Not a huge fan of Nehru, but to be fair, I do think India got better deal on the lac this year than it would had he agreed to Zhou Enlai's initial proposal. It is unfortunate that there were casualties on both sides though.The list of events that could have precipitated this confrontation is pretty limited. For both sides. China and India have indeed been delaying the resolution of not only this dispute but all three. The difference is China has been offering a compromise from the beginning. India in Nehru's "wisdom" decided they were markedly superior to China back in the 1960s and up to end of 2020, India continued to ignore settling this dispute with the compromise deal. This may have finally changed with the recent agreement. It remains to be seen how both sides will behave following this but I would imagine it would depend on their respective situations. I would not be at all surprised that India sees their keeping of their claim as a formality as a means to re-engage if and when they find the economic and military power to do so, relative to China's of course.
For example I wouldn't be surprised if India re-engaged if China is bogged down in a Taiwan conflict. But the PLA probably understands this as well and have preparations in case.
No doubt India will inflame and re-engage if they have the means to or if they think they've found China in a weak position. And honestly on that topic we cannot blame them as they see this stretch as much a part of their land as Chinese do, if not even more. Honestly this stretch is so far from China proper and not that significant for Chinese interests, while it could strategically be important for India. It's within artillery range of New Delhi.
i don't think any Indian millitary or gov. leaders seriously thought India could get finger 8. Indian patrols past finger 4 were far from frequent. Personally I think the Indian government calculation is agreeing to a buffer zone is worth it, since no Chinese camps on finger 4 would mean no threats to any of India's recent infrastructure in the region, including dsdbo. And considering India never had any permanent positions past finger 4, a simple cost/benefits analysis would clearly point towards pushing for status quo ante on the north bank. Of course India will still claim up to finger 8, but that is mostly symbolic.Not if we consider that India has far greater forces nearby and better means of mobilising them. Chinese road expanded only last year during this conflict. And was also done in part as response to undeniable Indian build up from 2018 to 2020.
From considering the 1959 deal, it would seem India has given up its claims with this buffer establishment if it also means PLA removes presence on paper. It makes sense for China to demand India concede to some variant of the 1959/1993 agreements since it freaking captured the land anyway and proven it can take it by force but with the cost of constant harassment from IA and intrusions.
The disengagement resembled the 1959/1992/3 deal far more than it resembles the Indian offer of everything up to F8.
I do believe that would be the Indian perspective on the disengagement deal.