If, as you say, none of the rules are set in stone, then why didn't China get an invitation to be a founding member? Even if no one believes China will join, the US still should have extended an invite. Also, if the US had no intention of using TPP as a containment tool, then it shouldn't have invited Vietnam while skipping China.
If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it isn't chicken.
Well, first off, keep in mind that the US was not the one who initiated the TPP. The TPP started between Brunei, Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile. Second, the US technically didn't officially invite anyone. Countries first show interest and ask to be part of the negotiations, and then the concurrent TPP members agree or disagree to invite other countries. Of course, the US encouraged certain countries to join through other diplomatic avenues and the backdoor, but it helps that once you have an economy the size of the US on board you generate a natural gravity towards the trade agreement. Third, keep in mind that technically SK and Japan weren't "invited" into the TPP until 2013, with some convincing by the US, so except for the US actively trying to recruit or not recruit certain countries, the TPP negotiations haven't excluded anyone.
Now that we've got that cleared up, if I'm right about the hedging strategy, then it would be counterproductive to the intent of the strategy to
invite China
before you've established the standard framework of the agreement and collected enough members. Growing the size of the trade pact before inviting China has the benefit not depending on China to make the framework valuable and powerful, and of making China want to opt in. It also bolsters the legitimacy of and establishes the relationships in a multilateral framework outside of China's influence, so that if China does join (and the hope is that it will want to because of the potential size and value of the agreement) it can't bend and shape it solely to fit its own interests. Finally, the US anchoring the agreement establishes an alternative superpower that will play nice, so that if China decides to be too aggressive or one sided in its relationships with its neighbors it risks increasing US influence, which further incentivizes China to play nice.
None of these objectives can be accomplished by inviting China first. If China were invited before a multilateral framework is legitimized and normalized with other countries, the trade agreement quickly begins revolving around the two elephant economies in the room, pushing out the relevance of all the other countries involved. You give too much say to China on what the framework looks like before less influential countries are able to get something that might be more agreeable to them, and thus give China leverage to establish unequal relationships or to poison the well (note that this focus on establishing a multilateral framework
before inviting China is a counter strategy to China's attempts to deal with each of its neighbors bilaterally, a divide and conquer strategy). Now, one could accuse the US of pursuing a similar tact to establishing relationships that favour itself at the detriment of other countries, but that would be a false equivalency. The US is not a geographically local power, and so does not have the potential or interest to pursue the kind of coercive avenues with the East Asian countries that China would have.
The way the US is approaching the TPP is a deliberate attempt to hedge against an aggressive China without trying to isolate a China that may be more interested in cooperation. It's not about excluding China at all costs, but about establishing norms that meet aggressive behavior with economic exclusion, but friendly behavior with economic benefits. Collecting other powers to join the TPP first before inviting China is an attempt to create a massive trade agreement carrot, with the nice superpower looking to strengthen friendships with China's neighbors being a proverbial stick. It is the difference between inviting someone to shape an organization with you, and creating an attractive organization before inviting someone to join. If China has interest in the TPP, it will eventually be invited, but not until the TPP is a more material agreement than it is now. This is the politics of trade negotiations, where sequence matters. An invite results in different outcomes at different stages of a trade pact.
Will such a strategy work? We will see. Any number of things can go wrong that could kill the TPP. If that's the case though, I fully expect the US to realize this approach to dealing with China in other ways. After all, in the last three years the TPP hasn't been the only permutation of this approach. We can also look to the US's relationship with Myanmar. The fundamental principle is to set a higher standard for relationships in the region in order to incentivize China to meet those standards as opposed to dictate its own. (Mommy will have trouble disciplining her child if Daddy is always giving the child candy). Interestingly enough, we've also seen China fight fire with when Xi bolstered China's relationship with Latin America before visiting Obama at Sunnylands.
I watched the video and read a couple of articles by him. I don't find anything disagreement between what he says, what you and latenlazy is saying and what the Asian Time article says.
In the short run, US welcomes limited Japanese rearmament (that's really the wrong word to describe it, as Japan is already heavily armed. more accurate to say allow Japan more freedom to use its armed forces) to help America carry more weight in the region. But in the long run, a more independent Japan make come back to bite the US in the ass because it may have different interests that conflict with America's.
But, that's where the disagreement is. I am saying the State Dept does not like Abe's hawkish politics (even if they understand why he's pursuing it, and it has a lot more to do with Japan's turbulent domestic politics than with a real intention to militarize Japan) at all, right NOW, not even limited rearmament. The US is getting bitten in the butt by Abe's hawkish policies even at this very moment (especially with SK).
