Tibet might be a good comparison. Just like Taiwan, Tibet had not been ruled by the central government for many years for historical reasons. Initially, the central government only made limited demands and Tibet could have had a high level of autonomy internally. Instead, they decided to resist until the PLA was in Tibet and then signed the 17 point agreement, giving them less power. A few years after, they decided to rip up the agreement and support rebellion and since then there has been comparatively little local power and the central government has been in charge. That's what you get for resisting. Macau is the positive example of seeking compromise and accepting reality. Macau doesn't cause trouble, so it's allowed to keep all its gambling industries, even though that might be harmful to the nation.
Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario
- Thread starter tphuang
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You are truly the best.
I would also add that I can't see Taiwanese troops being able to survive as long in fortified hideouts, because PLA has so many of these mini drones that can go in and do a lot of damage.
If they can completely knock out ROCA in the first 10 days, I'd be curious if landing a few hundreds special ops in Northern Taiwan could just quickly make their way into where Taiwanese leadership are and force surrender that way. With no power/radar, It would basically be impossible for them to be detected at night time unless there are emergency lighting somewhere.
well, you'd hope that if there is no sign of American help after a week and everything is cut off, Taiwanese leadership would just give in to a generous term of peace settlement.
On a separate note, Haidilao is truly overrated.
Evergrande is hardly a company that is seen as having privileges. If anything, they are a whipping boy being used an object example by the Central government
This post was totally full of sh*t… lol
The current conflict in Ukraine is partly a civil war. It seems to me that Russian forces enjoy a fairly high level of local support. Of course it can be partially explained by the departure of any possible resisters to the non-occupied areas.
On how this can relate to Taiwan…
Armed reunification can come by one-sided invasion or Declaration of Independence. Why is the automatic assumption usually one sided invasion? If there is such a declaration (or similar action), I think the danger would not be from the citizens becoming guerrillas to fight the PLA, but from whatever resistance that pops up to disrupt the newly minted ROTA. I would not expect a huge army or anything, but we need to keep in mind that keeping the status quo has consistently been the preferred option by most of the population. A Declaration of Independence (especially an illegal one) would probably fracture support amongst the local people.
It's actually very similar to my model of what I expect a Taiwan scenario to look like. If you have constructive criticism on certain points, please elaborate.
Also, the last survey I saw had support for reunification at 3%. That is not going to support a huge resistance movement.
So a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence would likely be accepted by the population if it didn't have serious consequences.
Some of them think they've been "independent" as "ROC" : )
One "nation" can't be "independent" for twice
That's a really horrible scenario. I really hope it doesn't end up happening, it would be a lot of unnecessary human suffering.
Do you think there's any realistic path to that not happening? A US "operational consolidation" and a Taiwanese agreement with the PRC? I just can't see Tsai going for it, but then again she's not already declared independence so maybe a withdrawal of US support could make even her see the writing on the wall. I struggle to see the US giving up Taiwan without a fight, though. I am honestly not sure why, it's not like the Taiwanese are going to bleed the PRC the way the Ukrainians are bleeding the Russians. Maybe it would be wanting to avoid Japan and south Korea viewing it as a fickle ally, but then I think the situation unfolding anything like what you described would be significantly worse for US alliances in Asia than that. The US could credibly claim it never had a treaty obligation to support Taiwan so Japan and south Korea are very different; a decade from now it might be accepted wisdom, and maybe westpac remains stable with the US in charge until China is much stronger than it is now. But if the US opposes China militarily and loses, I don't think they come back from that in terms of their reputation in Asia.
If the US manages to make the conflict with China trigger article 5 of NATO (I know that's against NATO rules, but that NATO dude recently said it would like it was fact so at least someone is thinking it), would that significantly change the outcome?
How exactly would NATO be able to help in conflict on the opposite side of the world when even the US with it's power projection and bases can't meaningfully contest? That was rhetorical in case you couldn't figure it out. Patchwork already mentioned sanctions, and I'ld imagine that would be about the only way the europeans could contribute to this.
So you don't think NATO involvement would significantly affect the outcome? That's interesting, a lot of citizens of NATO countries seem to think otherwise. I think they're probably wrong because I think NATO is mostly about where the US can put its military and it wins or loses based on US performance, but I'm interested in what Patchwork thinks because I know I have biases of my own. That's why I asked him.
I know you wanted Patchwork's thoughts, but I found idea too absurd to not respond to.
One of the biggest advantages China has in such scenario is Taiwan island's proximity to the mainland and the sheer volume of fire it can generate as a result. The US, for all it's lumbering size, cannot transport anywhere near the amount of fire needed to meaningfully contest China in this region. This is despite the US having significant logistical capability and regional bases. The rest of NATO has a significantly smaller blue-water navy and is even further away from the region than the US. Due to the distances involved, they're basically not going to be able to resupply after their first launch. The tiny amount of ships they can muster as well as the lack of resupply means their fires generation is truly pitiful. So exactly what effect are they going to have?
Let's pretend NATO ships are going from Antwerpen straight to Kaohsiung. That's a 11000+ nm journey and even sprinting at 25 kts for the entire duration, they will be spending at least 18 days in transit. And this is assuming no sea lane closures, never stopping for resupplying/refueling, and the ships are immediately available to be redeployed. In the meantime Taiwan will be basically under total air and sea blockade and starving. If the NATO ships opt to form up with the USN before entering the combat region, then that will take even longer! At that point, maybe we're talking a maybe a month before NATO can even try to fire in anger.
It'll be a similar story for NATO airforce too. What air route are they taking that will get them into the region? How will they be able to get the requisite maintenance and fueling to enter the fray? Distances involved means they will probably need refueling tankers once they take off from an airbase. Yet the few airfields/tankers available will already be in high demand with the USAF and being degraded constantly.
To see how absurd it all sounds, flip the script. Let's pretend Corisca-Sardinia declares independence. Assume the EU has a military the size of the US and decides to invade the island in response. Would Chinese involvement significantly change the outcome? Not unless the EU is committed to actually shooting itself in the face the entire war.
It seems quite self-evident but maybe I'm completely off base and Patchwork will correct me.
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