Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics
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Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
Pretty much all ships carry torpedo decoys. You could try to move out of the way or outrun the torpedo. I'm not sure about this but firing depth charges (if anyone carries those anymore) in front of the torpedo could kill it.
Carriers themselves could probably withstand a torpedo hit or two but the ship's listing would make air opeerations impossible.
Pretty much all ships carry torpedo decoys. You could try to move out of the way or outrun the torpedo. I'm not sure about this but firing depth charges (if anyone carries those anymore) in front of the torpedo could kill it.
Carriers themselves could probably withstand a torpedo hit or two but the ship's listing would make air opeerations impossible.
BLUEJACKET
Banned Idiot
Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
That's right! All an enemy should do is cripple it, and then, if possible, take it as a war prize! In the Cold War, Soviet SSGs/SSGNs routinely shadowed USN CBGs, besides long range bombers/patrol planes. If the general location is known, a few land/submarine based ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads could also knock it out. The EM pulse alone will put all radars & other electonics out of commission in a few hundred miles radius.
Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
BLUEJACKET sez;
Being a "Cold War " warrior this statement is so true. Shadowing.. But remember those Soivet subs were shadowed by USN SSN's and SSBN's also. I've seen many flyovers with the long range bombers . Usally they were the great Russian Bear.
BLUEJACKET sez;
Being a "Cold War " warrior this statement is so true. Shadowing.. But remember those Soivet subs were shadowed by USN SSN's and SSBN's also. I've seen many flyovers with the long range bombers . Usally they were the great Russian Bear.
Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
Any info on the position of a CSG will get old very quickly: a carrier group can lose itself with an area of 100,000 square miles in six hours. You'd better have your strike force in the air ready to attack the moment the info comes in and that force will have to be huge in order to saturate the defences of the CSG.
Any info on the position of a CSG will get old very quickly: a carrier group can lose itself with an area of 100,000 square miles in six hours. You'd better have your strike force in the air ready to attack the moment the info comes in and that force will have to be huge in order to saturate the defences of the CSG.
Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
For a long time i believed that sm-2 IIIb was capable of terminal guidance without ship based illuminators. I was then told my people more in the know of USN that is not the case and that first standard with its own terminal guidance will be sm-6 which will enter service in the next 5-10 years, budget willing.
Anyway, having said that, just how useful are standards in actually hitting enemy planes? Granted, they are a great deterrant and would force any incoming attackers in staying below radar horizon thus somewhat decreasing their range. I am, of course, assuming that recon planes are detecing possible USN ships from far away. If shot down by the carrier's airwing and not replaced, no attack would ever ensue.
Sticking to that doctrine, I still maintain the sam trap burke tactic is a waste of a ship. If attackers would be going on no matter what, without knowing that's out there for hundreds of km, then yeah, a sam trap could do great damage.
Anyway, finding, tracking and attacking an USN carrier group in the middle of the ocean is impossible in almost all cases i can think of today. Only if we talk hypothetical scenarios of, say, entire russian navy (mainly nuke subs) versus lone carrier group. Same goes for forseeable future, save for nuclear tipped ballistic missiles after a lucky, one in a million, satellite find. Engaging one closer to shore may be a different matter.
Even with closer to shore, though, it will come down to lots of resources thrown in the fight, more so than USN will be able to use. That's on top of of lots of platform contiuously searching and tracking the ship. Yes, it can be done but it'd be a huge undertaking.
For a long time i believed that sm-2 IIIb was capable of terminal guidance without ship based illuminators. I was then told my people more in the know of USN that is not the case and that first standard with its own terminal guidance will be sm-6 which will enter service in the next 5-10 years, budget willing.
Anyway, having said that, just how useful are standards in actually hitting enemy planes? Granted, they are a great deterrant and would force any incoming attackers in staying below radar horizon thus somewhat decreasing their range. I am, of course, assuming that recon planes are detecing possible USN ships from far away. If shot down by the carrier's airwing and not replaced, no attack would ever ensue.
Sticking to that doctrine, I still maintain the sam trap burke tactic is a waste of a ship. If attackers would be going on no matter what, without knowing that's out there for hundreds of km, then yeah, a sam trap could do great damage.
Anyway, finding, tracking and attacking an USN carrier group in the middle of the ocean is impossible in almost all cases i can think of today. Only if we talk hypothetical scenarios of, say, entire russian navy (mainly nuke subs) versus lone carrier group. Same goes for forseeable future, save for nuclear tipped ballistic missiles after a lucky, one in a million, satellite find. Engaging one closer to shore may be a different matter.
Even with closer to shore, though, it will come down to lots of resources thrown in the fight, more so than USN will be able to use. That's on top of of lots of platform contiuously searching and tracking the ship. Yes, it can be done but it'd be a huge undertaking.
Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
The reason why the SAM trap would work is that an inbound strike package (flying oveer water) uses compass locations solely to find its way. So if they get info of an enemy carrier group at point A, they will head for that location and launch at optimal ranges. A strike group usually maintains zero radar emmisions in order to prevent detection. As it nears its launch points, it climbs and turns on its radar to get an adequate radar lock on its target.
Here is what Andy Pico wrote about it on the link I posted.
A word about the opposition. The SNA strike regiments were (are) structured and armed very well to go kill naval formations. The AS4/6 on a Badger or Backfire in regimental strength backed with Bears in the recon role were and are formidable. They roughly had a Regiment per carrier. In a straight-forward engagement, the issue would have been "in doubt" at best. If a strike regiment caught a CV by surprise it would have been curtains. An alerted CV would have a better than even chance of surviving, but probable losses would have been severe. But the Regiment running through fighter opposition to their launch points and then getting back out would have taken crippling losses. They would have not been able to mount a second strike and would have been effectively destroyed if not annihilated. If a missile trap is set so that the regiment is climbing to launch altitude over a missile ship it doesn't know about until the radar comes up and missiles start impacting, the fight will be over before it barely starts. So it was critical for the target to be identified and located prior to the regiment being committed. This takes time and allows the CV time to maneuver, set decoy groups, missile traps, fighter ambushes, etc.
With two hours warning for example, a CV could dispatch a surface CG missile trap 60nm down the threat axis, station the CAP Outer Air Battle Grid, put a CG decoy group stationary, and run another 60nm down range and off axis in a silent mode. Then the regiment locates a likely target at the expected point, runs into a missile trap, fighter grid, and a target that can defend itself without ever threatening the CV.
So the trick is to prevent identification and localization of the force. Decoys run out and radiate. Aircraft launch on missions running silent, fly out to a deception point at low altitude, then climb and radiate as normal. The searchers locate the pop-up point but don't find the CV. This is particularly effective if the first launch of the day locates a large, neutral merchant or cruise liner and everybody uses that as the reference deception point. Then the searchers actually see a target at the point that the flight patterns indicate. In wartime they commit, they lose their regiment, and the CV then has a free ride.
We would also deliberately provide a false contact reference. If a searching aircraft is intercepted they can draw an operational radius of previously observed intercepts and conclude the CV is in that area. That allows a concentrated search. Now if we had deliberately intercepted him at an extended range and then moved the carrier at high speed in the other direction the search effort is concentrated at the wrong point. I did that one day by tanking an A7, running him out a long range and bringing him into an intercept of two Bears that were visually searching and identifying fishing boats and merchants trying to find us. I brought him in off-axis and took him back out off-axis (in other words not directly to or from the CV). We then cranked up the 32.5 knots the Midway could then do and went in the other direction. A few hours later we observed a "large number" of search aircraft vainly saturating that area of the ocean and giving all the fishing boats a great air show.
They could identify the E2's radar. They could then draw the normal circle around the E2's location and search that area. Trouble with that was that I was particularly adept at running out long range while silent, and then running a distant patrol point and acting as if the CV was close by. I used to routinely obtain contact at extended ranges. So by drawing their datum points based on my patrols they also looked in the wrong places, and at the same time I data-linked the complete tactical picture to all the silent participants.
About Subs shadowing a carrier
A sub vectored out to find us has to have some idea of where to look. If the CV has freedom to operate it can avoid contact by "random and dynamic" movement. Only if the CV locks itself to a set operational area and pattern (as in most structured exercises which lends itself to the prevailing myth of submarine superiority) does it become predictable and hence, vulnerable. If the CV moves it forces the sub to move to catch it, thereby making the sub more detectable
The reason why the SAM trap would work is that an inbound strike package (flying oveer water) uses compass locations solely to find its way. So if they get info of an enemy carrier group at point A, they will head for that location and launch at optimal ranges. A strike group usually maintains zero radar emmisions in order to prevent detection. As it nears its launch points, it climbs and turns on its radar to get an adequate radar lock on its target.
Here is what Andy Pico wrote about it on the link I posted.
A word about the opposition. The SNA strike regiments were (are) structured and armed very well to go kill naval formations. The AS4/6 on a Badger or Backfire in regimental strength backed with Bears in the recon role were and are formidable. They roughly had a Regiment per carrier. In a straight-forward engagement, the issue would have been "in doubt" at best. If a strike regiment caught a CV by surprise it would have been curtains. An alerted CV would have a better than even chance of surviving, but probable losses would have been severe. But the Regiment running through fighter opposition to their launch points and then getting back out would have taken crippling losses. They would have not been able to mount a second strike and would have been effectively destroyed if not annihilated. If a missile trap is set so that the regiment is climbing to launch altitude over a missile ship it doesn't know about until the radar comes up and missiles start impacting, the fight will be over before it barely starts. So it was critical for the target to be identified and located prior to the regiment being committed. This takes time and allows the CV time to maneuver, set decoy groups, missile traps, fighter ambushes, etc.
With two hours warning for example, a CV could dispatch a surface CG missile trap 60nm down the threat axis, station the CAP Outer Air Battle Grid, put a CG decoy group stationary, and run another 60nm down range and off axis in a silent mode. Then the regiment locates a likely target at the expected point, runs into a missile trap, fighter grid, and a target that can defend itself without ever threatening the CV.
So the trick is to prevent identification and localization of the force. Decoys run out and radiate. Aircraft launch on missions running silent, fly out to a deception point at low altitude, then climb and radiate as normal. The searchers locate the pop-up point but don't find the CV. This is particularly effective if the first launch of the day locates a large, neutral merchant or cruise liner and everybody uses that as the reference deception point. Then the searchers actually see a target at the point that the flight patterns indicate. In wartime they commit, they lose their regiment, and the CV then has a free ride.
We would also deliberately provide a false contact reference. If a searching aircraft is intercepted they can draw an operational radius of previously observed intercepts and conclude the CV is in that area. That allows a concentrated search. Now if we had deliberately intercepted him at an extended range and then moved the carrier at high speed in the other direction the search effort is concentrated at the wrong point. I did that one day by tanking an A7, running him out a long range and bringing him into an intercept of two Bears that were visually searching and identifying fishing boats and merchants trying to find us. I brought him in off-axis and took him back out off-axis (in other words not directly to or from the CV). We then cranked up the 32.5 knots the Midway could then do and went in the other direction. A few hours later we observed a "large number" of search aircraft vainly saturating that area of the ocean and giving all the fishing boats a great air show.
They could identify the E2's radar. They could then draw the normal circle around the E2's location and search that area. Trouble with that was that I was particularly adept at running out long range while silent, and then running a distant patrol point and acting as if the CV was close by. I used to routinely obtain contact at extended ranges. So by drawing their datum points based on my patrols they also looked in the wrong places, and at the same time I data-linked the complete tactical picture to all the silent participants.
About Subs shadowing a carrier
A sub vectored out to find us has to have some idea of where to look. If the CV has freedom to operate it can avoid contact by "random and dynamic" movement. Only if the CV locks itself to a set operational area and pattern (as in most structured exercises which lends itself to the prevailing myth of submarine superiority) does it become predictable and hence, vulnerable. If the CV moves it forces the sub to move to catch it, thereby making the sub more detectable
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Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
Well yes, bunch of subs would still be looking for a needle in a haystack. One would still need overwhelming numbers of various sensors so that maybe, after who know how much searching the carrier is located when enough subs are ready to receive the data and are close enough to catch it. Its far from a plausible scenario but in open seas, it's best anyone's got right now.
As for coastal based airplanes vs carrier - that's where i meant the sam trap wouldn't necesarrily work. Why would the attackers go in blind? Why wouldn't they have continuous information feed about the situation both at sea and in the air? Patrol planes and various awacs platforms. If one has enough fighters to protect them from carrier's airwing, it'd be possible to form a strike at surface units, first the silent burke, then the decoy burke, then the core of the carrier group. Granted, position of those would be changing but if they're being continously tracked, it's doable. Again, at great cost for attackers. I don't see any present air force in the world which could do it without suffering greater losses than carrier's airwing. And of course ships would get out of range once the airwing is lost.
Well yes, bunch of subs would still be looking for a needle in a haystack. One would still need overwhelming numbers of various sensors so that maybe, after who know how much searching the carrier is located when enough subs are ready to receive the data and are close enough to catch it. Its far from a plausible scenario but in open seas, it's best anyone's got right now.
As for coastal based airplanes vs carrier - that's where i meant the sam trap wouldn't necesarrily work. Why would the attackers go in blind? Why wouldn't they have continuous information feed about the situation both at sea and in the air? Patrol planes and various awacs platforms. If one has enough fighters to protect them from carrier's airwing, it'd be possible to form a strike at surface units, first the silent burke, then the decoy burke, then the core of the carrier group. Granted, position of those would be changing but if they're being continously tracked, it's doable. Again, at great cost for attackers. I don't see any present air force in the world which could do it without suffering greater losses than carrier's airwing. And of course ships would get out of range once the airwing is lost.
BLUEJACKET
Banned Idiot
Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
If nukes are used against tactical targets-i.e. ships, bases, troop concentrations and not against continental USA there is no risk of starting nuclear war. Besides, EMP bomb doesn't have to be nuclear, and their own forces can be kept at a safe distance before other conventional attacks are launched.
http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/archive/index.php/t-920.html
granted, it's not easy to find a carrier, but ocean surveillance satellites can detect CBG/SSG better than 1 in 1M chance. Besides space detection, there are other methods. And planes/submarines CAN get very close to a carrier-
and damaging her screw shaft as a result.
If nukes are used against tactical targets-i.e. ships, bases, troop concentrations and not against continental USA there is no risk of starting nuclear war. Besides, EMP bomb doesn't have to be nuclear, and their own forces can be kept at a safe distance before other conventional attacks are launched.
http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/archive/index.php/t-920.html