Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)

Jeff Head said:

Jeff Head's Proposal for the LCS Program:

1) Cap it at no more than 28 vessels consisting of the following:

a) 12 Freedom class, all of which get a Mk-41 and sensor upgrade to make them multi-role in capability. All of them also get "up armored" to get them from their current Combat 1+ to the Combat 2 classification that the Perry's were designed for.

b) 16 Independence Class. All of those would get an Mk-41 with necessary sensors, but not the "up armor." All of them would also get a decent TAS and also carry the CMM module. They would be used for Counter Mine measures, ASW duties as needed, and SPecOps command missions. While conducting those missions, they are much more capable of defending themselves as well.

2) Build 28 of the new frigate-like combatant. Either an upgraded Freedom class as proposed by Lockheed, or, IMHO perhaps even better, the upgraded, frigate version of the National Defense cutter proposed by Huntington Ingalls. All of these would be designed and built from the outset to be multi-role and be the replacement for the Perry Class which is still needed.

Anyhow, that's my current hope for the program.

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With due respect, I totally disagree with your proposal both from a program management and from a strategic consideration of the overall LCS program.

I think the onset of the whole LCS debacle has its roots in a lack of a strategic blueprint of the LCS concept and its fit into an overall naval doctrine. In looking through some of the discussions that had taken place regarding the birth of littoral warfare and the concept of LCS, there is nothing to go on besides there is a capability gap in operating within the littoral. Concurrently a plan was developed to merge a number of different assets into a single vessel called LCS using a modular approach to operate within the littoral for the purposes of MCM and ASW. To this end was the idea that a $200-300 million vessel could fit the bill as part of addressing the low end/high end force structure for the USN going forward into the 21st century. The problem we have is today the $250 million vessel is a pipe dream and the vessel in its basic form and the modules that supposedly go with it can't meet the basic requirements of the navy.

Given the lack of a strategic blueprint, I think it is the right call to cap the program and revisit the whole concept in light of present and future mission requirements and the new threat assessment that has developed since the 1990's. Hopefully the study on the multi purpose small surface combatant will provide a path way for the LCS program and for a multi purpose frigate going forward. Until the assessment is done, it is premature to talk about up arming and up armouring a vessel without understanding whether there is in fact a capability gap viz and viz planned mission requirements within overall naval doctrine.

As is, there are a number of program management issues with the LCS and that should be the immediate priority in fixing them. The troubling part is that there are still basic design issues that had not been addressed and capabilities untested but yet contracts had gone out to procure 20 more vessels just to beat the closing window pending reassessment. This will just exacerbate cost as it will require retro and expensive re-fit down the road. Such issues could be prevented by more robust program management. We know from the GAO reports there are weight issues that need addressing from hull design that if unattended to are imposing manning problems, endurance and or modules adoption down the road. Each of them and collectively have a direct impact on the capabilities of the vessel. For example, the helicopter is too underpowered to tow the sensor for CCM and the MCM modules cannot fit all the requirements onto a single package due to weight problem and has to be separated into different packages.

Ploughing ahead with a MK41 and sensors will make it into a $900 million vessel and not the cheap $250 million expendable vessel original envisaged for the LCS program. Until there is a clarity of strategic direction, the best course of action is to focus on program management.

USS Coronado (LCS 4) Conducts Dynamic Interface Testing with MQ-8B Fire Scout

I haven't followed the LCS development. Why did the navy opt to purchase both designs? Isn't that more expensive than choosing a single design because there are two sets of maintenance teams, two sets of spare parts, and two training protocols rather than one?

[video=youtube;a4U3Y6g4rvs]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4U3Y6g4rvs[/video]

footage of LCS 30mm gun firing exercise. can't hit a small target boat. what's going on here?

Brumby said:

With due respect, I totally disagree with your proposal both from a program management and from a strategic consideration of the overall LCS program.

I think the onset of the whole LCS debacle has its roots in a lack of a strategic blueprint of the LCS concept and its fit into an overall naval doctrine. In looking through some of the discussions that had taken place regarding the birth of littoral warfare and the concept of LCS, there is nothing to go on besides there is a capability gap in operating within the littoral. Concurrently a plan was developed to merge a number of different assets into a single vessel called LCS using a modular approach to operate within the littoral for the purposes of MCM and ASW. To this end was the idea that a $200-300 million vessel could fit the bill as part of addressing the low end/high end force structure for the USN going forward into the 21st century. The problem we have is today the $250 million vessel is a pipe dream...

Given the lack of a strategic blueprint, I think it is the right call to cap the program and revisit the whole concept in light of present and future mission requirements...

Ploughing ahead with a MK41 and sensors will make it into a $900 million vessel and not the cheap $250 million expendable vessel original envisaged for the LCS program. Until there is a clarity of strategic direction, the best course of action is to focus on program management.

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You're completely entitled to your opinion and you make good points.

But at this stage they are not going to cap the program at current built vessel or those building. Ten vessels of each is already contractually obligated and the logistic chain already ramped up for it.

I would actually like to see them cap it at 24. Right now it is 32.

Given that reality, you are going to have to do something to make the others useful.

My plan calls for making the Freedom class multi-role, and making the Independence class more adequate at self defense, but focusing them on MMC, SpecOp, and a good ASW capability.

In order to do that in both cases does not mean a 900 million vessel. They do not need the higher end DDG type, or FFG scaled down sensor capability. They do need something more adequate than they have...and that can be had. IMHO, adding a 16 cell Mk-41 and adequate, but not overblown sensors to make that functional need not cost 300 million.

The new combatant frigate will be built to a more multi-role design from the get go. If they handled it right, they should be able to get a FFG capable vessel for 600 million if they use an existing design (like the HI Berthold or one of the others) and build 32 of them. Sadly, in today's America, that will most probably balloon to the 800-900 million you speak of...but it need not do so if we would plan it correctly, manage it correctly, and not allow all sorts of creep to set in.

This blogger proposes that upgrade Fletcher DD is better suited for littoral warfare than LCS.



obvious more humorous than serious, but still makes valid point about the dysfunctional state of USN.

shen said:

This blogger proposes that upgrade Fletcher DD is better suited for littoral warfare than LCS.

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obvious more humorous than serious, but still makes valid point.

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navy matters is definitely a good usn blog to follow. I disagree with the author's views regarding various international relations issues of course, and I think he's a bit too ambitious and critical of some USN projects, but a lot of his stuff is quite informative.

Jeff Head said:

You're completely entitled to your opinion and you make good points.

But at this stage they are not going to cap the program at current built vessel or those building. Ten vessels of each is already contractually obligated and the logistic chain already ramped up for it.

I would actually like to see them cap it at 24. Right now it is 32.

Given that reality, you are going to have to do something to make the others useful.

My plan calls for making the Freedom class multi-role, and making the Independence class more adequate at self defense, but focusing them on MMC, SpecOp, and a good ASW capability.

In order to do that in both cases does not mean a 900 million vessel. The do not need the higher end DDG type, or FFG scaled down sensor capability. They do need something more adequate than they have...and that can be had. IMHO, adding a 16 cell Mk-41 and adequate, but not overblown sensors to make that functional need not cost 300 million.

The new combatant frigate will be built to a more multi-role design from the get go. If they handled it right, they should be able to get a FFG capable vessel for 600 million if they use an existing design (like the HI Berthold or one of the others) and build 32 of them. Sadly, in today's America, that will most probably balloon to the 800-900 million you speak of...but it need not do so if we would plan it correctly, manage it correctly, and not allow all sorts of creep to set in.

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Jeff,
Thanks for your candid reply. I don't think we are actually far apart in terms of opinion except in the intervening steps in getting there. The Mk-41 install may well end are as a residual outcome of the program but it is in my opinion not an immediate core issue and any layering in prematurely would just add immediate complexity and cost to the program until such time that a proper roadmap is fashioned.

I think there are some key intervening steps that are important in resolving and establishing direction of the program including :

(i) The need to flush out final design issues quickly because of the knock on effect to the build program down the path. The operational testing in Singapore of the Freedom class had provided important input on manning, endurance and performance issues. Likewise similar testing should be conducted on the Independence class but that would not happen until 2017. This beg the question in my mind as to what has happened to LCS-2 since its launch in Jan 2010 that would require 7 years to have ready a vessel for field testing. A pessimistic view is that there are significant problems with the first built.
(ii) The need to have a solid MCM capability coming through the LCS program. It is important resources and program management effort be directed in making it happen on time and within established parameters. The resolution of this may determine the platform delivery i.e. either Independence or Freedom and how important would a Mk-41 fit into such a mission profile.
(iii)The uncertainty on how a multi purpose frigate design would impact the role of the LCS vessels especially in ASW. My view is that even though the envisaged frigate might be multi role in nature, it would likely be optimised for ASW with built in organic capabilities unlike the LCS program which I think the ASW capability is somewhat compromised. I think ASW is increasingly important within naval operations given rapid investments of other players in SSK's and SSN's.

In short, there are too many unknowns currently with the LCS program that require some necessary intervening steps to get to some final fit out - whatever that might turn out to be.

This goes to show how confused the LCS has become all the way the from weight issues to manning and lets not forget the ever present lack of a clear role or weapons fit I sometimes wonder whose brainchild is this. It has come all the way from simple to expensive and quite possibly very dangerous to the crews who have the misfortune of serving on it. It almost begs the comparison to a famous WWII British vessel HMS HOOD and we all know what happened to that ship and crew don't we.

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Lockheed Martin said:

MARINETTE, Wis., Oct. 18, 2014 -- The Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT]-led industry team launched the nation's seventh Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Detroit, into the Menominee River at the Marinette Marine Corporation (MMC) shipyard.

The ship’s sponsor, Mrs. Barbara Levin, christened Detroit with the traditional smashing of a champagne bottle across the ship's bow just prior to the launch.

"It is a privilege to serve as the sponsor of the future USS Detroit and to participate in the major milestones along the way to her assuming her place as part of the great U.S. Navy fleet", said Mrs. Levin. I also look forward to an ongoing relationship with her courageous crews and their families throughout the ship's lifetime."

Following christening and launch, Detroit will continue to undergo outfitting and testing before delivery to the Navy in 2015.

“It is an honor to continue supporting the U.S. Navy with these capable and flexible warships,” said Dale P. Bennett, executive vice president of Lockheed Martin’s Mission Systems and Training business. “The Lockheed Martin-led team’s LCS design is lethal, survivable, and affordable.These ships will help the Navy achieve its goal to increase forward presence, and can be upgraded or modified quickly to meet future missions.”

The U.S. Navy awarded the contract to construct Detroit in March 2011. The ship is one of five LCS currently under construction at Marinette Marine.

“On behalf of Marinette Marine, we are incredibly proud to build these ships for the U.S. Navy,” said Jan Allman, MMC president and CEO. “We continue to streamline our processes and leverage the craftsmanship and skills of our employees in producing these high quality vessels for our warfighters.”

The Lockheed Martin-led industry team is building the Freedom-variant ships, and has already delivered two ships to the U.S. Navy. USS Freedom (LCS 1) completed a successful deployment to Southeast Asia in 2013. USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) will deploy to Southeast Asia in 2014. Milwaukee (LCS 5) will be delivered to the U.S. Navy in 2015. Detroit (LCS 7) was christened and launched on Oct. 18, 2014. Little Rock (LCS 9), Sioux City (LCS 11) and Wichita (LCS 13) are under construction. Billings (LCS 15) will begin construction this year.

Earlier this year, the Navy funded Indianapolis (LCS 17) and LCS 19, which is yet to be named..

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