And my point still stands.
Even as both Chengdu and Shenyang ACs have sufficient production slots to roll out 200-300 J-20As and J-35As respectively per year in the coming years - Having the PLAAF procuring both the J-20As and J-35s is still the better, if not superior option than overwhelmingly focusing on J-20/A production only, as per my reasoning above.
Plus, should I also remind that both Chendu and Shenyang ACs do produce other types of warplanes beyond the J-20A and J-35A, so there's that.
I'd suggest a re-read on what I have explained.
Annual procurement of 300 combined units of J-20 and J-35 seems excessive.
They would want to commit to J-35 production volumes for at least 10 years, which would imply an additional 3000 aircraft.
But if you look at the geography of the Western Pacific - even 200 per year means 2000 additional aircraft which is still way enough for air dominance over the 1st Island Chain.
Remember that with current standalone J-20 production levels, it is still plausible for China to achieve air superiority/dominance over the 1st Island Chain by 2030.
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Lockheed's F-35 production capacity is about 150-160 per year.
And the US military is only taking delivery of approximately 100 of these, with the rest for export.
J-20 production is at 100, possibly up to 120 per year. And there are indications they are maxed out at current capacity.
1. If the Chinese military want to match Lockheed production levels, that implies J-35 production of about 40-50 per year.
2. But I could see J-35 production reaching J-20 levels, which would mean about 100 per year
I would add that the the 2nd scenario becomes more likely if US-China relations remain bad.
And with the election of an unpredictable Trump, China needs a larger military just from a negotiating perspective and to dissuade any craziness.
