Not sure where this post should go, but it's a response to this post so I'll put it here for now.
The problem is no longer as complex as it seemed 5-6 years ago mostly because the rapid modernisation programs that were declared by everyone prety much only happened in.. China. In just a few years the "difficult to predict" situation has become fairly manageable.
Here are some simplifying factors:
WestPac conflict is for US by default an Indo-Pac conflict so European/Atlantic forces are moved to ME/Indian theatre. This is why USAF merged European and African commands. This means that at no point ME will be left completely without US presence, simply because US will be exploiting this theatre both militarily and economically in any WestPac conflict, and also trying to push India into war with China.
European allies can be ignored because European NATO will be hard-pressed to fill the gap left by USAF, especially considering how much of the logistical burden for NATO was carried by USAF. They will be completely exhausted by Russia and Med - factors that were only hypotheticals before 2022. Any involvement in WestPac conflict will be purely symbolic and likely be limited to filling the gap left by US forces in the US as they are transferred elsewhere. This is primarily caused by logistical limitations so it doesn't matter what kind of political stance European countries take. Even if they want to fight with the US they won't be able to.
Canada can be ignored because at present they don't have an air force capable of regular combat.
WestPac allies that can be reliably included for the purpose of establishing a maximum force level are:
- Australia - current: 72 F-35A + 24 SuperHornets (up to 100 F-35A total)
- Japan - current: 36 F-35A/B + 88 F-2A/B + 200 F-15J/DJ (up to 142 F-35A/B total)
- Korea - current: 40 F-35A + 167 KF-16C/D + 59 F-15K + irrelevant/legacy (up to 60 F-35A total)
- Taiwan - irrelevant due to proximity
This means that in practical terms US is fighting this one alone.
US has three air forces operating independently in logistical terms:
- USAF operating from land bases
- USN (incl. USMC VMAF squadrons in CAWs) operating from carriers
- USMC squadrons operating from land bases
Compare those numbers to what we estimate of PLAAF and it doesn't look nearly as bad as in 2018-2020.
USN has up to 11 CAWs (currently 9 with 2 CVNs in refuel/overhaul ) each with either 4 SuperHornet squadrons or 3 SuperHornet squadrons and 1 F-35C squadron. Each CAW has also 1 squadron of Growlers. Each squadron is 10-12 aircraft. That puts active force at up to 110 F-35C and 330 F/A-18E/F. Total number of SuperHornet airframes in service is up to 550 of which over 120 are conversion trainers. Total number of F-35C ordered is 340 but manpower and budget issues mean 2/3 of that number will be in reserve. Currently USN has little over 30 F-35C.
USN currently has 5 CVNs in the Pacific (1 in Japan, 4 in CONUS) and 4 CVNs in the Atlantic. Nominally it's 6 and 5. They can't be deployed 100% freely because they are part of CSG which fulfill also escort and sea control roles e.g. protecting SLOC against submarines etc.
USMC has a total order of 353 F-35B (and 67 F-35C but they are opearting as part of USN). Currently it's over 150 F-35B/C and the rest are legacy Hornets. USMC also reduced size of its squadrons to 10 aircraft per sqn which at current structure (16 sqn iirc) will mean 50% of ordered F-35B will be in reserve.
Lockheed declared in March 2024 that "more than 990" F-35s had been delivered to all customers while totals for 2023 sum to ~720 aircraft. With ~150 built during 2023 and early 2024 it must mean that about 120 aircraft has been physically "ready for delivery" but had not been formally delivered, possibly due to delays with software and hardware versions. At ~150 airframes annually USAF is receiving ~60 to 70 maximum over the next decade. That's a lot in the long term, but not something that can't be matched by the current production rate of J-20.
Also note the numbers of AWACS and ISR planes. USAF is trying to acquire the 26 E-7s ASAP because they are left with completely obsolete E-3s. Aerial refueling is the only area where PLA is still lagging.
I recommend looking up the Almanac because it lists budget data which allows for creating trendlines. One such important trendline is how much money is going into Operations and Maintenance and Personnel and Training. If you look at the stats for the several years before it shows USAF clearly lagging beyond its own aims and then requiring additional funding due to Russian invasion of Ukraine which involves primarily USAF and not USN or USMC. This means that additional funds were not used to augment readiness, training or modernisation for WestPac. And costs of other programs including strategic priorities like Sentinel are only growing - current estimate is 160 billion.
The overall dynamic of air force modernisation between US and China since 2018 or so (which is when I started paying attention more closely) is that US was failing to meet its own time schedule and training quota while China was significantly exceeding its presumptive time schedule. At this point I think we've reached a tentative equilibrium for the near term provided PLA solved its training issues.
And I think PLA sees this as well which is why they are pushing for higher rates of J-20 production even without WS-15 as well as continue J-16. It's a safe solution that proved to be resilient and scalable which is why China is the only country that not only met its modernisation requirements but likely exceeded them (those we know of).
Circa 2020 US recognised it needed an overmatch to get involved vs China by late 2020s and due to what happened in the last 5 years (2019-2024) they no longer have the ability to develop that overmatch unless the entire modernisation of PLAAF that we've seen was an elaborate deception.
