a Taiwan invasion, with the forces the PLA has at its disposal, is complete and utter fantasy.
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In regards to point #2 - only the SSGNs (and any LACM capable SSN) are worries.
I’d really like to understand how you think a PLA of say, 2027 won’t be able to decimate surface ships with AShBM, AShHGV/HCM and keep bombers away, using a combination of S/IRBMs (airbases), AEW&Cs, drones, UCAVs, PL-18/20/21 and at least 400 J-20s.
With back-pocket options like destroying GPS and cyber attacks on critical US infrastructure (pipelines, power grids, airports, airplanes, factories, dam control stations etc.) - and the capacity of a PRC wartime economy to produce/replenish ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles.
No.
It includes carriers and their airwings, as well as surface combatants with LACMs, are also threats.
People vastly underestimate how difficult it is to detect and acquire tracks and to organize sufficiently capable strike packages against something like an aircraft carrier during wartime.
This entire discussion has been about the PLA of today/immediate future (i.e.: a few months into the future).
In five years the capabilities of both the PLA and US military will of course evolve. I expect the balance to slide slightly into the PLA's favour, but we will have to reassess once we get there.
This has already been addressed before -- those same methods are available to the US to conduct strikes against China in those same domains.
But between China and the US, only one side has the capability and the geographical locations to conduct kinetic strikes against the other's production facilities and infrastructure. Oh, and the US will have a wartime economy as well to replenish their own weapons without having to suffer from kinetic strikes.
I feel like I'm wasting my time here, can people please read the actual thread?