PLA next/6th generation fighter thread

[Blitzo]

Network centric warfare is the direction things are going but you need capabilities for when network dependencies breakdown too.

I stated that retaining WVR weapons as a form of last ditch self defense is not unreasonable.




However, my primary point is:

"The most high yield, efficient gains in capability in a VLO vs VLO scenario, will be advances in networking, sensors and BVR capabilities" --- and by extension, pursuing WVR capability is a low yield, inefficient way of seeking to compete in modern VLO vs VLO aerial warfare between technologically advanced air forces.

 

[latenlazy]

I stated that retaining WVR weapons as a form of last ditch self defense is not unreasonable.




However, my primary point is:

"The most high yield, efficient gains in capability in a VLO vs VLO scenario, will be advances in networking, sensors and BVR capabilities" --- and by extension, pursuing WVR capability is a low yield, inefficient way of seeking to compete in modern VLO vs VLO aerial warfare between technologically advanced air forces.

Good to excellent WVR capabilities shouldn’t be treated as in tension with excellent BVR and high networked capabilities.

 

[Blitzo]

Good to excellent WVR capabilities shouldn’t be treated as in tension with excellent BVR and high networked capabilities.

That is not what I wrote and is not relevant to the discussion from the last few posts about the pursuit of aerial warfare capabilities for VLO vs VLO between advanced air forces.

 

[plawolf]

I think you are going the wrong direction with your vision for 5th gen vs 5th gen (or high tech air power vs high tech air power).

Equipping 5th gen aircraft with SRAAMs and cannons with the aim to defeat opfor 5th gen aircraft in the WVR domain is equipping them with last ditch self defense weapons with the expectation that each side's aircraft will only be able to stumble upon each other at WVR and be unable to engage each other at BVR ranges, thus have to resort to closer range engagements.


I think the complete opposite will be the case -- that as high tech air forces advance and seek to counter opposing 5th gen and above fighters, they will aim to further advance their BVR capabilities. This will be done through a combination of things:
- Continuing to develop and advance sensors and networking aboard fighter aircraft
- Pursuit of friendly offboard sensing capability -- most prominently this is seen in MUMT, where substantial offboard A2A UAV capability will be in the form of forward deployable, attritible sensor nodes that are networked with manned fighter aircraft and friendly weapons A2A UCAV platforms.
- Development of more sophisticated BVR weapons, especially in terms of guidance. This is not only in the form of terminal guidance (which is likely to be multi-modal including advanced AESA and also ImIR) but also more agile, dynamic and robust midcourse guidance as well.
- Also, simply being able to "outmass" the enemy in terms of the number of airborne, VLO, sensor and weapons platforms you have in the aerial battlespace at any one time.
- and finally, your generic ECM, ECCM capabilities and so on.



.... In other words, the way that future aerial warfare between opposing forces that are VLO and advanced, will be one where each side tries to achieve networking superiority over each other qualitatively and quantitatively, where the side with superior system of system of systems will win.


Pursuing WVR weapons and cannons is not an adequate counter for the way that future aerial warfare will go. At best, they can be maintained as a very last line, last ditch self defense capability.

But the most high yield, efficient gains in capability in a VLO vs VLO scenario, will be advances in networking, sensors and BVR capabilities.

I am aware of what everyone wants to do, I am just more…pragmatic in what they can realistically be able to achieve. Especially in an era of great power near-peer or even equal footing arms races and technological competition and potentially massed attritional combat.

The more you want to extend the engagement envelope, especially against stealths absent some game changing new detection technology; the more components and systems and assets you throw into the kill chain to facilitate all those future technologies and concepts, the harder it is to keep that hyper-complex network and all its moving pieces working together effectively enough to make the thing work. All the while your opponent is throwing all their technological might into developing counters to your systems.

It might work flawlessly against 3rd world countries who can barely cobble together an Air Force; and it may even work well against near-peers, until they start blasting huge gaping holes in your networks and orders of battle.

In that context, making minimal investments in terms of R&D funding and procurement costs to give yourself contingency options and fallback positions seems like a no-brainier to me.

Also, in a broader export context, just how many countries could realistically be able to afford the kind of networks you described?

Moreover, having detachable IRAAM/gun pod swing arms that can give you the option to mount IRAAMs and guns on your stealth jets when you need them; while also allowing you to remove them when you don’t seems a superior overall approach of having fixed internal guns and side weapons bays. And the best part, having this capacity detracts absolutely nothing from the plane or service’s vision to develop the platforms and networks needed to try to engage enemy stealths at extended ranges, so you loose nothing in investing in these capacities beyond the insignificant amount (in the context of how much such networks and future systems will cost) of R&D and procurement costs, which China can afford without even noticing.

 

[Blitzo]

I am aware of what everyone wants to do, I am just more…pragmatic in what they can realistically be able to achieve. Especially in an era of great power near-peer or even equal footing arms races and technological competition and potentially massed attritional combat.

The more you want to extend the engagement envelope, especially against stealths absent some game changing new detection technology; the more components and systems and assets you throw into the kill chain to facilitate all those future technologies and concepts, the harder it is to keep that hyper-complex network and all its moving pieces working together effectively enough to make the thing work.

It might work flawlessly against 3rd world countries who can barely cobble together an Air Force; and it may even work well against near-peers, until they start blasting huge gaping holes in your networks and orders of battle.

The whole point of pursuing network superiority is that when each side starts blasting massive gaping holes in each side's networks and orders of battle, the side with networking superiority will win due to the various factors I described in the previous post (superior sensors, superior offboard sensing capability, more capable BVR weapons, having superior mass/quantity of sensors and shooters than the enemy, superior ECCM).

In that context, making minimal investments in terms of R&D funding and procurement costs to give yourself contingency options and fallback positions seems like a no-brainier to me.

I have no issue with the continued development of WVR weapons in general because they can be useful as last ditch self defense.

But I am very against the idea that pursuit of enhanced WVR capabilities is the most high yield, efficient, or natural progression of the future of high end air combat between advanced air forces -- and they absolutely should not be pursued at the expense of BVR/networked warfare imperatives (not saying you wrote this part, but rather just a general statement from me).

Also, in a broader export context, just how many countries could realistically be able to afford the kind of networks you described?

For export customers, the same principles apply. Perhaps they apply at a smaller scale, but they remain true.

Pursuit of networking capabilities to an extent that is as capable as you can afford is the best option to take, regardless of whether you choose to procure an air force of combat aircraft, or a land based IADS, or something in between.

Moreover, having detachable IRAAM/gun pod swing arms that can give you the option to mount IRAAMs and guns on your stealth jets when you need them; while also allowing you to remove them when you don’t seems a superior overall approach of having fixed internal guns and side weapons bays. And the best part, having this capacity detracts absolutely nothing from the plane or service’s vision to develop the platforms and networks needed to try to engage enemy stealths at extended ranges, so you loose nothing in investing in these capacities beyond the insignificant amount (in the context of how much such networks and future systems will cost) of R&D and procurement costs, which China can afford without even noticing.

So long as the pursuit of some sort of WVR weapons advancement doesn't significantly detract from the design considerations and prioritization of the much higher yield BVR/networked aerial warfare capabilities, sure, why not.
However, to be honest I could take it or leave it. I consider high end WVR weapons to truly be an optional capability, and one which is not that important. It's nice to have, but it won't capture the true meat of the sort of domains where the future of aerial warfare will take place.


My overall point is to argue against the idea that the "ability" of integrating some kind of WVR weapon is somehow such a major benefit for 5th generation fighter in a VLO vs VLO fight.

Instead, having superior BVR weapons, superior sensors, superior networking, superior ECCM, and superior numbers of sensors/shooters in the air, is much much much more important in a VLO vs VLO fight.

 

[Gloire_bb]

Pursuing WVR weapons and cannons is not an adequate counter for the way that future aerial warfare will go. At best, they can be maintained as a very last line, last ditch self defense capability.

Cannons def no(last ditch only), but WVR aimed at simple overwhelming and breaking down enemy cohesion is an interesting plan.
No one is going that way, though.

p.s. but still fact remains, that sum of development of sensors and networking on one side, and EW & signature reduction led to engagement ranges very similar to those known since the late 1970s.
engagements against non-stealth airframes happen further away(abt. 50-100% further), but not dramatically so, as those, in the end, are limited by how much kinetic energy compact weapon can store inside.

J35 designers chose not to have a side bay, it’s not a mistake to be fixed, this is the design, work with it not against it. It has a huge main bay capable of holding 4 PL15s. That doesn’t mean it has to hold 4 PL-15s. It could hold 2 PL-15s and 2 PL-10s. Or a new missile that has IR/EO and Radar seekers with datalink or even CEC.

there is no indication pl-10 can be launched by catapult launcher. In fact, there is no known infrared missile capable of catapult launch at all. I personally suspect that narrow-field a2a IR seeker is simply incompatible with a powerful(yet unpredictable) punch to the side, and can't reliably acquire target after it even through LOAL.

 

[plawolf]

The whole point of pursuing network superiority is that when each side starts blasting massive gaping holes in each side's networks and orders of battle, the side with networking superiority will win due to the various factors I described in the previous post (superior sensors, superior offboard sensing capability, more capable BVR weapons, having superior mass/quantity of sensors and shooters than the enemy, superior ECCM).

And I question just how realistic it is for either side to expect to be able to enjoy such full spectrum network and systems dominance over the other.

What you are far more likely to end up with realistically speaking is a messy and imperfect blend of relative strengths and weaknesses on both sides, where one will enjoy limited advantages in some aspects while the other holds the edge on others.

Where neither side holds a complete and overwhelming advantage in primary fields such as networks and drones/AI, it is in the margins where the difference will be decided, and that’s why WVR still matters.

I have no issue with the continued development of WVR weapons in general because they can be useful as last ditch self defense.

But I am very against the idea that pursuit of enhanced WVR capabilities is the most high yield, efficient, or natural progression of the future of high end air combat between advanced air forces -- and they absolutely should not be pursued at the expense of BVR/networked warfare imperatives (not saying you wrote this part, but rather just a general statement from me).





For export customers, the same principles apply. Perhaps they apply at a smaller scale, but they remain true.

Pursuit of networking capabilities to an extent that is as capable as you can afford is the best option to take, regardless of whether you choose to procure an air force of combat aircraft, or a land based IADS, or something in between.






So long as the pursuit of some sort of WVR weapons advancement doesn't significantly detract from the design considerations and prioritization of the much higher yield BVR/networked aerial warfare capabilities, sure, why not.

However, to be honest I could take it or leave it. I consider high end WVR weapons to truly be an optional capability, and one which is not that important. It's nice to have, but it won't capture the true meat of the sort of domains where the future of aerial warfare will take place.


My overall point is to argue against the idea that the "ability" of integrating some kind of WVR weapon is somehow such a major benefit for 5th generation fighter in a VLO vs VLO fight.

Instead, having superior BVR weapons, superior sensors, superior networking, superior ECCM, and superior numbers of sensors/shooters in the air, is much much much more important in a VLO vs VLO fight.

Taking that line of argument to its natural conclusion would see everyone scrap fighters and just use B21s and H20s. You will have VLO and all the room and onboard power you could want for avionics, subsystems, munitions, maybe even APS, carrier drones and all sorts of other future tech.

But that’s not the direction anyone is heading towards because to go down that path is to put all your eggs needlessly in one basket of being able to dominate the network and BVR fields. When neither side can afford to assume to be able to do that, you need to build up as many advantages and leave as few weaknesses as possible.

Assuming you will be unchallengeable in key fields is what made America kill the F22 in favour of the more ‘economical’ F35, and its a decision many deeply regretted ever since, and could prove to be the most costly and devastating strategic mistake in history should China and America go hot before the US claws back some of its lost ground with 6th gens.

I’m pleased to see this is not a mistake the Chinese are keen to repeat with the J35, because aerodynamic performance is clearly being given high priority in its design choices.

This is the last I will say on the subject since it’s getting off topic and we will just be going around in circles.

 

[Blitzo]

And I question just how realistic it is for either side to expect to be able to enjoy such full spectrum network and systems dominance over the other.

What you are far more likely to end up with realistically speaking is a messy and imperfect blend of relative strengths and weaknesses on both sides, where one will enjoy limited advantages in some aspects while the other holds the edge on others.

Where neither side holds a complete and overwhelming advantage in primary fields such as networks and drones/AI, it is in the margins where the difference will be decided, and that’s why WVR still matters.

Nowhere did I said that one side would be able to enjoy "full spectrum network and systems dominance" over the other when two advanced air powers fought each other.

I agree that the outcome of the battle would be decided at the fringes of comparative systems -- but it would be at the fringes of which side has superior BVR and networking capabilities that are more resilient, attritible, and dynamic.
It is the side which is able to retain and continue to operate more of its surviving BVR and networking capabilities in the face of an opfor, would be the side that wins.


Which goes back to my position that pursuing BVR and networked warfare is the most high yield and efficient domain of capability for fighting an advanced, high technology opfor in a VLO vs VLO matchup.

Taking that line of argument to its natural conclusion would see everyone scrap fighters and just use B21s and H20s. You will have VLO and all the room and onboard power you could want for avionics, subsystems, munitions, maybe even APS, carrier drones and all sorts of other future tech.

But that’s not the direction anyone is heading towards because to go down that path is to put all your eggs needlessly in one basket of being able to dominate the network and BVR fields. When neither side can afford to assume to be able to do that, you need to build up as many advantages and leave as few weaknesses as possible.

Well, no one has gone that far yet -- at this stage of airpower technology and development (6th generation aircraft), the kinematic capabilities of the manned fighter is still placed with some significance due to the evolving maturity and capabilities of MUMT and advanced networked warfare.
At present, WVR capabilities are still held as a last ditch of defense, because it has yet to be made fully obsolete.
But that doesn't mean it isn't headed in that direction.

That said, I very much would not be surprised to see B-21s and H-20s further on in their life cycles to have a role in the aerial warfare orbat of both the USAF and PLAAF respectively

Assuming you will be unchallengeable in key fields is what made America kill the F22 in favour of the more ‘economical’ F35, and its a decision many deeply regretted ever since, and could prove to be the most costly and devastating strategic mistake in history should China and America go hot before the US claws back some of its lost ground with 6th gens.

It's difficult to envision with might have been, specifically what may have happened if the US had not killed the F-22 and what repurcussions it may have had on the F-35.

However as it is at present, the F-35 is the most capable air superiority system of systems in the world because it is able to exemplify and massively exploit those aforemementioned domains in networking and organic sensors, offboard sensing, high end BVR systems, ECM and ECCM, and also sheer mass due to just how many F-35s are being produced.

It may well be that if the US had pursued the F-22 in greater numbers and if it resulted in a much lower procurement of F-35s, that US air power and air superiority capability overall would have been inferior to what it will be going into the future.

But admittedly it is difficult to talk about alternative/counterfactuals.

I’m pleased to see this is not a mistake the Chinese are keen to repeat with the J35, because aerodynamic performance is clearly being given high priority in its design choices.

I don't think there's anything particular about J-XY/35 that prioritizes aerodynamic performance if we are comparing it to F-35, rather than a deliberate recognition that it is not necessary to pursue a larger diameter/depth internal weapons bay that is required for more ambitious strike missions (leading to a greater and more voluminous fuselage).

This is the last I will say on the subject since it’s getting off topic and we will just be going around in circles.

These discussions are primarily surrounding the nature of current and future aerial warfare, so I've moved this to the 6th gen thread.

 

[Gloire_bb]

I guess the designers of both F-35 and 350003 are trying (by their design choices) to convince the pilots to change their habit from relying on their eyes to relying more on the sensors. It is like teaching a person used to manual geared car to adapt to auto geared car.

They aren't...at least, not for optics. Those are contemporary for several obvious reasons.
(1)there is still no better way - and won't be for some time, - to display information in 360 deg, much less full sphere than overlay it over basic human vision. And since a human has FoV - the neck will have to move.
(2)integral quality of human vision (well, pilots') - i.e. combination of quality with the field of view, esp, against moving targets, and ability to process it - is still unmatched. Furthermore, it works until the pilot works, and if the pilot doesn't work anymore - then we're screwed. Basically - don't replace that's not broken unless you really can and have to.
(3)any data displayed have to go through pilots' senses anyways. Mostly eyes.
(4)System needs a working method not just to detect targets, but also to properly display to the pilot what and where is detected, and correctly chose it for engagement. The most precise, intuitive, fast, and efficient way for a human to do it is through eyesight direction - other forms of display are two-dimensional (or restricted otherwise). Other methods are complementary, but not suitable to replace this one.
Thus until you're capable of winning car race through an interface of tables - it's better to augment vision, not to replace it. And even when you'll be able to really replace eyes as the main and backup sensor(like, say, that BAE p.125 tried to aim for) - before we go into completely futuristic concepts like directly feeding data to the pilots' brain, it will still be better to give pilot full view one way or another. Thus, unless you can fully fool his sense of direction (which is notoriously hard) - even then he'll have to move his neck a whole lot.

Basically, augmented reality>100% synthetic picture, for now and probably for decades to come.

I drive a manual geared car, whenever I drive a leased auto geared car I have difficulty in moving it at the beginning minutes because I step on the break thinking I am stepping on the clutch.

The right analogy here won't be auto/manual - combat aircraft went through this stage back in the 1940s.
The right analogy will be getting record time at Nürburgring in two-way traffic, with pedestrians walking randomly in all directions, and occasional subway builders breaking the ground right throw the road below your hood.
All that while controlling your car through a set of tables. Sure, with tables it is probably way better than with a full deck of clocks, but still it's better to choose additional methods of display.

 

[lcloo]

At this modern age is it necessary to have a visual on the near 6 o'clock view of your aircraft? rear radar and optical sensor can warn the pilot much faster of enemy from behind than trying to turn one's hear and shoulder to look behind. (It is impossible to have a 6 o'clock view because of the ejection seat, which was not available to dog fighting pilots during WW2).

If 360 degree view is so necessary, the hump can be made transparent with glass by extending the size of the cockpit canopy to eliminate the metal panel that made the hump, if there is a canopy structure strength issue, a reinforcing bar could be used as in the canopy of J20.