Yeah, Javelins are getting a bit low, but it's not that big of a deal, seeing as how the threat they are kept around in consideration of is *Russia*, and seeing as how they're being used against Russia, we actually have had some serious discussion as to whether or not it's worth just saying "hey I mean, these are literally doing exactly what we want them to when we use them, but we don't have to go send our kids to die, so why not give them to the ones who do have to, and who are using them fairly proficiently so far?"
There was this analysis done by the Austrians that most of tank losses were actually caused by artillery, with ATGM's being in the low teens, if I remember correctly, and there was a time where the Stugna's seemed more effective than the Javelins, though, at least propaganda wise
Also, in the latest shipment, there are less Javelins being sent though it includes TOWs now. Needless to say, TOWs seem like a downgrade, at least portability wise.
And related to all of this, has there been any consideration with regards what will happens to all the weapons that won't make it to the frontlines, ever, and most likely will end up in somewhere far away from Ukraine in the first place?
the disparity in firepower is almost exactly offset by the disparity in precision, to where (during real engagements) UKR's modern tube artillery units, despite obviously running notably less tubes than the Russian formations in action on the other side of the battle, are damn near identical in their effects on enemy formations. BLU tubes sling 1-2 rounds where RED tubes sometimes eat through 6-8 to achieve similar probabilities of effect when the target isn't just like "that grid square" a-la Grad and is instead something like "that building" or other near-point targets lol.
I'm gonna take a wild guess and say NATO providing intel to Ukraine has lot to do with it?
Still the numbers of tubes being provided seem rather low even if they manage to compensate the disparity in a given location, specially when lossing one or two will already represent a significant loss relative to the existing inventory.
Honestly, there are genuinely reasonable, good faith arguments that could be made for who's got the "long game" advantage, and while I definitely don't count Russia out, I also don't think Ukraine is inherently in a losing position.
Unless they can mass enough manpower and equipment to mount a serious counteroffensive and take back all the land they have lost so far, wouldn't that classify as mostly a loss for Ukraine either way?.
I mean, at this point, it isn't Crimea and bits of pieces of Donbass and Luhansk anymore, but a big chunk Black Sea coast and as things stand, the rest of it still compromised despite not being anywhere near the russians.
Then there is the long term economic, social and political aspect of it all, since now you have a bunch of oligarchs with trained soldiers and NATO weapons running around unchecked, should the war stop today.
One of the biggest meme examples of that I see is that the Kyiv push was "just a feint." It was not. I absolutely, 100% positively, assure you that it was not. I don't even need to play classification-chicken to point out how absurd of a notion it is though tbh - I'd just note that a feint is functionally conducted to engage the enemy with the smallest force possible while providing an element of persuasion that the main effort of a maneuver is along that axis, in order to disguise the real maneuvers's intended direction, thus gaining a positional and information advantage in the process. Russia did none of those things, and received none of those benefits, lol. Massive force pretty much just went hey diddle-diddle straight up the middle, experienced what is likely much higher than anticipated attrition within the sustainment elements, and ended up in a position where they couldn't exploit Hostomel in earnest as a sustainment node, were unable to exploit P02/P56 as a sanitized LOC because of the prevalence of anti-tank teams along the route's flanks, and they were therefore pretty much just in a really bad spot, which took time to remedy, but during which, the Ukrainians took their freebie and ran with it, destroying lots of equipment. Typically in a feint, the feint is suppose to get noticed, make contact, but try not to be too decisively engaged, and maintain ability to break contact when needed.
I agree it wasn't a feint, though I am more of the opinion it was an attempt at putting pressure on Kiev to make them surrender, which obviously didn't work. Or maybe that was the political goal of the move rather than the military one.
It does seem a "wanting to run before learning to walk" type of situation. That being said, Russia could still muster up far more manpower and equipment than what's being used right now, could they not?.
Which returning somewhat to the point of this thread so as not to derail it that much, couldn't the US forces run in a similar scenario against China, only on the sea?. For one reason or another, biting more than they can chew.
As far as replenishing these weapons go... meh. WESTPAC is an air/naval operational environment, not a land one. They're not really related.
So, no plans of helping Taiwan retake mainland China?
More seriously now, should South Korea join in against China and the DPRK seize the oportunity, that could easily turn into a land war scenario, though.
