of course not, one can never depend on rational action on the part of your opponents. but trade relationships can be maintained without expanding a regional conflict into a global war. suddenly, all Chinese exports can go through Hong Kong. If Hong Kong exports are interdicted, South Korean and Taiwanese exports suddenly surge. And one of those central Asian republics suddenly becomes a major exporter of consumer goods to Europe. trade will find a way. much quicker than unilateral military actions.
You're assuming that other countries won't cooperate with such a blockade, but they very well may, especially if they're US allies. We can't presume to know for sure what scenario would trigger the US and China to go to war, but whatever that scenario is it will likely force the rest of the world to take sides, and in fact may even be a case where either the China or the US are second parties.
global conflict is made more likely by large military alliances. world peace is more likely be disrupted by special interests made rich by such alliances.
Sometimes large alliances are not the preceding cause but the antecedent effect of globalized conflicts. There are other more significant factors to the seeding of global conflict than special interests and degrees of military alliances. To be clear, it doesn't take the conflict to start off globally for it to expand into something global. A choice to blockade China could very well stem from a more regional conflict.
I disagree. Seeing foreign soldiers in your own country goes a long way in breeding resentment. American base in Saudi Arabia is the reason why 9/11 happened, is the reason why thousands of American soldiers lost their lives in meaningless wars during the past decade. American global base network is its greatest weakness. You mentioned in the 055 thread that Chinese culture is not immune to imperialism but perhaps not global imperialism. I agree. Chinese core interests are all in its immediate neighborhood. China has no interest, no capability, no historic inclination to project its military powers worldwide. China doesn't need nor should it build foreign bases. Over the past decade, Chinese interests have been advanced through mutually beneficial trade, not through establishing military protectorates worldwide. That trend should continue. In the news recently, Malaysia played down the significance of a PLAN exercise in SCS despite the best efforts of Western media to stir up tension. That's because Malaysia recognize the importance of peaceful economic interaction with China and obviously because China doesn't have military bases close to Malaysia. China doesn't want to nor does it have the ability to militarily interfere in whatever regional disputes Malaysia may have with its neighbor. That's the pattern China should follow worldwide.
Who said China would be putting its soldiers in India and Southeast Asia? More likely it would be a country like Sri Lanka or Pakistan, or Nigeria. Your troops don't seed resentment if your presence isn't seen as an occupation (the US and WWII Europe). Many countries that China could base in might even prefer having a Chinese presence. India doesn't have very good relations with most of its South Asian neighbors.
Your narrative about how China advances its interests sounds much like another country's earlier in the 20th century. That was precisely how the US advanced its interests until the Cold War, and until it needed more energy than it could produce on its own. Like I said earlier, countries may be forced to internationalize their military presence to preserve other interests they become dependent on. Given the reasons behind China's trade activities abroad, it's not hard to see how regional imperialism can become global imperialism. It's nice to believe that a country can simply maintain its interests abroad without getting sucked into local and regional politics far outside their borders, but international relations usually aren't so simple or ideal. What happens when a country you've invested billions in teeters on Civil War because the haves want you to stay and the have nots think you're making the problem worse? There are countless permutations of these sorts of problems that come with dependency on other countries for resources.
As for China-Malay relations, I'm pretty it's a strategy on China's part to divide consensus in ASEAN and not simply some push for peaceful interactions. On Malaysia's part, it probably sees a better chance of benefiting from the resources in the disputed territory by cooperating with China than by competing with it, and on China's part Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia are the three countries in ASEAN involved in the disputes that have good relations with China and don't lean towards the US. If China reaches out to a country it has strong relationships with that delegitimizes the complaints of the Philippines and Vietnam and destroys the possibility that ASEAN will reach a consensus against it, which then allows China to act more aggressively against those two countries to settle under China's terms.
To protect its SLOC militarily worldwide, China would need to go down the same path of imperial overreach as the United States. One PLAN CVBG in the Indian Ocean would not be enough to protect Chinese SLOC. It was just be a target. PLAN should focus on Chinese core interests closer to home. US can go on playing as the world's policeman, just don't mess with China on its own turf.
The US didn't want to become an imperial power either (and I would say it still doesn't quite fit the bill of one), and yet here we are. Like I said in the other thread, structural forces of international political economy have a powerful say in what kind of power a country becomes. If China becomes a world police, that won't be because it wanted to, but needed to. Personally, I don't think it will ever get that far, but we can't ignore how much China is investing abroad and how much resource dependency it is building in those countries either. That will have a significant impact.
Also, the point isn't to put on CVBG in the Indian Ocean, but to have bases in the Indian Ocean that can support multiple battle groups. You could have one battle group or CVG occupy that space in peace time and then allocate more if the need arises. That's what all navies that operate globally do. Forward deployment is not about how much military strength you allocate to different areas, but how much military strength your military infrastructure can support.
Chinese deterrence is greatest when its military assets are focused on protecting its core interests, all of which are close to home. There is no deterrence when PLAN combat assets are scattered and can be defeated individually. PLAN should take advantage of the geographic and strategic advantages you mentioned by limiting its goal to protecting its core interests.
The bolded portion is where things are starting to change. The problem is that China fundamentally cannot limit its dependence on global trade if it wants the kind of high intensity developed economy is is working towards because it has relatively poor resource endowments. Unless China makes a decision to change the kind of economy it wants to be, it's impossible for China to keep its core interests close to home. China's core interests
are becoming those interests abroad.
I agree some degree limited forward PLAN deployment is necessary. Which is why I proposed a limited PLAN East Africa station ship that's flexible enough to fulfill a variety of humanitarian and low intensity roles. But is not so heavily armed as to threaten local countries. It should have hello kitty painted on its sides, cruising the East Africa station, providing healthcare for the local people, fight pirates and collective intelligence at the same time.
This goes back to the problem I cited earlier about what happens when instability occurs in a country you have a relationship with, perhaps partially caused by your presence (you don't need a military for that to happen). It also makes little sense to have a presence in somewhere like East Africa and not have a chain of bases and logistical support along the routes going back to China. That more than anything would cause the fragmentation you were concerned about.
Of course China shouldn't seek a open military conflict with the US. US should be allowed into a comfortable retirement like past empire such as GB has. Just don't try to bully China on its own turf.
I'm not sure the US will even retire at all. The narrative that the US is in decline is overstated.
Anyways, the concern for China is that if there is a conflict between the two (say because the US is "bullying" China in its own turf), that a soft target is their dependence on global trade to maintain their economy (and as a consequence their fighting strength). So long as those soft spots exist, they are going to be targeted, unless they are hardened. Now, in the keypub thread about "Offshore Control" I pointed out that in the event that China could not contest a blockade, it could pursue less efficient offsets and even ration their resources domestically to keep their war machine going, so China wouldn't be totally screwed. It could even hold out for quite a while, perhaps even to win the war effort. However, that doesn't mean that, given that China is becoming increasingly vulnerable due to resource trade dependence, they shouldn't make preparations in the event that their SLOCs are targeted. As I've said many times already, the PLA's job is to prepare for the worst case scenarios.
USN assets would be disperse globally, busy inspecting container ships according the above scenario.