Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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tphuang

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What would you suggest in terms of PGMs and missiles?

Day 1), a couple of us estimated they need to launch about 1000 BM/CM/Rocket (from something like PCL-191)/PGMs to disable all the major Taiwanese military bases/communication tower/fuel depot and such. As we know from past cases, it's really hard to keep runways inoperable for long period of time. After that, they probably need to fire several hundred missiles/projectiles a day + having loitering UCAVs detecting ground troop movements and attacking them. Ideally, you overwhelm the air defense/radar system early on with ground launched missiles and EW aircraft and then having your best fighter jets take down the vastly overwhelmed F-16s from ROCAF while also launching a lot of PGMs on various targets. I think they need to air drop several hundreds PGMs in day 1.

After that, if they have artillery set up in Penghu and complete air control, then hopefully they can just reduce the reliance on air sorties and ground launched missiles for after that.

H-6s/J-16s and all of their ground launched ballistic/cruise missiles should be able to hit first island chain. Ideally, they can carry 250KG PGMs that can glide a couple of hundred km. The other possibility is having JASSM type of ground attack missiles that they can launch from 500 km out. I think they probably need at least 1000 missiles for first island chain targets initially.

And then there is second island chain. That they will probably have to rely on ground/naval launched balllistic/cruise missiles. At least before H20 is ready.

Taiwan itself has a lot of targets and people that can repair those bases/air strips. I have no insight on how quickly target bases in first/second island chain can be repaired. Repeat attacks are quite critical.
 

Sardaukar20

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Taiwan is one of those situations where actually having huge battleship guns capable of shore bombardment would actually be useful.
The PLA could still use 370mm and 750mm rockets of their PCL-191 MLRS to achieve the same effect. These rockets have more than enough range for shore bombardment, and they are guided. Those rockets can also reach far beyond the beaches, so there will be many more targets to strike further inland. The only question is, have China stockpiled a large amount of those rockets? The PLA are gonna need lots of them for shore bombardment operations.
 

Michaelsinodef

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The PLA could still use 370mm and 750mm rockets of their PCL-191 MLRS to achieve the same effect. These rockets have more than enough range for shore bombardment, and they are guided. Those rockets can also reach far beyond the beaches, so there will be many more targets to strike further inland. The only question is, have China stockpiled a large amount of those rockets? The PLA are gonna need lots of them for shore bombardment operations.
Should not be a question, cuz the answer is definitely a lot.

Probably North of some 10k, since I'm expecting at least like ~100ish to be used against Taiwan (so one burst would be what? 800ish? Before reload.)
 

Sardaukar20

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Penghu Island is indeed a strategic location for both the PLA and ROCAF. We can bet that the ROCAF and the Western intelligence who advise them are gonna be aware of its significance. Nevertheless, the PLA must have a plan to not have to rely on Penghu Island for staging an amphibious landing on the Taiwanese shores. Capturing it would be great, but it should not be entirely necessary for the PLA's overall amphibious operation.

The PLA could instead use the strategic significance of Penghu Island to manipulate the actions of the ROCAF. Make the enemy think that it desperately needs Penghu Island. The PLA can do feint attacks on Penghu Island to manipulate the enemy's perception. Right after the initial wave of heavy bombardment to take out Taiwanese air and naval bases. Make them move their remaining air and naval assets to attempt to intercept the PLAN's 'attempts' to take the island, and then ambush them.

The PLA can make the ROCAF over-commit to Penghu Island. Let them waste men and materiel trying to 'defend' or 'retake' that island from China. The West always love their symbolic victories. In the Ukraine conflict, they pushed the Ukrainians to attempt to retake Snake Island, and to launch their hyped-up counter-offensive near Kharkov. Both of which ended in defeat and the loss of many lives. The Taiwanese leadership, on the advice of the West is more than likely to make the same kind of mistake.
 

AndrewS

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Day 1), a couple of us estimated they need to launch about 1000 BM/CM/Rocket (from something like PCL-191)/PGMs to disable all the major Taiwanese military bases/communication tower/fuel depot and such. As we know from past cases, it's really hard to keep runways inoperable for long period of time. After that, they probably need to fire several hundred missiles/projectiles a day + having loitering UCAVs detecting ground troop movements and attacking them. Ideally, you overwhelm the air defense/radar system early on with ground launched missiles and EW aircraft and then having your best fighter jets take down the vastly overwhelmed F-16s from ROCAF while also launching a lot of PGMs on various targets. I think they need to air drop several hundreds PGMs in day 1.

It would be helpful if you could be more specific on the "several hundreds PGMs in day 1"

After that, if they have artillery set up in Penghu and complete air control, then hopefully they can just reduce the reliance on air sorties and ground launched missiles for after that.

The assumption is that Penghu is a suitable base, but it's over 50km from Taiwan. So you would have to use extended-range guided artillery shells which aren't cheap given the payload. Alternatively MLRS rockets work out better.


H-6s/J-16s and all of their ground launched ballistic/cruise missiles should be able to hit first island chain. Ideally, they can carry 250KG PGMs that can glide a couple of hundred km.

250kg PGMs that can glide a couple of hundred km don't exist. It looks like 70km for a 250kg Glide Bomb (JDAM-ER) and 120km for a 125kg Glide Bomb (SDB).

Plus I expect the JH-7s to be the primary platform for deploying these glide bombs initially.
The J-16 is better used in the air-superiority role and the H-6 is too vulnerable to close to 70km next to Taiwan.

The other possibility is having JASSM type of ground attack missiles that they can launch from 500 km out. I think they probably need at least 1000 missiles for first island chain targets initially.

If you're talking about targets in the 1st Island Chain, then it won't be a short campaign.
So you could easily with at least 2000 JASSM-ERs or JASSM-XRs. They'll probably cost $1.5-2 million each.


And then there is second island chain. That they will probably have to rely on ground/naval launched balllistic/cruise missiles. At least before H20 is ready.

Taiwan itself has a lot of targets and people that can repair those bases/air strips. I have no insight on how quickly target bases in first/second island chain can be repaired. Repeat attacks are quite critical.

Low-cost glide bombs are the way to go for fixed ground targets. You could get 70km of range from a 250kg JDAM-ER glide bomb, and the basic GPS/INS version would likely be around $40K.
 

tch1972

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Penghu Island is indeed a strategic location for both the PLA and ROCAF. We can bet that the ROCAF and the Western intelligence who advise them are gonna be aware of its significance. Nevertheless, the PLA must have a plan to not have to rely on Penghu Island for staging an amphibious landing on the Taiwanese shores. Capturing it would be great, but it should not be entirely necessary for the PLA's overall amphibious operation.

The PLA could instead use the strategic significance of Penghu Island to manipulate the actions of the ROCAF. Make the enemy think that it desperately needs Penghu Island. The PLA can do feint attacks on Penghu Island to manipulate the enemy's perception. Right after the initial wave of heavy bombardment to take out Taiwanese air and naval bases. Make them move their remaining air and naval assets to attempt to intercept the PLAN's 'attempts' to take the island, and then ambush them.

The PLA can make the ROCAF over-commit to Penghu Island. Let them waste men and materiel trying to 'defend' or 'retake' that island from China. The West always love their symbolic victories. In the Ukraine conflict, they pushed the Ukrainians to attempt to retake Snake Island, and to launch their hyped-up counter-offensive near Kharkov. Both of which ended in defeat and the loss of many lives. The Taiwanese leadership, on the advice of the West is more than likely to make the same kind of mistake.

I don't think Penghu is that important to serve as the springboard to invade Taiwan with modern weaponry. Maybe so one century ago. Taking Penghu mainly serve 2 purposes.

1. Losing Penghu could really delivered a heavy psychological blow and demoralised the enemy and Taiwanese.

2. Decoy as Taiwanese forces would need to divert their defence to the south leaving other region vulnerable.

I think invasion of Penghu (likely by special force) should be done in tandem with Air campaign and artillery bombardment of the entire operation .

Total sea, air superiority and Penghu should fall under PLA control within 48hr. Beach landing and heli ops will commence thereafter.

Still will depend on the timeline of the operations . Will PLA decide to

1.bypass Penghu and take on Taiwan directly
2. Attack Penghu first before invading Taiwan
3. Attack both Taiwan and Penghu at the same time?

I think probability for option 2 is higher follow by 3.

As for Kinmen, Matsu and dongsha, i think PLA can wait.
 

tphuang

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It would be helpful if you could be more specific on the "several hundreds PGMs in day 1"
What year and time frame are we looking at? For this to be meaningful, I'm assuming timeline of 10 years from now when they are much further along in the deployment of PGMs. So far, Chinese censors have been very careful about not showing J-16s with PGMs for example.

If we assume 250 kg PGMs are ready, then each J-10 can carry 4 and each J-16s can carry 6 while also be able to loiter long enough to get battlefield assessment and hit the correct targets. We are assuming they are fully trained on ground ISR and the routine of directing fighter jet to carry out strike missions, assess the success of hitting those targets and determining where to hit next. If you have 3 brigades of 40+ J-16s engaging against Taiwan, then you might be able to do 60 ground strike sorties with them on day 1. If we have similar number of J-10 sorties, then you could launch 600 PGMs on day 1 with just J-16/J-10s. I don't think you want to use H-6 for these type of missions, since the risk of them getting shot down is significantly higher. Maybe H-6Ks can be used later when they are convinced that there is no more risk. H-6K could carry 30 250 kg PGMs, so they do have a lot of usage.

The assumption is that Penghu is a suitable base, but it's over 50km from Taiwan. So you would have to use extended-range guided artillery shells which aren't cheap given the payload. Alternatively MLRS rockets work out better.
yes, you would have to use extended range guided artillery shells and I'm also assuming some range improvement over next 10 years. But yes, they can use an older generation of rocket systems from Penghu.
250kg PGMs that can glide a couple of hundred km don't exist. It looks like 70km for a 250kg Glide Bomb (JDAM-ER) and 120km for a 125kg Glide Bomb (SDB).

Plus I expect the JH-7s to be the primary platform for deploying these glide bombs initially.
The J-16 is better used in the air-superiority role and the H-6 is too vulnerable to close to 70km next to Taiwan.
I would expect JH-7 to be retired by then. J-10s (even J-10As) should be able to do the task of launch stand off missiles/PGMs as well if not better than JH-7 and they will be far more survivable.

I'd expect there to be 200 km glide bombs in another 10 years. As with above, there is an important question of how many they will have purchased by then. Against less guarded islands, H-6K maybe survivable enough. If not, they can just have them launch LACMs against 2nd island chain targets.

If you're talking about targets in the 1st Island Chain, then it won't be a short campaign.
So you could easily with at least 2000 JASSM-ERs or JASSM-XRs. They'll probably cost $1.5-2 million each.

Low-cost glide bombs are the way to go for fixed ground targets. You could get 70km of range from a 250kg JDAM-ER glide bomb, and the basic GPS/INS version would likely be around $40K.
no, JASSM is the wrong one. What they need is something like JSM, a lighter, more stealthy and lower emitting version of KD-88. They need one that can hit land targets 400 km away and are about 600 kg in weight. a J-10 can carry 2 of them. a J-16 can carry 4 of them. In the initial phase against first island chain, they might not get close enough for PGMs, you have to go with stand off missiles. PGMs are for later when you can get close enough.
 

Rettam Stacf

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Penghu Island is indeed a strategic location for both the PLA and ROCAF. We can bet that the ROCAF and the Western intelligence who advise them are gonna be aware of its significance. Nevertheless, the PLA must have a plan to not have to rely on Penghu Island for staging an amphibious landing on the Taiwanese shores. Capturing it would be great, but it should not be entirely necessary for the PLA's overall amphibious operation.

The PLA could instead use the strategic significance of Penghu Island to manipulate the actions of the ROCAF. Make the enemy think that it desperately needs Penghu Island. The PLA can do feint attacks on Penghu Island to manipulate the enemy's perception. Right after the initial wave of heavy bombardment to take out Taiwanese air and naval bases. Make them move their remaining air and naval assets to attempt to intercept the PLAN's 'attempts' to take the island, and then ambush them.

The PLA can make the ROCAF over-commit to Penghu Island. Let them waste men and materiel trying to 'defend' or 'retake' that island from China. The West always love their symbolic victories. In the Ukraine conflict, they pushed the Ukrainians to attempt to retake Snake Island, and to launch their hyped-up counter-offensive near Kharkov. Both of which ended in defeat and the loss of many lives. The Taiwanese leadership, on the advice of the West is more than likely to make the same kind of mistake.

The main Penghu Island is not small. It is almost 10 km in both N-S and E-W direction. It has a 3000m runway, a harbor that can service cruise liners, and a ROCAF base.

It is almost inevitable that PLA has to take control over the Penghu Islands in the early phase of any reunification campaign. Without totally disabling up front any military capability on the island group, it will be highly risky to movement of PLA soldiers and materials across the Taiwan Strait during an amphibian assault. And if the PLA is able to do that, so might as well take over the Penghu Islands and use them to her advantage.
 
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AndrewS

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What year and time frame are we looking at? For this to be meaningful, I'm assuming timeline of 10 years from now when they are much further along in the deployment of PGMs. So far, Chinese censors have been very careful about not showing J-16s with PGMs for example.

Say in 5 years in 2027.
That's enough time to develop and field large numbers of any existing PGM type.
It also aligns with the 2027 target for the capacity to successfully invade and conquer Taiwan.

The requirements and technology won't have changed too much from today's situation.

If we assume 250 kg PGMs are ready, then each J-10 can carry 4 and each J-16s can carry 6 while also be able to loiter long enough to get battlefield assessment and hit the correct targets. We are assuming they are fully trained on ground ISR and the routine of directing fighter jet to carry out strike missions, assess the success of hitting those targets and determining where to hit next. If you have 3 brigades of 40+ J-16s engaging against Taiwan, then you might be able to do 60 ground strike sorties with them on day 1. If we have similar number of J-10 sorties, then you could launch 600 PGMs on day 1 with just J-16/J-10s. I don't think you want to use H-6 for these type of missions, since the risk of them getting shot down is significantly higher. Maybe H-6Ks can be used later when they are convinced that there is no more risk. H-6K could carry 30 250 kg PGMs, so they do have a lot of usage.

If we're looking at a 2027, the vast majority of JH-7s will still be around.

And if we assume that only 100 JH-7s are tasked, they could launch [1200 SDB + 300 JDAM-ER] glide bombs every day.
So they could keep the J-16/J-10/J-20 tasked with air superiority.

After 2 days or so, they start using MALE drones and JH-7s over Taiwan.

As for the H-6, they're better off conducting longer-range attacks against tougher targets in Taiwan with powered missiles like the KD-88.
And then being kept in reserve for either more Taiwan attacks or elsewhere in the 1st Island Chain.

yes, you would have to use extended range guided artillery shells and I'm also assuming some range improvement over next 10 years. But yes, they can use an older generation of rocket systems from Penghu.
The cost of existing extended range guided artillery shells is similar to a JDAM or SDB-1. Yet the artillery shell has a far smaller warhead.

I would expect JH-7 to be retired by then. J-10s (even J-10As) should be able to do the task of launch stand off missiles/PGMs as well if not better than JH-7 and they will be far more survivable.

If we're talking about standoff missiles/PGMs, the JH-7s will be more survivable because they have space for targeting and EW pods, whilst the J-10 doesn't have enough hardpoints. Plus the JH-7 has a lot more range and therefore endurance over any potential battlefield.


I'd expect there to be 200 km glide bombs in another 10 years. As with above, there is an important question of how many they will have purchased by then. Against less guarded islands, H-6K maybe survivable enough. If not, they can just have them launch LACMs against 2nd island chain targets.

Look at the performance figures of glide bombs. 125kg class = 110km, 250kg class = 70km.
Glide bombs trade height for speed.
If you want a 200km range glide bomb, my guestimate is a maximum weight of 30kg. How big a warhead could you put on this?
Note an SDB only has a 16kg warhead.

Secondly, if an aircraft can launch glide-bombs from a distance of 70km, only radars actively transmitting will be able to detect and engage. But no Taiwanese aircraft or SAM system will survive for long if it is actively transmitting.
So there's no pressing need for a 200km glide bomb.

no, JASSM is the wrong one. What they need is something like JSM, a lighter, more stealthy and lower emitting version of KD-88. They need one that can hit land targets 400 km away and are about 600 kg in weight. a J-10 can carry 2 of them. a J-16 can carry 4 of them. In the initial phase against first island chain, they might not get close enough for PGMs, you have to go with stand off missiles. PGMs are for later when you can get close enough.

I would argue land-based JASSMs are cheaper than air-launched JSMs.
Using the J-10 and J-16 as a bomb truck would be a waste, as they should focus on the air-superiority mission.
 
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