plawolf
Lieutenant General
The status quo on the Korean Peninsula is far essential for China, it's not even the least bad position never mind anything remotely approaching desirable for Beijing. It just happens to be the least risky and destabilising position.
A non-nuclear NK would be far more preferable than the current one, a non-nuclear NK instigating Chinese style economic and political reforms would just about approach being desirable.
China today isn't China of the 1950s, unlike back then, there is no remotely likely risk of either a US and western sponsored invasion of the mainland by Nationalist forces from Taiwan and/or a direct Vietnam style invasion by US led western forces.
With all the military bases America already have in the region, would a few more make that much of a difference? If anything, having large numbers of US troops stationed a proverbial stones throw from a Chinese land boarder that the PLA could pretty much annihilate with its ground forces at will (Albert with significant cost) could be a decided geopolitical advantage to Beijing as it would massively increase both the likelihood and expected number of US military casualties in any direct conflict with China over an elective conflict for the US, say Taiwan for example.
China does not really need NK as a buffer against invasion any more, China's support for NK is just a legacy of the Cold War and risk management by Beijing. That means that if the situation changes significantly on the ground in NK, so might the outcome of China's risk minimisation assessment.
I have long argued that it would be very beneficial for China to strike a grand bargain with SK to bargain unification under SK's terms as well as massive Chinese financial support for rebuilding and the modernisation of the former NK territories in exchange for the new unified Korea to ditch America and ally itself with China.
But such a move is going to be massively risky and massively destabilising for both the region and the world, so it's not something to be taken lightly. Right now the risks of it all going horribly wrong and the consequences of it going wrong will make such a move extremely unlikely. But that calculus changes completely if NK looks like it might implode or start a nuclear war.
A non-nuclear NK would be far more preferable than the current one, a non-nuclear NK instigating Chinese style economic and political reforms would just about approach being desirable.
China today isn't China of the 1950s, unlike back then, there is no remotely likely risk of either a US and western sponsored invasion of the mainland by Nationalist forces from Taiwan and/or a direct Vietnam style invasion by US led western forces.
With all the military bases America already have in the region, would a few more make that much of a difference? If anything, having large numbers of US troops stationed a proverbial stones throw from a Chinese land boarder that the PLA could pretty much annihilate with its ground forces at will (Albert with significant cost) could be a decided geopolitical advantage to Beijing as it would massively increase both the likelihood and expected number of US military casualties in any direct conflict with China over an elective conflict for the US, say Taiwan for example.
China does not really need NK as a buffer against invasion any more, China's support for NK is just a legacy of the Cold War and risk management by Beijing. That means that if the situation changes significantly on the ground in NK, so might the outcome of China's risk minimisation assessment.
I have long argued that it would be very beneficial for China to strike a grand bargain with SK to bargain unification under SK's terms as well as massive Chinese financial support for rebuilding and the modernisation of the former NK territories in exchange for the new unified Korea to ditch America and ally itself with China.
But such a move is going to be massively risky and massively destabilising for both the region and the world, so it's not something to be taken lightly. Right now the risks of it all going horribly wrong and the consequences of it going wrong will make such a move extremely unlikely. But that calculus changes completely if NK looks like it might implode or start a nuclear war.