On the meta-materials debate, the Chinese are indicating that they have used meta-material RAM on either the current J-20 or a future iteration. The West, in contrast, was first to meta-materials (British development), Lockheed Martin has its own meta-material research division, and there's been little noise about whether the F-35 uses metamaterial RAM, although descriptions of how the F-35 employs RAM suggests metamaterials (nano-composites with RAM baked into the composite structure).
It's reasonable to assume that the J-20 or a later version of the J-20 will use metamaterials. It's also reasonable to assume it's likely that the F-35 is using metamaterials.
The more important thing about the J-20 claims of using metamaterials is that the Chinese have published RCS reduction figures for their metamaterials, roughly putting it in a negative 20-30 dBsm RCS suppression. We have no equivalent numbers for potential Western metamaterials.
@Brumby :
If I recall, the traditional claim was that stealth was "shaping, shaping, shaping, and materials", i.e, implying that 75% of stealth effect was the result of shaping. But this quote came roughly from the Nineties and Noughts, when the best unclassified stealth RCS figure was around negative 20-30 dBsm. Hypothetically, say a material can provide an RCS reduction of negative 60 dBsm. This completely upturns the existing formula, i.e, RAM becomes highly dominant in the composition of stealth and you could theoretically make a MiG-21 extremely stealthy by slapping RAM onto it.
@siegecrossbow :
Which means we go back to the high-speed interceptor debate, no? This is obviously a highly emotional issue for Chinese posters here, but the J-20 design (long-coupled, large motors for elevators, intended to sport TVC) suggests it's more optimized for high-speed performance than low-speed performance. It's not necessarily to say that the J-20's low-speed maneuverability is "bad", but it emphasizes winning at high speeds (i.e, BVR missile launches at high Mach 1 or Mach 2-3 range) more than dogfights.
I still don't understand why posters here are addicted to the Soviet dogfight paradigm when, for instance, the MiGs in Vietnam took more casualties than the Americans did, and that modern WVR missiles of increasing capability are making short-range encounters suicidal.
It's reasonable to assume that the J-20 or a later version of the J-20 will use metamaterials. It's also reasonable to assume it's likely that the F-35 is using metamaterials.
The more important thing about the J-20 claims of using metamaterials is that the Chinese have published RCS reduction figures for their metamaterials, roughly putting it in a negative 20-30 dBsm RCS suppression. We have no equivalent numbers for potential Western metamaterials.
@Brumby :
If I recall, the traditional claim was that stealth was "shaping, shaping, shaping, and materials", i.e, implying that 75% of stealth effect was the result of shaping. But this quote came roughly from the Nineties and Noughts, when the best unclassified stealth RCS figure was around negative 20-30 dBsm. Hypothetically, say a material can provide an RCS reduction of negative 60 dBsm. This completely upturns the existing formula, i.e, RAM becomes highly dominant in the composition of stealth and you could theoretically make a MiG-21 extremely stealthy by slapping RAM onto it.
@siegecrossbow :
Which means we go back to the high-speed interceptor debate, no? This is obviously a highly emotional issue for Chinese posters here, but the J-20 design (long-coupled, large motors for elevators, intended to sport TVC) suggests it's more optimized for high-speed performance than low-speed performance. It's not necessarily to say that the J-20's low-speed maneuverability is "bad", but it emphasizes winning at high speeds (i.e, BVR missile launches at high Mach 1 or Mach 2-3 range) more than dogfights.
I still don't understand why posters here are addicted to the Soviet dogfight paradigm when, for instance, the MiGs in Vietnam took more casualties than the Americans did, and that modern WVR missiles of increasing capability are making short-range encounters suicidal.