J-20 has a set of capabilities unprecedented in the Chinese air force. The PLAAF needs to explore the potentials of these capabilities, work out operating doctrines, maintenance procedures to support the doctrines, doctrines for how other types of aircraft and assets should coordinate with the J-20.
None of these can be effectively done with 5-6 prototypes. Yet all of these require units with both above average pilot proficiency, as well as exceptional pilot and staff skills in not just following new doctrines and procedures, but have a track record of being unusually innovative and take the large view in developing these doctrines and procedures, which means the units truly capable of developing the j-20 would be just a small subset of units that might eventually become fully qualified on the j-20 once the process and procedures have become established.
Furthermore, as the process and doctrine for the j-20 is developed, room for improvements in the j-20 would undoubtedly be identified. Some of these can be mundane, like the size and location of maintenance access panels, how much maintenance can be done by line units and how much require depot, and location of central refueling ports for fast sortie rates, and some may require more structural changes. Room for improvement in ground support equipment would also be identified, and these may also require matching changes to the aircraft.
Hence the low rate initial production. No need to flood the air force with more j-20s than it could integrate at this stage, no need to build too many airframes without the service improvements that can later be shown to be needed during initial integration, doctrine and procedure development.
Fundmantally, China doesn’t see high probability of high intensity warfare in the near future, hence no need to prematurely flood the air force with unimproved initial versions of j-20
None of these can be effectively done with 5-6 prototypes. Yet all of these require units with both above average pilot proficiency, as well as exceptional pilot and staff skills in not just following new doctrines and procedures, but have a track record of being unusually innovative and take the large view in developing these doctrines and procedures, which means the units truly capable of developing the j-20 would be just a small subset of units that might eventually become fully qualified on the j-20 once the process and procedures have become established.
Furthermore, as the process and doctrine for the j-20 is developed, room for improvements in the j-20 would undoubtedly be identified. Some of these can be mundane, like the size and location of maintenance access panels, how much maintenance can be done by line units and how much require depot, and location of central refueling ports for fast sortie rates, and some may require more structural changes. Room for improvement in ground support equipment would also be identified, and these may also require matching changes to the aircraft.
Hence the low rate initial production. No need to flood the air force with more j-20s than it could integrate at this stage, no need to build too many airframes without the service improvements that can later be shown to be needed during initial integration, doctrine and procedure development.
Fundmantally, China doesn’t see high probability of high intensity warfare in the near future, hence no need to prematurely flood the air force with unimproved initial versions of j-20
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