JH-7/JH-7A/JH-7B Thread

[lcloo]

That timeline seems too soon?

Based on the video of the woman pilot, she has only been flying for a short period of time after changing.

Assuming she was qualified for something like J-10 (which is newer), why waste the time/money to train her for JH-7?

Experienced pilots do not need long training period for conversion to another aircraft type.

A few months of training on a two seater conversion trainer (J11BS/J16/10S), should enable them to qualify for single seater jets. Admittedly though, for optimal proficiency in new type of aircraft, several hundred hours of flight time may be needed.

 

[Blitzo]

The idea of replacing JH-7/As that soon is a little bit difficult to believe, because the idea of the PLA undergoing a reduction of fighter numbers seems a bit implausible.

The entire reason why the PLA has held onto so many legacy J-7/J-8 (and previously J-6 and Q-5) units in the past was to keep the units and their pilots and support system intact so that they could be transitioned adequately to new generation fighters once it came around to their turn.

After all, it is much easier to transition an existing fighter unit than to disband them and then raise a new unit a few years later.



The only way this makes sense, is if perhaps the PLANAF JH-7/As (which make up half of the total PLA JH-7/A fleet) is replaced by pure carrier based aviation, meaning it's more like 400 odd total land based fighters to be replaced between now and 2025 (and 120 of which to be replaced by carrier based fighters).

But even then the numbers don't fully work out.



Overall I'm skeptical with the idea that older aircraft would be replaced on anything that is significantly less than 1:1.

 

[Totoro]

Indeed. My doubts are along the same line. If it was the geopolitical climate of the early 2010s, then I wouldn't bat an eye to such news. But given the geopolitical climate China is in now and will be even more so in the mid 2020s, lowering the number of trained pilots and crews in active service seems a bit odd. Especially considering the if there is a shooting war, Chinese air forces might be eventually facing almost 4000 enemy planes (not all at once of course).

If anything, I'd say the production pace of all the models of the last several years points to even more pilots and crews (and planes) in active service. With China perhaps aiming at operating hundreds of planes more than today come 2030.

 

[MarKoz81]

The idea of replacing JH-7/As that soon is a little bit difficult to believe, because the idea of the PLA undergoing a reduction of fighter numbers seems a bit implausible.

It doesn't need to be a reduction.

Last year I made a table of PLAAF and PLANAF units using scramble orbat with 2020 data. There is a margin of error and uncertainty involved but it looked like this:



The orbat listed 11 JH-7/A units with a total of 264 aircraft:

• 2 JH-7 units in PLANAF (2 ETC) - 48 aircraft
• 3 JH-7A units in PLANAF (2 NTC, 1 STC) - 72 aircraft
• 6 JH-7A units in PLAAF (1 WTC, 2 NTC, 2 ETC, 1 STC) - 144 aircraft

Recently the YT channel Binkov's Battlegrounds made a video on PLA air force modernization and while I can't assess the quality of data (that's yours and Deino's field) I'll use it for this exercise:

J-10C
deliveries - 230 total:
2015 - 12, 2016 - 24, 2017 - 30, 2018 - 35, 2019 - 35, 2020 - 35, 2021 - 35, 2022 - 24
units - ?

J-16
deliveries - 222 total:
2015 - 8, 2016 - 16, 2017 - 22, 2018 - 28, 2019 - 32, 2020 - 36, 2021 - 40, 2022 - 40
units - 9?

J-20
deliveries - 126 total (speculative):
2016 - 4, 2017 - 8, 2018 - 12, 2019 - 18, 2020 - 24, 2021 - 30, 2022 - 30
units - 5?

If you compare those figures to those in my table there's a difference of 93 J-10C (excluding 55 J-10B), 78 J-16 and 78 J-20 which combined give 249 aircraft. This figure is on its own sufficient to cover all withdrawn JH-7/A.

If the rumor indicates 2025 it means that we have between two more years of production to fill the gap. At current rates of production indicated in Binkov video of 24 J-10C, 40 J-16 and 30 J-20 that gives 48 J-10C, 80 J-16 and 60 J-20 for a total of 188 new aircraft to replace moved or retired aircraft, excluding any 2025 production to meet the 2025 retirement deadline without significant loss to readiness.

If the above figures are close to what you and Deino estimate there's already a safe margin for withdrawal of JH-7/A that is only limited by the intended aircraft distribution in the units.

As for retiring J-7 I don't think all of J-7s need to be retired before 2025 for a simple reason - unlike JH-7 the J-7 is a cheap platform for performing of secondary tasks in the field of air defense and airspace protection. JH-7 is a heavy twin-engine strike aircraft in a similar class as J-16 (14,5t empty weight vs 17,7 empty weight) but comparably with very limited capabilities. Most importantly it can't perform air superiority tasks like the J-16 which greatly limits its combat role in any plausible scenario. Both J-10C and J-16 are preferable, even excluding the issues of logistics and maintenance.

J-7 can still fly air patrols, respond to airspace violations and shoot down cruise missiles. It can still perform those roles safely along the central-northern (Mongolia) and south-western (Myanmar, Laos, Vietam) borders in cooperation with other fighters in main roles. Not to mention it can be expended to countries like North Korea, Bangladesh, Cambodia etc if necessary. It also serves as a introductory fighter and can be used to facilitate training which is the main bottleneck in force generation for PLAAF. Until there is sufficient number of LIFT trainers and twin-seaters J-7 will still have a role to play.

Retiring JH-7 has three beneficial results: (1) generates savings, (2) improves ground strike capabilities, (3) increases the number of air superiority assets available to planners. Retiring J-7 improves air-to-air capabilities and adds ground strike capability but at the increase of expenditures.

So while the rumor feels wrong the numbers suggest it might be right on the money. Personally I'd retire J-11A before J-7. It seems counter-intuitive if you only look at how a plane looks in stats or pictures but once you start crunching the boring numbers of logistics, force generation and retention and funding then it becomes rather obvious which is a better choice. At least this is my perspective on the issue.

Not to mention that if the numbers I cited are close to correct then in 2025 all three - JH-7, J-7 and J-11A - should have sufficient number of replacements and no reduction will be necessary.

 

[Maikeru]

It may be that JH7 is not replaced entirely by crewed aircraft but at least in part by UCAVs like GJ11.

Or perhaps it will be replaced by JH-XX. Or both.

 

[Blitzo]

It doesn't need to be a reduction.

Last year I made a table of PLAAF and PLANAF units using scramble orbat with 2020 data. There is a margin of error and uncertainty involved but it looked like this:

View attachment 99954

The orbat listed 11 JH-7/A units with a total of 264 aircraft:

• 2 JH-7 units in PLANAF (2 ETC) - 48 aircraft
• 3 JH-7A units in PLANAF (2 NTC, 1 STC) - 72 aircraft
• 6 JH-7A units in PLAAF (1 WTC, 2 NTC, 2 ETC, 1 STC) - 144 aircraft

Recently the YT channel Binkov's Battlegrounds made a video on PLA air force modernization and while I can't assess the quality of data (that's yours and Deino's field) I'll use it for this exercise:

J-10C
deliveries - 230 total:
2015 - 12, 2016 - 24, 2017 - 30, 2018 - 35, 2019 - 35, 2020 - 35, 2021 - 35, 2022 - 24
units - ?

J-16
deliveries - 222 total:
2015 - 8, 2016 - 16, 2017 - 22, 2018 - 28, 2019 - 32, 2020 - 36, 2021 - 40, 2022 - 40
units - 9?

J-20
deliveries - 126 total (speculative):
2016 - 4, 2017 - 8, 2018 - 12, 2019 - 18, 2020 - 24, 2021 - 30, 2022 - 30
units - 5?

If you compare those figures to those in my table there's a difference of 93 J-10C (excluding 55 J-10B), 78 J-16 and 78 J-20 which combined give 249 aircraft. This figure is on its own sufficient to cover all withdrawn JH-7/A.

If the rumor indicates 2025 it means that we have between two more years of production to fill the gap. At current rates of production indicated in Binkov video of 24 J-10C, 40 J-16 and 30 J-20 that gives 48 J-10C, 80 J-16 and 60 J-20 for a total of 188 new aircraft to replace moved or retired aircraft, excluding any 2025 production to meet the 2025 retirement deadline without significant loss to readiness.

If the above figures are close to what you and Deino estimate there's already a safe margin for withdrawal of JH-7/A that is only limited by the intended aircraft distribution in the units.

As for retiring J-7 I don't think all of J-7s need to be retired before 2025 for a simple reason - unlike JH-7 the J-7 is a cheap platform for performing of secondary tasks in the field of air defense and airspace protection. JH-7 is a heavy twin-engine strike aircraft in a similar class as J-16 (14,5t empty weight vs 17,7 empty weight) but comparably with very limited capabilities. Most importantly it can't perform air superiority tasks like the J-16 which greatly limits its combat role in any plausible scenario. Both J-10C and J-16 are preferable, even excluding the issues of logistics and maintenance.

J-7 can still fly air patrols, respond to airspace violations and shoot down cruise missiles. It can still perform those roles safely along the central-northern (Mongolia) and south-western (Myanmar, Laos, Vietam) borders in cooperation with other fighters in main roles. Not to mention it can be expended to countries like North Korea, Bangladesh, Cambodia etc if necessary. It also serves as a introductory fighter and can be used to facilitate training which is the main bottleneck in force generation for PLAAF. Until there is sufficient number of LIFT trainers and twin-seaters J-7 will still have a role to play.

Retiring JH-7 has three beneficial results: (1) generates savings, (2) improves ground strike capabilities, (3) increases the number of air superiority assets available to planners. Retiring J-7 improves air-to-air capabilities and adds ground strike capability but at the increase of expenditures.

So while the rumor feels wrong the numbers suggest it might be right on the money. Personally I'd retire J-11A before J-7. It seems counter-intuitive if you only look at how a plane looks in stats or pictures but once you start crunching the boring numbers of logistics, force generation and retention and funding then it becomes rather obvious which is a better choice. At least this is my perspective on the issue.

Not to mention that if the numbers I cited are close to correct then in 2025 all three - JH-7, J-7 and J-11A - should have sufficient number of replacements and no reduction will be necessary.

My previous post was predicated on working with the claims from the last few posts -- that all J-7s, J-8s and JH-7s variants would be retired by 2025.


Your numbers work out because you don't retire all of the J-7s, which is fine, but that's separate from what I was talking about.



If we are looking at the original claims as stated (retire all J-7, J-8, JH-7 and variants by 2025), with the current rate of fighter procurement, I cannot see how they would not experience a rather sizeable shortfall in numbers.

It may be that JH7 is not replaced entirely by crewed aircraft but at least in part by UCAVs like GJ11.

Or perhaps it will be replaced by JH-XX. Or both.

Not a bad idea, but probably they will not be mature enough to make up the shortfall in airframes again, and it also leads to questions like how many GJ-11 (if it even ends up being the UCAV model that is procured in large numbers) would equate to a JH-7A in capability etc.


Either the claim is true and:
-the PLA are okay suffering a reduction of airframe numbers, or
-there are other capabilities or platforms that are intended to make up a shortfall in that time period

... Or, the claim is not true.

 

[supersnoop]

Experienced pilots do not need long training period for conversion to another aircraft type.

A few months of training on a two seater conversion trainer (J11BS/J16/10S), should enable them to qualify for single seater jets. Admittedly though, for optimal proficiency in new type of aircraft, several hundred hours of flight time may be needed.

She went from single seater to JH-7. I am assuming the single seater was J-10.

It's possible that the single seater was J-7 or something, but do they really train that many J-7 pilots now? Second, there seems to be a lot of female J-10 pilots.

I'm assuming this kind of transfer would be approved based on openings. If the aircraft was to be retired soon, then there are probably not many free openings. JH-7 being a relatively new-ish aircraft (90's) means most of the pilots are probably not too old to retire.

She has to be fairly proficient if they sent her to Russia for those joint exercises, which means they must be doing a good amount of flight hours.

I admit this is a lot to read into, but it's also kind of common sense stuff that isn't like some "alien technology" explanation. Plus with the production/replacement numbers, it does make more sense.

 

[Tempest]

It doesn't need to be a reduction.

Last year I made a table of PLAAF and PLANAF units using scramble orbat with 2020 data. There is a margin of error and uncertainty involved but it looked like this:

View attachment 99954

The orbat listed 11 JH-7/A units with a total of 264 aircraft:

• 2 JH-7 units in PLANAF (2 ETC) - 48 aircraft
• 3 JH-7A units in PLANAF (2 NTC, 1 STC) - 72 aircraft
• 6 JH-7A units in PLAAF (1 WTC, 2 NTC, 2 ETC, 1 STC) - 144 aircraft

Recently the YT channel Binkov's Battlegrounds made a video on PLA air force modernization and while I can't assess the quality of data (that's yours and Deino's field) I'll use it for this exercise:

J-10C
deliveries - 230 total:
2015 - 12, 2016 - 24, 2017 - 30, 2018 - 35, 2019 - 35, 2020 - 35, 2021 - 35, 2022 - 24
units - ?

J-16
deliveries - 222 total:
2015 - 8, 2016 - 16, 2017 - 22, 2018 - 28, 2019 - 32, 2020 - 36, 2021 - 40, 2022 - 40
units - 9?

J-20
deliveries - 126 total (speculative):
2016 - 4, 2017 - 8, 2018 - 12, 2019 - 18, 2020 - 24, 2021 - 30, 2022 - 30
units - 5?

If you compare those figures to those in my table there's a difference of 93 J-10C (excluding 55 J-10B), 78 J-16 and 78 J-20 which combined give 249 aircraft. This figure is on its own sufficient to cover all withdrawn JH-7/A.

If the rumor indicates 2025 it means that we have between two more years of production to fill the gap. At current rates of production indicated in Binkov video of 24 J-10C, 40 J-16 and 30 J-20 that gives 48 J-10C, 80 J-16 and 60 J-20 for a total of 188 new aircraft to replace moved or retired aircraft, excluding any 2025 production to meet the 2025 retirement deadline without significant loss to readiness.

If the above figures are close to what you and Deino estimate there's already a safe margin for withdrawal of JH-7/A that is only limited by the intended aircraft distribution in the units.

As for retiring J-7 I don't think all of J-7s need to be retired before 2025 for a simple reason - unlike JH-7 the J-7 is a cheap platform for performing of secondary tasks in the field of air defense and airspace protection. JH-7 is a heavy twin-engine strike aircraft in a similar class as J-16 (14,5t empty weight vs 17,7 empty weight) but comparably with very limited capabilities. Most importantly it can't perform air superiority tasks like the J-16 which greatly limits its combat role in any plausible scenario. Both J-10C and J-16 are preferable, even excluding the issues of logistics and maintenance.

J-7 can still fly air patrols, respond to airspace violations and shoot down cruise missiles. It can still perform those roles safely along the central-northern (Mongolia) and south-western (Myanmar, Laos, Vietam) borders in cooperation with other fighters in main roles. Not to mention it can be expended to countries like North Korea, Bangladesh, Cambodia etc if necessary. It also serves as a introductory fighter and can be used to facilitate training which is the main bottleneck in force generation for PLAAF. Until there is sufficient number of LIFT trainers and twin-seaters J-7 will still have a role to play.

Retiring JH-7 has three beneficial results: (1) generates savings, (2) improves ground strike capabilities, (3) increases the number of air superiority assets available to planners. Retiring J-7 improves air-to-air capabilities and adds ground strike capability but at the increase of expenditures.

So while the rumor feels wrong the numbers suggest it might be right on the money. Personally I'd retire J-11A before J-7. It seems counter-intuitive if you only look at how a plane looks in stats or pictures but once you start crunching the boring numbers of logistics, force generation and retention and funding then it becomes rather obvious which is a better choice. At least this is my perspective on the issue.

Not to mention that if the numbers I cited are close to correct then in 2025 all three - JH-7, J-7 and J-11A - should have sufficient number of replacements and no reduction will be necessary.

If it is worth anything, I concur with this general sentiment. While JH-7s provide a more potent combat capability than J-7s at face value, they provide similar value on the backend; and with the prevailing PLAAF modernization, both are essentially second-rate aircraft regardless. However, the J-7's value in supporting roles, equal to that of the JH-7, is much less taxing on both the logistics and financial fronts, which puts them in a favorable position as the PLAAF's interim "low-end" aircraft of choice.

 

[TK3600]

If it is worth anything, I concur with this general sentiment. While JH-7s provide a more potent combat capability than J-7s at face value, they provide similar value on the backend; and with the prevailing PLAAF modernization, both are essentially second-rate aircraft regardless. However, the J-7's value in supporting roles, equal to that of the JH-7, is much less taxing on both the logistics and financial fronts, which puts them in a favorable position as the PLAAF's interim "low-end" aircraft of choice.

How does J-7's support role equal to JH-7 at less logistical cost? Then why develop JH-7 at all.

 

[Atomicfrog]

How does J-7's support role equal to JH-7 at less logistical cost? Then why develop JH-7 at all.

How a j-7 can carry couple of YJ-82 on a 900km combat range, laser guided or antiradiation missiles ? Or carry some Pl-12 for BVR combat ? They are clearly not role equal... JH-7 and JH-7a are generations behind of new aircrafts but still carry deterrence that j-7 have no way to achieve.

J-15/J-16 could take their flags when they will be done in mileage but j-7 role of light fighter could be replaced by Jl-10 or even jl-9 easily.