I think Patch has been pretty clear that the current force posture heavily favors PLA and the peak of PLA advantage will be around 2025. So given that there are elections in 2024 in both Taiwan and America, it's probably a good thing that PLA would be ready for a conflict if things go really haywire. Or the very least, US military knows that a conflict will be disastrous and tell the politicians to back off. We've also discussed that the think tank times are normally several years behind the curve, so their influence over politicians is a huge disaster to world peace.
The question is what happens after 2025 that changes things. The most obvious ticket items that the deep state is look forward to are B-21, NGAD, hypersonic fires and more effective force structure in westpac. To me, hypersonic fire for us military will always be overly expensive and won't reach the same level of lethality as PLARF hypersonic fire just from quantity pov.
Which I think brings us to the bigger issue of B-21 and NGAD. If PLA can put US carriers in danger with hypersonic anti-ship missiles within second island chain, then longer ranged platform with all aspect stealth will be the big ticket items where PLA face the greatest threat.
To me, it's always easier to deal with these threats by destroying the bases they operate from rather than actually being able to detect them from 1000 km out. The latter seems not possible with current technology even if satellite ISR can tell the when these platforms leave their air bases.
So, how do you threaten bases further out. At a minimum, I think we are talking about Tindal (Darwin), Diego Garcia and Alaska. For Alaska, we are talking about Elmendorf AFB in Anchorage, Elielson AFB and possibly major airports like ANC and FAI. In the latest DOD report, US military has conceded that China can take out bases all the way to Guam. We know that US military is spending money to build out Tindal. In my mind, they can probably take out Tindal and Diego Garcia in the next few years, but things will be operationally challenging because they would need to have a large escort fleet of J-20s supporting H-6Ks operating from Spratley's. Would be hard to protect that with naval escorts once you get out of SCS.
So, what can change that in the next 10 years? The most immediate change is the availability of DF-27. This I think is a huge game changer if it has 5000 to 8000 km range as discussed in DoD report. My only concern is that they won't be able to procure enough of them due to cost for such a platform. There are some seriously worthy targets for DF-27 (like for example aircraft carriers sitting in Pearl Harbor or other capital warships like long range replenishment ship and LHDs. The operational reality of US navy will be quite stark if they cannot be comfortable being able to park carriers like Pearl Harbor. +
@Blitzo,
@Mohsin77 and
@latenlazy for thoughts on this one.
After that, I think CV-18 joining service with J-35 is the next major change. This would remove the range limitations of J-20. For example, you can have CV-18 protected by 093Bs and a whole bunch of ASW assets heading in the Australia direction and having J-35s protecting cover for H-6Ks flying out of Spratley. By having a carrier in the Celebes Sea (between Phillipines and Indonesia), you can have destroyers close enough to launch LACMs. You can have J-35s and KJ-600s able to protect H-6Ks and J-15Bs carrying hypersonic fires and long range LRASM-like missiles at Tindal air base. You could still have YY-20A from Spratleys providing refueling for this type of mission. In the 8 to 10 years, I feel like these are the type of missions that something like CV-18 could provide for PLA.
The big ones after that are obviously H-20 and 095. The former would be able to really threaten Alaska. And if they ever get to the point where they take out the air defense capabilities in Alaska, then it might even be able to threaten bases in British Columbia and Washington state (assuming Russians will allow them to land in air bases in Far East.
For 095, we are making the assumption that it can be built in large numbers and will be similar in noise level to early Virginia class and can carry large number of UVLS. In that scenario, they should be relatively hard to detect in open ocean when operating alone and would be able to launch probably 1000 km long hypersonic missile and 2000 km long subsonic cruise missiles. That would allow them to again threaten Alaska and Pearl Harbour, but also any naval base in the west coast.
So I think in order to deal with the upcoming challenges, they would probably have to build up their own access denial platforms that can deny access much further out than second island chain. I think they are going to have to get to a stage where they are pumping out 5 to 8 095s a year as well as 15 to 20 H-20s.
