PLA missile defense system
- Thread starter Roger604
- Start date
Martian
Senior Member
You have to be careful. You could be jumping to a false conclusion. You have to interpret the Chinese government's statement from a lawyer's view and recognize the ambiguity in their claim.
"Estimating the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal has always relied almost exclusively on U.S. intelligence estimates, while Chinese government information about the size or composition of its nuclear forces has been almost non-existent. In the Chinese view, secrecy increases the potential adversaries’ uncertainty about Chinese capabilities and therefore increases the deterrent effect, although it may also – as in the case of the United States – cause that adversary to assume the worst. Perhaps in recognition of this dilemma, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in April 2004 published a fact sheet that included the statement: “Among the nuclear-weapon states, China ... possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal.”93 Since Britain has declared that it has less than 200 operationally available warheads, and the United States, Russia and France have more, the Chinese statement could be interpreted to mean that China’s nuclear arsenal is smaller than Britain’s.94
Not surprisingly, the devil is in the details. When the Chinese statement uses the word “arsenal,” does that mean the entire stockpile or just the portion of it that is operationally deployed? To add to the confusion, Britain has not disclosed the size of its stockpile but only declared that “less than 200 warheads” are “operationally available.” This strongly suggests that there may be additional British warheads in storage." (see pp. 38-39)
Martian
Senior Member
There are only two ways for China to restrain the United States. Firstly, in addition to using strategic nuclear ambiguity, China hopes that it possesses a sufficiently large nuclear deterrent to prevent a nuclear attack by the U.S.
Secondly, China places a high priority on developing a "PLA missile defense system" to hopefully lessen the effects of a nuclear exchange and to create more uncertainty in the minds of the U.S. government and military.
The following article gives us a glimpse into the plans of an U.S. military strike on Russia and/or China. In my opinion, it's overkill. However, you know those military types, if they don't drop five thermonuclear warheads on each Russian (or Chinese) city then they won't be satisfied.
"The Doomsday Dilemma
This Spring, Barack Obama will push toward his goal of a nuclear-free world. But the stiffest resistance may be at home.
By John Barry and Evan Thomas | NEWSWEEK
Published Apr 3, 2010
From the magazine issue dated Apr 12, 2010
For many years, America's master plan for nuclear war with the Soviet Union was called the SIOP—the Single Integrated Operational Plan. Beginning in 1962, the U.S. president was given some options to mull in the few minutes he had to decide before Soviet missiles bore down on Washington. He could, for instance, choose to spare the Soviet satellites, the Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe. Or he could opt for, say, the "urban-industrial" strike option—1,500 or so warheads dropped on 300 Russian cities. After a briefing on the SIOP on Sept. 14, 1962, President John F. Kennedy turned to his secretary of state, Dean Rusk, and remarked, "And they call us human beings."
Ever since the dawn of the atomic age at Hiroshima in August 1945, American presidents have been trying to figure out how to climb off the nuclear treadmill. The urgency may have faded in the post–Cold War era, but the weapons are still there. By 2002, President George W. Bush was signing off on a document containing his administration's Nuclear Posture Review, an -analysis of how America's nuclear arms might be used. Bush scribbled on the cover, "But why do we still have to have so many?" According to a knowledgeable source who would not be identified discussing sensitive national-security matters, President Obama wasn't briefed on the U.S. nuclear-strike plan against Russia and China until some months after he had taken office. "He thought it was insane," says the source. (The reason for the delay is unclear; the White House did not respond to repeated inquiries.)
During his presidential campaign, Obama embraced a dream first articulated by President Reagan: the abolition of nuclear weapons. The idea is no longer all that radical. In January 2007, an op-ed piece calling for a nuclear-weapons-free world appeared in The Wall Street Journal, signed by Reagan's secretary of state George Shultz; Nixon's and Ford's secretary of state, Henry Kissinger; Clinton's secretary of defense Bill Perry; and Sam Nunn, the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and longtime wise man of the defense establishment. "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," as they were quickly dubbed, had gotten together to give cover to politicians. "We wanted the candidates of both parties to feel they could debate the issue freely," said Nunn.
...
The prospect of nuclear proliferation is anxiety-inducing for all presidents, especially as terrorists try to get their hands on loose nukes. Obama is convinced that nuclear terrorism now poses a greater threat than the remote possibility of a nuclear war. On April 12 and 13, he will host a Washington summit of more than 40 heads of government with the aim of getting tougher measures to secure the fissile material still lying unprotected around the world. He's set a deadline of four years for truly securing the most dangerous materials. His own advisers suspect he is being overambitious but see the summit as a "consciousness-raising exercise." Every five years, the signers of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty meet to review progress, and in May they will meet again. The Obama team hopes to use the conference to push his no-nukes agenda, but he will be resisted by countries, like Iran, that resent American power. At the same time, Obama can't cut America's arsenal as much as he might like. Countries long under U.S. nuclear protection, like Japan, may decide they need their own nuclear arms as American power declines in the world. Countries choosing to stay under the nuclear umbrella will want reassurances that they can depend on it."
Secondly, China places a high priority on developing a "PLA missile defense system" to hopefully lessen the effects of a nuclear exchange and to create more uncertainty in the minds of the U.S. government and military.
The following article gives us a glimpse into the plans of an U.S. military strike on Russia and/or China. In my opinion, it's overkill. However, you know those military types, if they don't drop five thermonuclear warheads on each Russian (or Chinese) city then they won't be satisfied.
"The Doomsday Dilemma
This Spring, Barack Obama will push toward his goal of a nuclear-free world. But the stiffest resistance may be at home.
By John Barry and Evan Thomas | NEWSWEEK
Published Apr 3, 2010
From the magazine issue dated Apr 12, 2010
For many years, America's master plan for nuclear war with the Soviet Union was called the SIOP—the Single Integrated Operational Plan. Beginning in 1962, the U.S. president was given some options to mull in the few minutes he had to decide before Soviet missiles bore down on Washington. He could, for instance, choose to spare the Soviet satellites, the Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe. Or he could opt for, say, the "urban-industrial" strike option—1,500 or so warheads dropped on 300 Russian cities. After a briefing on the SIOP on Sept. 14, 1962, President John F. Kennedy turned to his secretary of state, Dean Rusk, and remarked, "And they call us human beings."
Ever since the dawn of the atomic age at Hiroshima in August 1945, American presidents have been trying to figure out how to climb off the nuclear treadmill. The urgency may have faded in the post–Cold War era, but the weapons are still there. By 2002, President George W. Bush was signing off on a document containing his administration's Nuclear Posture Review, an -analysis of how America's nuclear arms might be used. Bush scribbled on the cover, "But why do we still have to have so many?" According to a knowledgeable source who would not be identified discussing sensitive national-security matters, President Obama wasn't briefed on the U.S. nuclear-strike plan against Russia and China until some months after he had taken office. "He thought it was insane," says the source. (The reason for the delay is unclear; the White House did not respond to repeated inquiries.)
During his presidential campaign, Obama embraced a dream first articulated by President Reagan: the abolition of nuclear weapons. The idea is no longer all that radical. In January 2007, an op-ed piece calling for a nuclear-weapons-free world appeared in The Wall Street Journal, signed by Reagan's secretary of state George Shultz; Nixon's and Ford's secretary of state, Henry Kissinger; Clinton's secretary of defense Bill Perry; and Sam Nunn, the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and longtime wise man of the defense establishment. "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," as they were quickly dubbed, had gotten together to give cover to politicians. "We wanted the candidates of both parties to feel they could debate the issue freely," said Nunn.
...
The prospect of nuclear proliferation is anxiety-inducing for all presidents, especially as terrorists try to get their hands on loose nukes. Obama is convinced that nuclear terrorism now poses a greater threat than the remote possibility of a nuclear war. On April 12 and 13, he will host a Washington summit of more than 40 heads of government with the aim of getting tougher measures to secure the fissile material still lying unprotected around the world. He's set a deadline of four years for truly securing the most dangerous materials. His own advisers suspect he is being overambitious but see the summit as a "consciousness-raising exercise." Every five years, the signers of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty meet to review progress, and in May they will meet again. The Obama team hopes to use the conference to push his no-nukes agenda, but he will be resisted by countries, like Iran, that resent American power. At the same time, Obama can't cut America's arsenal as much as he might like. Countries long under U.S. nuclear protection, like Japan, may decide they need their own nuclear arms as American power declines in the world. Countries choosing to stay under the nuclear umbrella will want reassurances that they can depend on it."
Martian
Senior Member
1) China also has AESA radar technology (see Type 052C Aegis-class destroyer or KJ-2000 AWACS). It is only a matter of time (e.g. 5, 10, 15, or 20 years; take your pick) before China has roughly equivalent AESA radar on fighter planes.
2) I don't know enough about radar. However, countermeasures may be designed against a microwave attack. A "Faraday cage" blocks electrical energy. There might be a similar analogue for microwave energy. An obvious countermeasure is radiation hardening of missile electronics.
3) I don't know if a long-range microwave weapon is feasible. Looking at the electromagnetic spectrum (see picture below), microwave energy is extremely weak in comparison to visible light. We know that lasers aren't that great for shooting down missiles. The latest Boeing ABL (i.e. Airborne Laser) test required over two minutes to damage a ballistic missile. Furthermore, the ABL was using the chemical energy output available from a massive tank carried on a giant Boeing 747 airplane. The chemical energy output available to power a microwave/"electromagnetic beam" weapon from a fighter jet is extremely tiny in comparison.
4) Microwave energy is a form of electromagnetic energy. It has the same shortcomings as a laser-based weapon. Microwave weapons are useless when it's foggy or rains (e.g. the water moisture absorbs the electromagnetic energy; it's like heating a cup of water in a microwave oven). You also have refraction problems. Also, as a countermeasure, scientists can probably design ablative armor tuned to the frequencies of microwave radiation to protect attack missiles.
5) Another countermeasure is to place the sensitive electronics within a metamaterial that is invisible to microwave energy. China also possesses very advanced metamaterial technology.
"In October 2006, a US-British team of scientists created a metamaterial which rendered an object invisible to microwave radiation. As the visible spectrum ..."
"Oct 16, 2009 ... (PhysOrg.com) -- Two physicists in China have used metamaterials to create the first artificial electromagnetic black hole."
In conclusion, an arms race is always exciting to watch.
Martian
Senior Member
You should expand my title to the "fog, rain, and atmosphere" guy. The directed AESA beam weapon sounds similar to a MASER (Microwave Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation). The part that I'm uncertain about is whether the electromagnetic waves from the AESA radars are coherent or not. In any case, any electromagnetic weapon (e.g. laser, maser, or AESA-based) will have a very limited range at sea level because the thick atmosphere (e.g. air density) absorbs electromagnetic energy. I remember my college physics professor saying that if you fire a very powerful laser at sea level then the physics equations show that the energy will be dissipated by the atmosphere when it reaches the other end of the tennis court.
Electromagnetic beam weapons face beam energy dissipation and focusing problems at sea-level due to the thick atmosphere and unpredictable fluctuations in atmospheric density. The two big problems are that the atmosphere will absorb the beam energy (e.g. similar to pumping a lot of heat energy into a giant heat-sink or iceberg) and distort the direction of the beam, which makes continuous targeting a nightmare (e.g. you've seen the shimmering atmospheric distortions with your naked eye when the heat rises from the ground in a hot desert). Also, every night, you see the stars twinkle. That is continuous atmospheric distortion.
Giraffe in heat haze.
The following article from Global Security examines the multitude of problems with all beam weapons. I think it may be premature to declare that AESA beam weapons have overcome the problems of maintaining targeting, energy output requirement, energy absorption and distortion by thick sea-level atmosphere, and my favorite "it could be foggy or rainy today." Scientists have been working on these problems for decades and I haven't really heard of good "conceptual" (e.g. new theoretical) methods to overcome these long-standing problems. I'm not saying that it can't be done, however what has changed in the last few years to allow them to overcome all of these physics problems that no one could solve for decades? The last paragraph (e.g. prior to "sources and resources") in the Global Security article informs us that scientists were still scratching their heads in 2007.
"Directed Energy Weapons
A Directed Energy Weapon is a system using directed-energy primarily as a direct means to damage or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel. Directed energy offers promise as a transformational “game changer” in military operations, able to augment and improve operational capabilities in many areas. Yet despite this potential, years of investment have not resulted in any operational systems with high energy laser capability. The lack of progress is a result of many factors from unexpected technological challenges to a lack of understanding of the costs and benefits of such systems. Ultimately, as a result of these circumstances, interest in such systems has declined over the years.
Initially, the American projects were developed as separate entities, with a relatively loose interservice coordination. In 1978, however, the Department of Defense organized an Office of Directed Energy Technology to coordinate the development of beam weapons, and the Pentagon established the Particle Beam Technology Study Group, composed of 53 Defense Department and US scientific community personnel.
Through fiscal year 1993, SDIO spent about $4.9 billion over 9 years of a planned $6.7 billion for directed energy research and development, or about $800 million less than the 1984 plan specified was needed over 6 years. SDIO said that this was nearly all of the national effort in high-power directed energy weapons. SDIO also said that this under funding becomes larger if it is recognized that stretched-out programs cost more than efficiently funded programs and that dollars spent in years following the planned years had been degraded by inflation. In the early years of SDI, the directed energy funding made up nearly a quarter of SDI’s total funding. Annual funding peaked at $827 million in fiscal year 1983 and subsequently decreased to $162 million in fiscal year 1993.
A particle beam transmits a stream of high-energy atomic particles which can destroy or neutralize a target. The particles may have a positive or negative charge or may be neutral. In each case the particles are injected into some type of medium, normally an electron beam, and accelerated to near-light (relativistic) velocities. The medium, called a plasma when combined with the particles, can then be aimed at the desired target. For example, a negatively charged electron beam similar to those in a television picture tube can be fired through a gas or other source of positive atomic particles such as protons. These particles are swept along by the oppositely charged electron beam. Since the electron beam is relativistic, the positive particles are accelerated to relativistic velocities. The almost massless electrons can then be removed from the beam, leaving a stream of relatively heavy atomic particles.
This stream of particles traveling at a relativistic velocity is a tremendous energy emission. Einstein's famous formula, E = mc2, shows the relationship between energy, mass, and the velocity of light. For example, it demonstrates why a very small object, such as an atomic particle, moving at a relativistic velocity will have a very high energy potential and why it will impart an enormous amount of energy to whatever it strikes.
Particle beams are not a steady stream of energy but rather are a series of pulses. Like a bolt of lightning, each pulse is only a few millionths of a second long and discharges great quantities of energy which can have a variety of effects on a target, depending on the level of energy. For example, a beam of five seconds' duration with an energy of 25 megajoules would have the explosive equivalent of 50 pounds of TNT. Such an explosive force could have devastating effects on an intercontinental ballistic missile's (ICBM) reentry vehicle or its booster during the powered portion of flight. Additionally a selected target could be totally disintegrated, by making its molecular structure unstable through the enormous energy transfer. Similarly, a target could become super heated and vaporize. A beam with a lower energy level could pass through a target, such as an ICBM reentry vehicle, causing electrical and magnetic disruptions in its electronic 5components. The lethality and relativistic nature of beam weapons make them especially suitable for antiballistic missile (ABM) applications.
A Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) weapon produces a beam of near-light-speed-neutral atomic particles by subjecting hydrogen or deuterium gas to an enormous electrical charge. The electrical charge produces negatively charged ions that are accelerated through a long vacuum tunnel by an electrical potential in the hundreds-of-megavolt range. At the end of the tunnel, electrons are stripped from the negative ions, forming the high-speed-neutral atomic particles that are the neutral particle beam. The NPB delivers its kinetic energy directly into the atomic and subatomic structure of the target, literally heating the target from deep within. Charged particle beams (CPB) can be produced in a similar fashion, but they are easily deflected by the earth’s magnetic field and their strong electrical charge causes the CPB to diffuse and break apart uncontrollably. Weapons-class NPBs require energies in the hundreds of millions of electron volts and beam powers in the tens of megawatts. Modern devices have not yet reached this level.
In 1951, Charles Townes and co-workers discovered stimulated emission in ammonia, which led to the development of a maser (microwave amplification by stimulated emission). They were encouraged by AFOSR to extend the work to shorter wavelength all the way to the optical region. Ten years later, in 1961, Ted Maiman (Hughes Aircraft Company) announced the development of a laser (light amplification by stimulated emission). The use of lasers in numerous applications eventually led to more powerful devices.
The long-cited advantages of high-energy lasers [HEL] include speed of light response, precision effects, limiting collateral damage, deep magazines, and low cost per kill. High-energy lasers have two characteristics that make them particularly valuable for effects-based application: they are extremely fast and extremely precise. The laser begins its attack within seconds of detecting its target and completes its destruction a few seconds later. This means the operator has time for multiple shots if needed to destroy the target or engage multiple targets.
Lasers can be built as either continuous wave (CW) or pulsed devices. CW laser effects are generally described in terms of power density on target in W/m2; pulsed laser effects are described in terms of energy density on target in J/m. For the space-earth geometry multimegawatt power is required for a CW weapons laser and hundreds to thousands of joules of energy per pulse is required for a pulsed weapons laser (depends on pulse length and pulse repetition frequency).
The laser beam delivers its energy to a relatively small spot on the target—typically a few inches in diameter. The incident intensity is sufficient to melt steel. Typical melt-through times for missile bodies are about 10 seconds. But if the heated area is under stress from aerodynamic or static pressure loads, catastrophic failure can occur more quickly. The beam can attack specific aim points on a missile that are known to be vulnerable; for example, pressurized fuel tanks or aerodynamic control surfaces. The laser weapon design, therefore, must include the ability to "see" and identify specific aim points, to put the beam on that aim point and hold it for a few seconds, and finally, to determine when the desired effect on the target has been achieved.
There are four fundamental approaches to high- and medium-power laser energy: chemical lasers, solid-state lasers, fiber lasers, and free electron lasers.
* Chemical lasers can achieve continuous wave output with power reaching to multi-megawatt levels. Examples of chemical lasers include the chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL), the hydrogen fluoride (HF) laser, and the deuterium fluoride (DF) laser. There is also a DF-CO 2 (deuterium fluoride-carbon dioxide) laser.
* Diode-pumped solid-state (DPSS) lasers operate by pumping a solid gain medium (for example, a ruby or a neodymium-doped YAG crystal) with a laser diode.
* Combining the outputs of many fiber lasers (100 to 10,000) is a possible way to achieve a highly efficient HEL. Fiber-laser technology continues to advance. At 1 ??m, 200 W amplifiers are available commercially, and > 500 W has been demonstrated in the lab.
* Free-electron lasers (FELs) are unique lasers in that they do not use bound molecular or atomic states for the lasing medium. FELs use a relativistic electron beam (e-beam) as the lasing medium. Generating the e-beam energy requires the creation of an e-beam (typically in a vacuum) and an e-beam accelerator. This accelerated e-beam is then injected into a periodic, transverse magnetic field (undulator). By synchronizing the e-beam/electromagnetic field wavelengths, an amplified electromagnetic output wave is created.
Years of major investment in chemical lasers produced megawatt-class systems that could have a wide range of applications. However, size, weight, and logistics issues limit them to integration on large platforms, such as the 747 used for the ABL program, or fixed ground applications such as the Ground-Based Laser for Space Control. As a consequence, interest in these systems and expectations of progress has significantly decreased.
The laser weapon delivery system is a complicated one, consisting of many elements grouped as subsystems. Two parts to the system involve equipment used in the operation of the laser weapon: (1) beam generation or laser source; and (2) supporting technologies such as acquisition, pointing, and tracking (including fast beam-slewing equipment, adaptive optics, and reflective mirrors). To develop an effective laser system two other important areas have to be considered: (1) beam-target interaction/lethality science and validation; and (2) modeling and simulation including theoretical calculations and/or computer models.
Key issues that have an impact on all initiatives include pointing and tracking accuracy, beam control, and beam propagation in a battlefield environment or during poor weather conditions
. In the case of laser weapons, lethality effects against a variety of targets must also be clearly understood.
Pointing and tracking accuracy is the ability to point the laser beam to the desired aimpoint and to maintain that aimpoint on the target. To achieve the status of a precision-aimed weapon, laser weapon systems will require pointing and tracking accuracies in the 10 to 100 nanoradian range for systems in low earth orbit.
Beam control refers to forming and shaping the beam. Depending on the nature of the specific laser, beam control can include initial processing of the beam to shape it and eliminate unwanted off-axis energy, or can include wavefront shaping and/or phase control. For visible and near-infrared lasers, the frequencies under study for use at long range, optics in the four to 20 meter diameter should suffice for a system in low earth orbit.
Beam propagation describes the effects on the beam after it leaves the HEL output aperture and travels through the battlefield environment to the target. Optical stability of the platform and beam interactions with the atmosphere, both molecules and aerosol particles, primarily determine the laser beam quality at the target. Beam quality is a measure of how effective the HEL is in putting its light into a desired spot size on the target.
Atmospheric and propagation effects on HEL performance requires expanded efforts to measure and understand low-altitude, “thick-air” atmospheric effects. Primary concerns include the effects of atmospheric turbulence and aerosol scattering on the HEL beam. Nonlinear propagation effects such as thermal blooming can also have important effects for many applications. Technical remedies are available to deal with atmospheric turbulence, but much more understanding is needed, as is the ability to predict and measure atmospheric turbulence. Non-linear propagation effects require detailed analyses and experiments. They also require beam control concepts to ameliorate the negative effects. No such analyses or experiments exist for multi-pulse systems.
Lethality defines the total energy and/or fluence level required to defeat specific targets. The laser energy must couple efficiently to the target, and it must exceed a failure threshold that is both rate dependent and target-specific. Laser output power and beam quality are two key factors for determining whether an HEL has sufficient fluence to negate a specific target.
By 2007 the focus was on solid state lasers with the promise of providing for smaller, lighter systems with deep magazines. However, the current goal for solid state laser development would provide a power level more than an order of magnitude lower than current chemical lasers. While beam quality and other factors can compensate for some of the difference in power level, there is currently little investment in those aspects. Further, these cannot make up the delta in power of chemical vs. solid state lasers. The near-term projection for solid state lasers is a power level closer to two orders of magnitude below that of chemical lasers.
Sources and Resources
Directed Energy/Space-Based Laser: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) The Directed Energy (DE) program continues the process of integrating high power chemical laser components and technologies developed over the past 10 years specifically for the ballistic missile defense boost phase intercept mission.
High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility The High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility (HELSTF) is located at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. HELSTF has been managed by the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (USASSDC) since October 1990. HELSTF is designated as the Department of Defense (DoD) National Test Facility for high energy laser test and evaluation. HELSTF is the home of the Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL), the United States' most powerful laser.
SEALITE Beam Director (SLBD) The SEALITE Beam Director (SLBD) is mounted on top of Test Cell 1. It consists of a large aperture (1.8 meter) gimbaled telescope and optics to point the MIRACL or other laser beam onto a target. The high power clear aperture is 1.5 meters. The remaining 0.3 meters is normally reserved for a tracker using the outer annulus of the primary mirror. The system is extremely agile and capable of high rotation and acceleration rates"
Electromagnetic beam weapons face beam energy dissipation and focusing problems at sea-level due to the thick atmosphere and unpredictable fluctuations in atmospheric density. The two big problems are that the atmosphere will absorb the beam energy (e.g. similar to pumping a lot of heat energy into a giant heat-sink or iceberg) and distort the direction of the beam, which makes continuous targeting a nightmare (e.g. you've seen the shimmering atmospheric distortions with your naked eye when the heat rises from the ground in a hot desert). Also, every night, you see the stars twinkle. That is continuous atmospheric distortion.
Giraffe in heat haze.
The following article from Global Security examines the multitude of problems with all beam weapons. I think it may be premature to declare that AESA beam weapons have overcome the problems of maintaining targeting, energy output requirement, energy absorption and distortion by thick sea-level atmosphere, and my favorite "it could be foggy or rainy today." Scientists have been working on these problems for decades and I haven't really heard of good "conceptual" (e.g. new theoretical) methods to overcome these long-standing problems. I'm not saying that it can't be done, however what has changed in the last few years to allow them to overcome all of these physics problems that no one could solve for decades? The last paragraph (e.g. prior to "sources and resources") in the Global Security article informs us that scientists were still scratching their heads in 2007.
"Directed Energy Weapons
A Directed Energy Weapon is a system using directed-energy primarily as a direct means to damage or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel. Directed energy offers promise as a transformational “game changer” in military operations, able to augment and improve operational capabilities in many areas. Yet despite this potential, years of investment have not resulted in any operational systems with high energy laser capability. The lack of progress is a result of many factors from unexpected technological challenges to a lack of understanding of the costs and benefits of such systems. Ultimately, as a result of these circumstances, interest in such systems has declined over the years.
Initially, the American projects were developed as separate entities, with a relatively loose interservice coordination. In 1978, however, the Department of Defense organized an Office of Directed Energy Technology to coordinate the development of beam weapons, and the Pentagon established the Particle Beam Technology Study Group, composed of 53 Defense Department and US scientific community personnel.
Through fiscal year 1993, SDIO spent about $4.9 billion over 9 years of a planned $6.7 billion for directed energy research and development, or about $800 million less than the 1984 plan specified was needed over 6 years. SDIO said that this was nearly all of the national effort in high-power directed energy weapons. SDIO also said that this under funding becomes larger if it is recognized that stretched-out programs cost more than efficiently funded programs and that dollars spent in years following the planned years had been degraded by inflation. In the early years of SDI, the directed energy funding made up nearly a quarter of SDI’s total funding. Annual funding peaked at $827 million in fiscal year 1983 and subsequently decreased to $162 million in fiscal year 1993.
A particle beam transmits a stream of high-energy atomic particles which can destroy or neutralize a target. The particles may have a positive or negative charge or may be neutral. In each case the particles are injected into some type of medium, normally an electron beam, and accelerated to near-light (relativistic) velocities. The medium, called a plasma when combined with the particles, can then be aimed at the desired target. For example, a negatively charged electron beam similar to those in a television picture tube can be fired through a gas or other source of positive atomic particles such as protons. These particles are swept along by the oppositely charged electron beam. Since the electron beam is relativistic, the positive particles are accelerated to relativistic velocities. The almost massless electrons can then be removed from the beam, leaving a stream of relatively heavy atomic particles.
This stream of particles traveling at a relativistic velocity is a tremendous energy emission. Einstein's famous formula, E = mc2, shows the relationship between energy, mass, and the velocity of light. For example, it demonstrates why a very small object, such as an atomic particle, moving at a relativistic velocity will have a very high energy potential and why it will impart an enormous amount of energy to whatever it strikes.
Particle beams are not a steady stream of energy but rather are a series of pulses. Like a bolt of lightning, each pulse is only a few millionths of a second long and discharges great quantities of energy which can have a variety of effects on a target, depending on the level of energy. For example, a beam of five seconds' duration with an energy of 25 megajoules would have the explosive equivalent of 50 pounds of TNT. Such an explosive force could have devastating effects on an intercontinental ballistic missile's (ICBM) reentry vehicle or its booster during the powered portion of flight. Additionally a selected target could be totally disintegrated, by making its molecular structure unstable through the enormous energy transfer. Similarly, a target could become super heated and vaporize. A beam with a lower energy level could pass through a target, such as an ICBM reentry vehicle, causing electrical and magnetic disruptions in its electronic 5components. The lethality and relativistic nature of beam weapons make them especially suitable for antiballistic missile (ABM) applications.
A Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) weapon produces a beam of near-light-speed-neutral atomic particles by subjecting hydrogen or deuterium gas to an enormous electrical charge. The electrical charge produces negatively charged ions that are accelerated through a long vacuum tunnel by an electrical potential in the hundreds-of-megavolt range. At the end of the tunnel, electrons are stripped from the negative ions, forming the high-speed-neutral atomic particles that are the neutral particle beam. The NPB delivers its kinetic energy directly into the atomic and subatomic structure of the target, literally heating the target from deep within. Charged particle beams (CPB) can be produced in a similar fashion, but they are easily deflected by the earth’s magnetic field and their strong electrical charge causes the CPB to diffuse and break apart uncontrollably. Weapons-class NPBs require energies in the hundreds of millions of electron volts and beam powers in the tens of megawatts. Modern devices have not yet reached this level.
In 1951, Charles Townes and co-workers discovered stimulated emission in ammonia, which led to the development of a maser (microwave amplification by stimulated emission). They were encouraged by AFOSR to extend the work to shorter wavelength all the way to the optical region. Ten years later, in 1961, Ted Maiman (Hughes Aircraft Company) announced the development of a laser (light amplification by stimulated emission). The use of lasers in numerous applications eventually led to more powerful devices.
The long-cited advantages of high-energy lasers [HEL] include speed of light response, precision effects, limiting collateral damage, deep magazines, and low cost per kill. High-energy lasers have two characteristics that make them particularly valuable for effects-based application: they are extremely fast and extremely precise. The laser begins its attack within seconds of detecting its target and completes its destruction a few seconds later. This means the operator has time for multiple shots if needed to destroy the target or engage multiple targets.
Lasers can be built as either continuous wave (CW) or pulsed devices. CW laser effects are generally described in terms of power density on target in W/m2; pulsed laser effects are described in terms of energy density on target in J/m. For the space-earth geometry multimegawatt power is required for a CW weapons laser and hundreds to thousands of joules of energy per pulse is required for a pulsed weapons laser (depends on pulse length and pulse repetition frequency).
The laser beam delivers its energy to a relatively small spot on the target—typically a few inches in diameter. The incident intensity is sufficient to melt steel. Typical melt-through times for missile bodies are about 10 seconds. But if the heated area is under stress from aerodynamic or static pressure loads, catastrophic failure can occur more quickly. The beam can attack specific aim points on a missile that are known to be vulnerable; for example, pressurized fuel tanks or aerodynamic control surfaces. The laser weapon design, therefore, must include the ability to "see" and identify specific aim points, to put the beam on that aim point and hold it for a few seconds, and finally, to determine when the desired effect on the target has been achieved.
There are four fundamental approaches to high- and medium-power laser energy: chemical lasers, solid-state lasers, fiber lasers, and free electron lasers.
* Chemical lasers can achieve continuous wave output with power reaching to multi-megawatt levels. Examples of chemical lasers include the chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL), the hydrogen fluoride (HF) laser, and the deuterium fluoride (DF) laser. There is also a DF-CO 2 (deuterium fluoride-carbon dioxide) laser.
* Diode-pumped solid-state (DPSS) lasers operate by pumping a solid gain medium (for example, a ruby or a neodymium-doped YAG crystal) with a laser diode.
* Combining the outputs of many fiber lasers (100 to 10,000) is a possible way to achieve a highly efficient HEL. Fiber-laser technology continues to advance. At 1 ??m, 200 W amplifiers are available commercially, and > 500 W has been demonstrated in the lab.
* Free-electron lasers (FELs) are unique lasers in that they do not use bound molecular or atomic states for the lasing medium. FELs use a relativistic electron beam (e-beam) as the lasing medium. Generating the e-beam energy requires the creation of an e-beam (typically in a vacuum) and an e-beam accelerator. This accelerated e-beam is then injected into a periodic, transverse magnetic field (undulator). By synchronizing the e-beam/electromagnetic field wavelengths, an amplified electromagnetic output wave is created.
Years of major investment in chemical lasers produced megawatt-class systems that could have a wide range of applications. However, size, weight, and logistics issues limit them to integration on large platforms, such as the 747 used for the ABL program, or fixed ground applications such as the Ground-Based Laser for Space Control. As a consequence, interest in these systems and expectations of progress has significantly decreased.
The laser weapon delivery system is a complicated one, consisting of many elements grouped as subsystems. Two parts to the system involve equipment used in the operation of the laser weapon: (1) beam generation or laser source; and (2) supporting technologies such as acquisition, pointing, and tracking (including fast beam-slewing equipment, adaptive optics, and reflective mirrors). To develop an effective laser system two other important areas have to be considered: (1) beam-target interaction/lethality science and validation; and (2) modeling and simulation including theoretical calculations and/or computer models.
Key issues that have an impact on all initiatives include pointing and tracking accuracy, beam control, and beam propagation in a battlefield environment or during poor weather conditions
. In the case of laser weapons, lethality effects against a variety of targets must also be clearly understood.
Pointing and tracking accuracy is the ability to point the laser beam to the desired aimpoint and to maintain that aimpoint on the target. To achieve the status of a precision-aimed weapon, laser weapon systems will require pointing and tracking accuracies in the 10 to 100 nanoradian range for systems in low earth orbit.
Beam control refers to forming and shaping the beam. Depending on the nature of the specific laser, beam control can include initial processing of the beam to shape it and eliminate unwanted off-axis energy, or can include wavefront shaping and/or phase control. For visible and near-infrared lasers, the frequencies under study for use at long range, optics in the four to 20 meter diameter should suffice for a system in low earth orbit.
Beam propagation describes the effects on the beam after it leaves the HEL output aperture and travels through the battlefield environment to the target. Optical stability of the platform and beam interactions with the atmosphere, both molecules and aerosol particles, primarily determine the laser beam quality at the target. Beam quality is a measure of how effective the HEL is in putting its light into a desired spot size on the target.
Atmospheric and propagation effects on HEL performance requires expanded efforts to measure and understand low-altitude, “thick-air” atmospheric effects. Primary concerns include the effects of atmospheric turbulence and aerosol scattering on the HEL beam. Nonlinear propagation effects such as thermal blooming can also have important effects for many applications. Technical remedies are available to deal with atmospheric turbulence, but much more understanding is needed, as is the ability to predict and measure atmospheric turbulence. Non-linear propagation effects require detailed analyses and experiments. They also require beam control concepts to ameliorate the negative effects. No such analyses or experiments exist for multi-pulse systems.
Lethality defines the total energy and/or fluence level required to defeat specific targets. The laser energy must couple efficiently to the target, and it must exceed a failure threshold that is both rate dependent and target-specific. Laser output power and beam quality are two key factors for determining whether an HEL has sufficient fluence to negate a specific target.
By 2007 the focus was on solid state lasers with the promise of providing for smaller, lighter systems with deep magazines. However, the current goal for solid state laser development would provide a power level more than an order of magnitude lower than current chemical lasers. While beam quality and other factors can compensate for some of the difference in power level, there is currently little investment in those aspects. Further, these cannot make up the delta in power of chemical vs. solid state lasers. The near-term projection for solid state lasers is a power level closer to two orders of magnitude below that of chemical lasers.
Sources and Resources
Directed Energy/Space-Based Laser: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) The Directed Energy (DE) program continues the process of integrating high power chemical laser components and technologies developed over the past 10 years specifically for the ballistic missile defense boost phase intercept mission.
High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility The High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility (HELSTF) is located at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. HELSTF has been managed by the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (USASSDC) since October 1990. HELSTF is designated as the Department of Defense (DoD) National Test Facility for high energy laser test and evaluation. HELSTF is the home of the Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL), the United States' most powerful laser.
SEALITE Beam Director (SLBD) The SEALITE Beam Director (SLBD) is mounted on top of Test Cell 1. It consists of a large aperture (1.8 meter) gimbaled telescope and optics to point the MIRACL or other laser beam onto a target. The high power clear aperture is 1.5 meters. The remaining 0.3 meters is normally reserved for a tracker using the outer annulus of the primary mirror. The system is extremely agile and capable of high rotation and acceleration rates"
Last edited:
Martian
Senior Member
China: Missile defense system test successful
"China: Missile defense system test successful
Posted 1/11/2010 8:08 PM
BEIJING (AP) — China announced that its military intercepted a missile in mid-flight Monday in a test of new technology that comes amid heightened tensions over Taiwan and increased willingness by the Asian giant to show off its advanced military capabilities.
The official Xinhua News Agency reported late Monday that "ground-based midcourse missile interception technology" was tested within Chinese territory.
"The test has achieved the expected objective," the three-sentence report said. "The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country."
Monday's report follows repeated complaints in recent days by Beijing over the sale by the U.S. of weaponry to Taiwan, including PAC-3 air defense missiles. These sales are driven by threats from China to use force to bring the island under its control, backed up by an estimated 1,300 Chinese ballistic missiles positioned along the Taiwan Strait.
Communist-ruled China split with Taiwan amid civil war in 1949 and continues to regard the self-governing democracy as part of its territory. Beijing has warned of a disruption in ties with Washington if the sale goes ahead, but has not said what specific actions it would take.
In Washington, the U.S. Defense Department said it had no notice before the Chinese test but that the United States does not consider it related to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
"We did not receive prior notification of the launch," Maj. Maureen Schumann, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said. "We detected two geographically separated missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision also being observed by space-based sensors. We are requesting information from China regarding the purpose for conducting this interception as well as China's intentions and plans to pursue future types of intercepts."
China's military is in the middle of a major technology upgrade, spurred on by double-digit annual percentage increases in defense spending. Missile technology is considered one of the People's Liberation Army's particular strengths, allowing it to narrow the gap with the U.S. and other militaries that wield stronger conventional forces.
Xinhua did not further identify the system tested, although China is believed to be pursuing a number of programs developed from anti-aircraft systems aimed at shooting down stealth aircraft and downing or disabling cruise missiles and precision-guided weapons.
Such programs are shrouded in secrecy, but military analysts say China appears to have augmented its air defenses with homemade technologies adapted from Russian and other foreign weaponry. China purchased a large number of Russian surface-to-air missiles during the 1990s and has since pressed ahead with its own HQ-9 interceptor, along with a more advanced missile system with an extended range.
Foreign media reports in 2006 said Beijing had tested a surface-to-air missile in the country's remote northwest with capabilities similar to the American Patriot interceptor system. According to South Korea's Dong-A Ilbo newspaper, the test involved the detection and downing of both a reconnaissance drone and an incoming ballistic missile by an interceptor, adding that it appeared to mark the official launch of China's indigenous interceptor unit.
"There is an obvious concern in Beijing that they need an effective anti-ballistic missile defense in some form," said Hans Kristensen, an expert on the Chinese military with the Federation of American Scientists.
Staging a successful test "shows that their technology is maturing," Kristensen said.
The 2009 Pentagon report on China's military says the air force received eight battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 surface-to-air missiles since 2006, with another eight on order. The missiles have a range of 125 miles (200 kilometers) and reportedly provide limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities.
Such interceptor missiles are believed to be deployed near major cities and strategic sites such as the massive Three Gorges Dam, but they could also be used to protect China's own ballistic missile batteries that would themselves become targets in any regional conflict.
Such interceptors would be of relatively little use against U.S. cruise missiles, although they could be effective against ballistic missiles deployed by Russia or India, China's massive neighbor to the south with which it has a growing military rivalry and lingering territorial disputes.
Monday's report continues a growing trend of greater transparency over China's new military technologies typified by last year's striking Oct. 1 military parade marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the communist state. Large numbers of missiles were displayed in the show, including ICBMs, together with tanks, amphibious craft and latest-generation jet fighters.
China's anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles — capable of striking U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and bases in the Pacific — have drawn the most attention from analysts in recent months.
Military displays and announcements of successful tests help build public pride in the military's rising capabilities and bolster support for rising defense spending that increased by almost 15% last year to $71 billion. The figure is thought by many analysts to represent only a portion of total defense spending, although it still amounts to only a fraction of the U.S. military budget.
Meanwhile, showing off such capabilities also helps put adversaries on notice, Kristensen said.
"It's the new Chinese way to signal that they are now able to do these things," he said.
Copyright 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed."
"China: Missile defense system test successful
Posted 1/11/2010 8:08 PM
BEIJING (AP) — China announced that its military intercepted a missile in mid-flight Monday in a test of new technology that comes amid heightened tensions over Taiwan and increased willingness by the Asian giant to show off its advanced military capabilities.
The official Xinhua News Agency reported late Monday that "ground-based midcourse missile interception technology" was tested within Chinese territory.
"The test has achieved the expected objective," the three-sentence report said. "The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country."
Monday's report follows repeated complaints in recent days by Beijing over the sale by the U.S. of weaponry to Taiwan, including PAC-3 air defense missiles. These sales are driven by threats from China to use force to bring the island under its control, backed up by an estimated 1,300 Chinese ballistic missiles positioned along the Taiwan Strait.
Communist-ruled China split with Taiwan amid civil war in 1949 and continues to regard the self-governing democracy as part of its territory. Beijing has warned of a disruption in ties with Washington if the sale goes ahead, but has not said what specific actions it would take.
In Washington, the U.S. Defense Department said it had no notice before the Chinese test but that the United States does not consider it related to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
"We did not receive prior notification of the launch," Maj. Maureen Schumann, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said. "We detected two geographically separated missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision also being observed by space-based sensors. We are requesting information from China regarding the purpose for conducting this interception as well as China's intentions and plans to pursue future types of intercepts."
China's military is in the middle of a major technology upgrade, spurred on by double-digit annual percentage increases in defense spending. Missile technology is considered one of the People's Liberation Army's particular strengths, allowing it to narrow the gap with the U.S. and other militaries that wield stronger conventional forces.
Xinhua did not further identify the system tested, although China is believed to be pursuing a number of programs developed from anti-aircraft systems aimed at shooting down stealth aircraft and downing or disabling cruise missiles and precision-guided weapons.
Such programs are shrouded in secrecy, but military analysts say China appears to have augmented its air defenses with homemade technologies adapted from Russian and other foreign weaponry. China purchased a large number of Russian surface-to-air missiles during the 1990s and has since pressed ahead with its own HQ-9 interceptor, along with a more advanced missile system with an extended range.
Foreign media reports in 2006 said Beijing had tested a surface-to-air missile in the country's remote northwest with capabilities similar to the American Patriot interceptor system. According to South Korea's Dong-A Ilbo newspaper, the test involved the detection and downing of both a reconnaissance drone and an incoming ballistic missile by an interceptor, adding that it appeared to mark the official launch of China's indigenous interceptor unit.
"There is an obvious concern in Beijing that they need an effective anti-ballistic missile defense in some form," said Hans Kristensen, an expert on the Chinese military with the Federation of American Scientists.
Staging a successful test "shows that their technology is maturing," Kristensen said.
The 2009 Pentagon report on China's military says the air force received eight battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 surface-to-air missiles since 2006, with another eight on order. The missiles have a range of 125 miles (200 kilometers) and reportedly provide limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities.
Such interceptor missiles are believed to be deployed near major cities and strategic sites such as the massive Three Gorges Dam, but they could also be used to protect China's own ballistic missile batteries that would themselves become targets in any regional conflict.
Such interceptors would be of relatively little use against U.S. cruise missiles, although they could be effective against ballistic missiles deployed by Russia or India, China's massive neighbor to the south with which it has a growing military rivalry and lingering territorial disputes.
Monday's report continues a growing trend of greater transparency over China's new military technologies typified by last year's striking Oct. 1 military parade marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the communist state. Large numbers of missiles were displayed in the show, including ICBMs, together with tanks, amphibious craft and latest-generation jet fighters.
China's anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles — capable of striking U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and bases in the Pacific — have drawn the most attention from analysts in recent months.
Military displays and announcements of successful tests help build public pride in the military's rising capabilities and bolster support for rising defense spending that increased by almost 15% last year to $71 billion. The figure is thought by many analysts to represent only a portion of total defense spending, although it still amounts to only a fraction of the U.S. military budget.
Meanwhile, showing off such capabilities also helps put adversaries on notice, Kristensen said.
"It's the new Chinese way to signal that they are now able to do these things," he said.
Copyright 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed."
Martian
Senior Member
Air Force: Test missile misses its Pacific target
The United States is not that far ahead of China in NMD (i.e. national missile defense) technology.
"Air Force: Test missile misses its Pacific target
AP foreign, Monday February 1 2010
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. (AP) — The Air Force says a missile-intercept test failed when a long-range missile launched from California missed a target missile launched from a Pacific island because of radar problems.
A statement posted on the Vandenberg Air Force Base Web site says the target missile was launched from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands on Sunday at about 3:40 p.m. and the long-range interceptor missile was launched from California's central coast shortly after.
The statement says both missiles launched and flew without trouble but the system's sea-based X-band radar did not perform as expected and the interceptor missed its target.
The statement says officials from the Missile Defense Agency that conducted the test will conduct an extensive investigation to determine the cause of the failure."
The United States is not that far ahead of China in NMD (i.e. national missile defense) technology.
"Air Force: Test missile misses its Pacific target
AP foreign, Monday February 1 2010
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. (AP) — The Air Force says a missile-intercept test failed when a long-range missile launched from California missed a target missile launched from a Pacific island because of radar problems.
A statement posted on the Vandenberg Air Force Base Web site says the target missile was launched from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands on Sunday at about 3:40 p.m. and the long-range interceptor missile was launched from California's central coast shortly after.
The statement says both missiles launched and flew without trouble but the system's sea-based X-band radar did not perform as expected and the interceptor missed its target.
The statement says officials from the Missile Defense Agency that conducted the test will conduct an extensive investigation to determine the cause of the failure."
Martian
Senior Member
It is apparent to everyone (except some die-hards; you know who you are) that U.S. NMD technology is currently highly-deficient and that major potential adversaries may have the upper hand.
1) U.S. NMD is highly experimental. The failed test in February is proof of the experimental nature of U.S. NMD technology (see ).
2) The success rate of U.S. NMD under actual battlefield conditions cannot be reliably projected. U.S. NMD is a very risky and unproven system at best.
"However NMD real-world effectiveness against longer range ICBMs is less clear because they are much faster and a single warhead much harder to hit. Furthermore, warheads are likely to be accompanied by sophisticated penetration aids that are difficult to defeat."
3) I think it is amateurish to propose using Patriot and THAAD for the intercept of ICBM warheads that travel at much faster speeds than SRBM or IRBM warheads.
"ICBMs are differentiated by having greater range and speed than other ballistic missiles: intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and the newly-named theatre ballistic missiles.
...
reentry phase (starting at an altitude of 100 km) — 2 minutes — impact is at a speed of up to 4 km/s (for early ICBMs less than 1 km/s); see also maneuverable reentry vehicle."
"Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), formerly Theater High Altitude Area Defense, is a United States Army system to shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles using a hit-to-kill approach. The missile carries no warhead but relies on the kinetic energy of the impact. THAAD was designed to hit Scuds and similar weapons, but also has a limited capability against ICBMs."
4) The Federation of American Scientists has highlighted serious problems with attempting to intercept a terminal phase warhead. The countermeasures available include the following:
"Several countermeasures are available to combat a terminal-phase defense:
* Speed: Early re-entry vehicle designs used blunt shapes which caused them to decelerate significantly during re-entry. Modern re-entry vehicles are shaped like ice cream cones to minimize aerodynamic drag. While the primary purpose of high-speed re-entry is to improve accuracy, it carries the collateral benefit of reducing the duration of exposure to terminal missile defense.
* Maneuvers: It is possible to design a re-entry vehicle that will perform simple but unpredictable and intense maneuvers upon re-entry. All that is required is that the re-entry vehicle’s center of gravity and center of drag not line up along its trajectory. This can be done by using a slightly bent nose, a small fin at the rear, or an internal weight that is moved laterally during re-entry. In the 1970s the U.S. developed a maneuvering re-entry vehicle, the Mark 500, for the Trident 1 SLBM. Its tests were successful and included 200G maneuvers that would severely challenge any defense. The Mark 500 was not deployed because the Soviet missile defense system did not warrant it. Maneuvering re-entry vehicles of this type sacrifice some accuracy and payload, but for a rogue state attack these are probably not significant. Whether China or a rogue state could now equal such thirty year old American technology requires further study.
* Ladder down: A nuclear warhead exploding in the upper atmosphere would create a cloud of ionized gas that would be opaque to radar for several minutes. One tactic available to the offense would be to use such a precursor explosion to mask a following re-entry vehicle. The second re-entry vehicle would become visible after passing through the cloud, but the time remaining for the defense would be significantly reduced. Possibly a second, lower, precursor could be used to ensure penetration by the third re-entry vehicle."
5) Decoys problem.
"The NIC report stated that a country capable of fielding an ICBM would be capable of developing countermeasures.[20] A Union of Concerned Scientists/ Massachusetts Institute of Technology (UCS/MIT) report that focused on relatively unsophisticated countermeasures concluded that these countermeasures would have a significant impact on the effectiveness of GMD.[21] Rather than focusing on making decoys resemble a warhead, they considered countermeasures that would disguise the warhead to make it look like a decoy, which would be a simpler prospect. Also, the warhead could be covered in a liquid nitrogen-cooled metal shroud, which would make it more difficult for the EKV to find the warhead in time to maneuver into its path. These two types of countermeasures require the EKV to be highly proficient at not only detecting a warhead, which may be disguised or hidden, but also distinguishing it from decoys that are specifically designed to fool it."
In conclusion, U.S. NMD technology can be used to intimidate unsophisticated countries like North Korea and Iran. U.S. NMD technology and its plethora of problems are almost useless against a major military and technological power (e.g. "near-peer") like China.
1) U.S. NMD is highly experimental. The failed test in February is proof of the experimental nature of U.S. NMD technology (see ).
2) The success rate of U.S. NMD under actual battlefield conditions cannot be reliably projected. U.S. NMD is a very risky and unproven system at best.
"However NMD real-world effectiveness against longer range ICBMs is less clear because they are much faster and a single warhead much harder to hit. Furthermore, warheads are likely to be accompanied by sophisticated penetration aids that are difficult to defeat."
3) I think it is amateurish to propose using Patriot and THAAD for the intercept of ICBM warheads that travel at much faster speeds than SRBM or IRBM warheads.
"ICBMs are differentiated by having greater range and speed than other ballistic missiles: intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and the newly-named theatre ballistic missiles.
...
reentry phase (starting at an altitude of 100 km) — 2 minutes — impact is at a speed of up to 4 km/s (for early ICBMs less than 1 km/s); see also maneuverable reentry vehicle."
"Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), formerly Theater High Altitude Area Defense, is a United States Army system to shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles using a hit-to-kill approach. The missile carries no warhead but relies on the kinetic energy of the impact. THAAD was designed to hit Scuds and similar weapons, but also has a limited capability against ICBMs."
4) The Federation of American Scientists has highlighted serious problems with attempting to intercept a terminal phase warhead. The countermeasures available include the following:
"Several countermeasures are available to combat a terminal-phase defense:
* Speed: Early re-entry vehicle designs used blunt shapes which caused them to decelerate significantly during re-entry. Modern re-entry vehicles are shaped like ice cream cones to minimize aerodynamic drag. While the primary purpose of high-speed re-entry is to improve accuracy, it carries the collateral benefit of reducing the duration of exposure to terminal missile defense.
* Maneuvers: It is possible to design a re-entry vehicle that will perform simple but unpredictable and intense maneuvers upon re-entry. All that is required is that the re-entry vehicle’s center of gravity and center of drag not line up along its trajectory. This can be done by using a slightly bent nose, a small fin at the rear, or an internal weight that is moved laterally during re-entry. In the 1970s the U.S. developed a maneuvering re-entry vehicle, the Mark 500, for the Trident 1 SLBM. Its tests were successful and included 200G maneuvers that would severely challenge any defense. The Mark 500 was not deployed because the Soviet missile defense system did not warrant it. Maneuvering re-entry vehicles of this type sacrifice some accuracy and payload, but for a rogue state attack these are probably not significant. Whether China or a rogue state could now equal such thirty year old American technology requires further study.
* Ladder down: A nuclear warhead exploding in the upper atmosphere would create a cloud of ionized gas that would be opaque to radar for several minutes. One tactic available to the offense would be to use such a precursor explosion to mask a following re-entry vehicle. The second re-entry vehicle would become visible after passing through the cloud, but the time remaining for the defense would be significantly reduced. Possibly a second, lower, precursor could be used to ensure penetration by the third re-entry vehicle."
5) Decoys problem.
"The NIC report stated that a country capable of fielding an ICBM would be capable of developing countermeasures.[20] A Union of Concerned Scientists/ Massachusetts Institute of Technology (UCS/MIT) report that focused on relatively unsophisticated countermeasures concluded that these countermeasures would have a significant impact on the effectiveness of GMD.[21] Rather than focusing on making decoys resemble a warhead, they considered countermeasures that would disguise the warhead to make it look like a decoy, which would be a simpler prospect. Also, the warhead could be covered in a liquid nitrogen-cooled metal shroud, which would make it more difficult for the EKV to find the warhead in time to maneuver into its path. These two types of countermeasures require the EKV to be highly proficient at not only detecting a warhead, which may be disguised or hidden, but also distinguishing it from decoys that are specifically designed to fool it."
In conclusion, U.S. NMD technology can be used to intimidate unsophisticated countries like North Korea and Iran. U.S. NMD technology and its plethora of problems are almost useless against a major military and technological power (e.g. "near-peer") like China.
1. It's always been said that this system is to guard against certain beligerent states with a limited offensive BM capability, not to neutralize the ICBM forces of China or Russia. Repeating the obvious and labaling it as a discovery.
2. Of course the system is deficient, it is not fully operational, it's in the testing stage, hence it was a test. If no test would ever fail, then there would be no reason to do any.
3. Basicly the entire modern chinese military machine is not combat tested, J-11, J-10, ZTZ-99, ZTZ-96, 054A, 052C, 094, 039. According to your logic, is the chinese military trash because it has never proven itself in modern combat?
4. At least there is a system that can offer some limeted degree of protection, so when a strike occures, the defenders can at least take action and try to safe people on the ground, instead of sitting idle and watching.
I basicly agree with all of the problems you mentioned existing for BMD. But those won't make BMD useless by default. That won't stop China from all out nuclear attack on the US, but that's not the purpose of NMD; the US nuclear arsenal will.
At least initially, NMD will be a defensive line against kamikaze guys throwing around with BMs.