Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

Tam said:

China better make more mobile howitzer, less SOF bs, and do more reservists. Maybe there's something about Soviet doctrines after all.

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This guy makes some really good points on the Russia-Ukraine war.

Although, with him mentioning that Russia's initial usage of BTGs due to lack of manpower bringing not that much of a success initially, and that the Russia ground troops reverting back to tanks-supporting-infantry tactics - I wonder if all those old tank stockpiles that Russia has (and to an extension, China as well) can be converted into simple drone tanks, like how they converted those old fighter jets into loitering munitions?

Simple drone tanks as to conduct simple fire supports, baiting enemy fire, and if possible, act as something like a ground-based loitering munition? Not sure whether such concepts would work, however.

And yes, I would really hope China can stockpile her ammo for at least 4-5 years-worth of region-wide intense, full-out confrontation against not just Taiwan, but also the US-&-Lackeys Co.

Also, yes, China must be able to muster enough long-range artilleries such that as many enemy positions across the strait on that island would be suppressed 24/7 and rendered ineffective for any sorts of counterattack against the PLA liberation forces.

On another note,

escobar said:

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I'll just quote this segment from the article itself.

Today Colin Kahl, the undersecretary for defense for policy, underlined that idea, saying, “Potential adversaries and aggressors everywhere else in the world are looking at the global response in Ukraine.

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“If I’m sitting in Beijing, I think the fundamental question to draw is, you know, if they were to commit an act of aggression sometime in the future, will the world react the way that it did when China snuffed out democracy in Hong Kong, or will the world react more like they did in the case of Ukraine,” Kahl said at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security. “I think it’s imperative for the leadership in Beijing to understand that, where the world is now, the Ukraine scenario is a much more likely outcome than the Hong Kong scenario.

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Still drunk in copium, I see...

If I was America, I'd be more worried myself about the findings from the Russia Ukraine war.

Russia had a land border to Ukraine through which 100 000s troops could pour in, yet Russia didn't find success until the LDPR mobilized. Ukraine was numerically and technologically inferior, yet the home court advantage allowed them to mitigate it to a surprising degree.

America has no border with China and is thousands of kilometers away. Almost every area which could be used to base an attack on China is within range of severe bombardment. While America has more numbers, the quality is fairly even, and China is capable of mobilising far more troops due to population size.

Can Americans count on ROC troops with morale on the same level as LDPR troops fighting nationalist batallions that would torture them and their families if captured? When said ROC are facing a professional army that accepts surrender and will likely pardon 95% of prisoners?

The life expectancy of your average Ukrainian separatist is also much higher than your average Chinese separatist owing to the sheer difference in firepower between PLA and UA. People tend to follow self preservation. For the Donbass people, they would seem to believe Russian victory is likely or even inevitable, can the same be said for ROC conscripts about American victory?

If Russia is struggling to invade a clearly weaker power over some separatist areas that are bordering Russia itself, America should be extremely pessimistic about their chances to steal Taiwan Island against a militarily similar force.

ACuriousPLAFan said:

Although, with him mentioning that Russia's initial usage of BTGs due to lack of manpower bringing not that much of a success initially, and that the Russia ground troops reverting back to tanks-supporting-infantry tactics

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I get his point. This seems to have been the case in the Russian northern attacks like he said. But the operations in the south and east worked fine in this regard. And in the south the Russians did not use Donbass militia or Chechens from what I understand. From what I understand the south operations were done with VDV troops and perhaps the Marines. The Chechens and Marines have been used in the Donbass in places like Mariupol. The area between Kiev and Kharkov was an issue because they needed tanks and infantry to do both things. But the Russians probably never had enough troops in the field to do all those operations simultaneously in the first place. From what I get the VDV and Marines have way more infantry than the tank and mechanized units. And they should be well trained and decently equipped. But they also have way lighter vehicles so they had some issues of their own.

With regards to artillery. China should try to find out some way to make cheap guided artillery rounds if they haven't already. And this conflict clearly showed the 15cm rounds aren't enough to crack open bunkers and the like. So China should come up with some kind of bunker busting weapon. The Russians do have the Kinzhal which they can use in a pinch if they have to but they seem to be mostly keeping that on reserve. They only use it in really critical targets.

escobar said:

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Bah. I will tell you I have been watching the Russian military buildup for a couple of years already. Even I was surprised at the huge, and I mean HUGE, amount of cruise missiles the Russians have used in this conflict. They deliberately played down the amount of cruise missiles they were buying for years. It was supposed to be around 30-60 a year according to the Russian state order then Shoigu said they had made ten times that amount a year ago. A bit after the US started sending weapons to Ukraine. No one believed him then. Well it seems that he was not bullshitting. Just consider that each of those things has a miniature jet turbine engine and the Russians built literally thousands of them. That is some scary shit. There is little difference in regards to complexity between a cruise missile and a drone.

Some issues which cropped up like unevenness of the distribution of modernized equipment, well, that was more or less well known. A couple years ago the Russians started a bunch of new units in a hurry with T-72Bs, and I do mean the Bs, not the B3s. It was quite clear the Russians were in a hurry to ramp up the enlargement of the army because they fully expected this conflict. The Russians have been complaining about NATO not keeping their end of the deal with regards to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe at least since the Munich Security Conference in 2007. They clearly take the threat really seriously.

My only negative with regards to Russian equipment was how things like the BMP-1 still showed up in the conflict. The huge amount of BMP-2s in storage, and with all the produced BMP-3s they have, they could have clearly done better.

I also expected better performance from the Su-34 to be honest. I mean it is doing ok but now I understand why they are pushing the upgrade for it. And clearly they did not manufacture enough glide munitions for it.

ACuriousPLAFan said:

This guy makes some really good points on the Russia-Ukraine war.

Although, with him mentioning that Russia's initial usage of BTGs due to lack of manpower bringing not that much of a success initially, and that the Russia ground troops reverting back to tanks-supporting-infantry tactics - I wonder if all those old tank stockpiles that Russia has (and to an extension, China as well) can be converted into simple drone tanks, like how they converted those old fighter jets into loitering munitions?

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If you look at the number of mechanised infantry in a notional BTG or Heavy Combined Arms Battalion, there isn't much difference between Russia, China or the US.

Russian BTG: 200 infantry
Chinese Heavy Combined Arms Battalion: 252 infantry (based on 28 IFV x 9 infantry)
US Heavy Combined Arms Battalion: 408 or 204 infantry (depending on whether the Brigade is tank or IFV heavy)

But the key problem is that Russian infantry units are mostly comprised of conscripts who couldn't be sent from Russia to Ukraine.
Russian BTGs are short of infantry anyway for operations in complex terrain like cities or forests where there are small units of opposing infantry, but the absence of conscripts meant Russian BTGs were critically short of infantry.

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If I look to the Chinese military, I see the following ORBAT

6 Heavy Amphibious Assault Brigades (with Tracked Tanks/IFVs)
22 Heavy Brigades (with Tracked Tanks/IFVs)
23 Medium Brigades (with wheeled IFVs)
23 Light Brigades (with trucks or jeeps)

6 Light (Airborne) Brigades
6 Marine Brigades

At first glance, it does look like there is sufficient Infantry. And there shouldn't be any issues with deploying infantry because the Chinese Army always receives enough volunteers for its conscript positions and they know what they are signing up for.

Taiwan is the primary planning scenario for the Army. Plus in society overall, the "One China Policy" is almost like a religious dogma amongst the population. However what "One China" actually means with respect to Taiwan can be interpreted.

While China has a constitution that allows the state to call for conscription and citizens have a duty to serve, it currently uses an all volunteer force due to how small the military is relative to population. That makes it different than say Russia or South Korea in that regard.

However, I'm pretty sure Russia has also mainly used their most experienced soldiers in the war, because they've sent relatively few troops overall. If they tapped into conscripted reserves, they could likely get 400k+ soldiers in relatively short order, yet Russian forces remain around 190k.

tphuang said:

The only one that can and probably is willing to provide US help to a significant degree is Japan. Despite the confidence level of nut cases in Australian military, they simply don't have the means to really help US.

So, if we do get to a war scenario, then the two possibilities are US intervening early on and US not prepositioned to intervene.

If America already has all of its forces positioned in a war to allow for intervening from the onset of the war, then it doesn't make sense to mount landing of Taiwan itself, since that would just take resources away from the main fight. They can just take Penghu island, put artillery on there and the goal would be to keep Taiwan from assisting US. Keep Taiwanese bases unusable throughout the conflict. I'd assume if they can beat back American forces, then Taiwanese government would just surrender.

If America is not prepositioned to intervene in any significant way, then China would need sufficient force to be able to defeat Taiwan quickly before America can intervene.

For the former, you dissuade US "allies" by making sure that your missiles can very quickly hit those bases. My guess is that only Japan will offer their bases an help America in significant way.

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Brave of you to think America will make a clear and decisive decision. Especially early on.

I think it far more likely that the US initial response will be to gather its forces while talking a lot but doing nothing overtly hostile against China.

That not only fits with how modern American leaders lead from the back and defer important decisions as long as possible; it also makes good strategic sense as a means of increasing their likelihood of victory while also putting significant time pressure on China hoping to make China rush and make mistakes and take needlessly heavy losses in its hast.

Then, depending on how the fight goes down, America will ultimately make its big decision on whether to fight or not.

On Chinese strategy, firstly, I don’t think China will so cheaply give up the initiative to dance to America’s tune, as would be the case if they adopted their battle plan based on how America reacts. Instead I think China will try to steer America’s decision with its own actions and performance on the battlefield.

Secondly, while Penghu will undoubtedly be taken and taken early on, I don’t think the PLA will have significant plans for using it as a springboard for the main landings.

As the Russians have so recently and pointedly demonstrated, it’s terrible practice to make complicated, multi-axis/directional battle plans that are sequentially dependant on earlier steps all going according to plan to come together. As would be the case with wanting to make Penghu into an artillery park/logistics hub for the main landings.

I don’t expect PLA initial battle plans for Penghu to go much beyond taking out defenders and securing it with troops, most of which may well pull straight out once they have made the place safe.

They may well land artillery and set up logistics on the island later, but only as an afterthought and probably only if the initial fight isn’t going according to plan and they need more dakka to finish the job.

This is because the amphibious assault and transport capacity needed to make Penghu into an artillery park and keep it supplied so it can actually perform that role will be directly competing with the resources needed for the main landings.

What more, setting up artillery on Penghu will also put that artillery within range of ROC artillery for counter battery fire. The size of Penghu will also limit the mobility of your own artillery and make it more likely for the PLA to take needless losses there.

tphuang said:

Depends on how much it gets attacked and how much resource they devote to defend it. Aside from being able to put Taiwan inside of the standard artillery range, there is some value from just having another military base that US military would need to attack due to its closeness to the battle area.

It's not any closer to Ryuku island chain than southeast coastal part of China. So it doesn't provide any additional value from that point of view. I think taking Penghu would be a logical first step along with cutting communication, dealing huge damages to Taiwan's military infrastructure. At while point, you can put artillery on there. That along with drones might be able to allow PLAAF to save a lot of PGMs and cruise missiles that they'd want to use against further away targets. The Russians have shown that with drones, you can do a lot of damge through artillery. And China would have more advanced UCAVs that it can be used to both attack and provide ISR to its artillery units.

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The PLA should not be attempting this without many times the number of PGMs and missiles as their worst estimates show as needed.

While one should not be wasteful with expensive air dropped PGMs and missiles, saving a buck should be the very last thing any military commander is thinking about in wartime combat scenarios.

PLA should get as many PGMs and missiles as they should. However, if they can accomplish the same task with artillery, then they will want to do that.

They will have a huge battle ahead where they need to be prepared to strike many targets repeatedly in first and second island chain. Maybe they will get the cost of missiles down so much and production level so high that they don't need to be concerned about running low in stock. Even aside from that, you have fixed number of launching platforms. If those launching platforms have to attack Taiwan military bases as well, then fewer might be available for other targets.

Taiwan is one of those situations where actually having huge battleship guns capable of shore bombardment would actually be useful.

tphuang said:

PLA should get as many PGMs and missiles as they should. However, if they can accomplish the same task with artillery, then they will want to do that.

They will have a huge battle ahead where they need to be prepared to strike many targets repeatedly in first and second island chain. Maybe they will get the cost of missiles down so much and production level so high that they don't need to be concerned about running low in stock. Even aside from that, you have fixed number of launching platforms. If those launching platforms have to attack Taiwan military bases as well, then fewer might be available for other targets.

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What would you suggest in terms of PGMs and missiles?