So much surface warship development. What's PLAN doing about its relative weakness below the surface? Anti-sub may have improved a lot and caught up if not surpassed but can they ensure any decent safety against the hordes of USN subs? They must be feeling pretty damn confident with PLAN's current anti-sub warfare but maybe this area doesn't get any attention or leaks from the authorities for a reason. Once you can detect subs with certainty and effectiveness, they are basically sitting ducks. In this respect, it is only a question of technology. The rest of the problem is securing airspace for anti-sub aircraft to release their ordinance. Could that be why China seems to consider air domain to be more important?
China's own sub fleet is a threat to the USN surface vessels more than they are to USN subs. It may not need the same level and numbers of submarines (though that's certainly useful for A2AD) to be totally capable of removing the USN submarine threat. It just seems while plenty of things are leaked and even very publicly shown and talked about, anti-sub insight is limited to just a few special mission aircraft and whispers of revolutionary detection tech. Anyway it's certainly true that if PLAN possess one or some new and effective anti-sub capabilities, it's only a matter of contesting and fighting for airspace - which explain spamming Type 055s and weapons dedicated to taking carriers.
This is an indication that the PLAN is transforming from a pure deterrence force to a presence force. As stated in its latest defence white paper, the main tasks of PLAN is "
near seas defense and far seas protection". My understanding on the breakdown is:
- To safeguard China's sea territories (including South China Sea) and coastal economic interests (thus numerous 056s + coastal guard force + fortified SCS islands);
- To achive area denial in case of conflict over TW, and to a less extent SCS (thus all sorts of long-range anti-ship capabilities + ever growing number of anti-air destroyers + the currently moderate carrier program);
- To create a secure base for China's SSBNs in the SCS (again 056s + SCS islands + underwater detection/defence systems + KQ-200s)；
- To provide reliable and economic long-range escort for China's shipping (054s + anti-prirate voyages)
- To build up an initial capacity for far seas deterence/presence (a small carrier task force + some SSNs)
- To lay the foudation for a US-style global navy for the future, in case it's needed one day
In this context, a small sub force, especially in terms of SSNs, is suitable for China's needs today, since SSNs are mainly attack weapons in the far seas. In the costal area with shallow waters, the underwater defence system, diesel subs, 056s and KQ-200s would be adequate and more cost-efficient.
In contrast, US seeks global marintime dominance and, to some extent, the search-and-destroy capability on enemy SSBNs in its nuclear doctrine, thus a huge SSN force is suitable. While for the Russians, a presence navy was never their thing and nuclear is THE pillar of their national defence strategy now. So of course all resources go to SSBNs and SSNs.
