This is 100% wrong on many levels: 1. Most of those nations have also deindustrialized in the last few decades considerably, not as the US perhaps, but they are getting there. 2. Two of the most still actually industrially productive of them are right at China's doorsteps and 10000km away from the US. Their industries would be obliterated at the moment they decided to help the US use them in a war economy against China in a short period. 3. Countries in the EU already had governments being changed every few months, with constant civil unrest and 20-30% support rates. I assign the possibility of them contributing to the US war economy in any meaningful way against China maybe some single digit %. 5. You yourself said that Russia outproduced the entire NATO multiple times so it didn't even matter if the US got them to commit somehow in the Ukraine - it still wasn't enough to translate into power that it presents.
1. In most industries I agree, Europe has experienced industrial decline over the last few decades but in certain areas it's defense industrial technology level remains competitive globally. The issue seems to be producing weapon systems economically and in sufficient numbers. Europe is still capable of a certain level of war time production. Even smaller European nations have the ability to produce relatively large numbers of small arms. The degree which they can ramp up is limited by the number of skilled workers and physical capital in manufacturing. It's capabilities will continue to decline as their related civilian sector lags behind. Weapon systems will become increasingly expensive as it's unable to share CAPEX with civilian industry. Europe has largely failed to keep up with US and China when it comes to new technologies but remains strong in traditional weapon systems. It may lag China and US but not compared with vast majority of the world.
2. That's true. In the context of balance of power in the Western Pacific, military might is largely naval.
. This is not directly military but the much of the capital investment and skillsets are shared. US navy can potentially
for repair and construction of new hulls which they have considered. This would be useful for build up and sustainment before a kinetic war (if it even gets to this point) but as you stated, in a hot war these facilities would be targeted and destroyed. I don't think China would strike first. Nonetheless, the US has access to these nations' defense production base to offset it's own shortcomings, China does not.
In a US Navy briefing, it's mentioned
. In a hypothetical conflict in the Western Pacific where both sides suffer heavy losses, it is likely that China is able to reconstitute an even more modern navy within a few years while the US will be crippled for decades with South Korean and Japanese shipyards out of commission for naval defense production. This will cement the loss of hegemony within the region. It's not in the US's favor to fight a conventional war in the Western Pacific with China. Its inability to produce sufficient numbers of large surface combatants is likely why it's turning more to smaller dispersed unmanned systems but China will likely gain a relative advantage in this area as well.
3. You live in Europe so likely know better than me in assessing the risk of successfully creating coalition in Europe against China in a wartime scenario. You assess it as a low probability event but it's a non-zero probably. It's not a factor I'm personally comfortable discounting.
It's not needed that the US creates an anti-China defense coalition to benefit. As long as their defense industry is open to business to the US, it stands to benefit through trading USD for weapons or other military systems. Often times China doesn't have access to this defense industrial base, even during peacetime, less so during war time. It's not that China needs this, but it's still a source of power for the US.
Now the disclaimer: No one ever said that nominal GDP is not useful, it is just that it maybe should be looked at 10-20% when painting a picture of the economic power of great powers or superpowers. Not the 80% of the picture that westoid retarded media and dumbfuck redditors present as such. But I guess that it's true if you are a smaller-sized country that needs to import the majority of stuff then it may climb to 50% of usefulness in the basket of economic data you should look at when evaluating the economic significance of a specific smaller-sized country.
I agree that a more accurate approach may be to use a blend but often laymen wants to see something easier to understand and compare like 'X' vs. 'Y' number without complicated reasonings behind them. A practical problem with using a basket approach is having to constantly debate and change the weights of each component. Even with CPI the weights and components are constantly updated. Maybe we should just compare the actual productive capacity in comparable situations.