A) A bigger payload competes with both structural strengthening and range requirements for weight. This is a tough balance to strike.
B) Perhaps. But if a stealthy strike UCAV can handle the same payload, that is an overlap of niches. It can simply take over the role. Ferrying a standoff weapon into range is a waste of a fighter frame. It makes more sense for the fighter to play complement to the UCAV carrying the stand off weapon rather than vice versa. Putting a stand off payload in the UCAV doesn't compromise it and it lets you maximize the mission flexibility of the fighter.
The kinematic and RCS impact is only temporary on the second proposal.
I don't think it makes much sense, doctrinally, for the PLAN to prioritize strike at the cost of some degree of A2A capability if they are also developing a dedicated strike UCAV. If the intention is to develop such a UCAV, then you won't need a manned stealth fighter to have larger payloads to conduct deep penetration strikes because the UCAV would be a better fit for such a role, and deep penetration strikes on a clean stealth configuration would be the primary reason you'd want a bigger weapons bay.
Furthermore, I'm not sure having a manned stealth fighter that compromises A2A capabilities for strike capabilities fits with what we can guess about China's intended carrier doctrine going forth. A2A, I'd argue, is more important for the PLAN's carrier doctrine, given their likely mission profiles and lack of PLAAF mission support when projecting power to distant geographies, than it is for the USN's carrier doctrine.
The first option forces you to live with a compromise between strike and A2A kinematics in perpetuity. The second option lets you convert between strike and A2A kinematics, and recover your A2A kinematic abilities the moment you've unloaded your strike package. Kinematic penalties aren't a big deal for strike missions, but they adversely affect A2A capabilities. Stealth may be a trickier consideration for the second option, but if we're talking about a design with a cleaner exterior than the first option the penalty from carrying an external package that's been shaped to minimize RCS contributions may not be much worse than a chunkier airframe.
Even if a future manned naval stealth fighter conducted strike missions fairly frequently, not all or even most of those missions will require larger payload capacity in combination with a clean stealthy exterior, especially if there will be other dedicated platforms that perform strike roles.
I think maybe you're underestimating the weight and airframe penalties involved with trying to fit in a larger weapons bay in a design that will already be weight challenged by range and carrier TOL requirements. These requirements are all competing for very limited real estate. If T:W suffers too much, it could very well mean a supercruise capable A2A design loses the ability to supercruise. Remember, again, China's current design bottleneck is the engines, which will put more pressure on keeping weight down, since adding thrust is not likely to be the viable get out of jail card it has proven to be for the JSF.
The X-35 that flew was optimized for an A2A role. The program delays and cost overruns that followed weren't a consequence of bad procurement, but a consequence of trying to engineer too many requirements into a single airframe. Sure, if you take out the B variant those problems may have been less severe, but even then with the F-35C we're talking about a product that the USN seems to tacitly consider a compromised solution. It's telling that the USN has already decided it won't be teaming up with the USAF again for a 6th gen fighter, and I think that speaks volumes about what they feel like they got from the JSF.
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