J-15 carrier fighter thread

[Iron Man]

PLAN airwings probably won't have a 50/50 4th-5th gen. mix to begin with; I expect the J-15B to be the mainstay until well into the mid-2020s when the J-XY can actually enter serial production. Even then, due to cost concerns and potentially engine troubles, the PLAN's 5th-generation component will be numerically constrained (I would not be surprised if PLAN settles with 36 J-15s + 12 J-XYs for each CV).

The J-XY might act as an information "vacuum" for the PLAN's other assets and potentially undertake light air superiority work, but the grunts will still be the J-15B for the forseeable future for both anti-surface and anti-air missions.

Using J-15s against F-35s in the air superiority role is like throwing grunts in front of an enemy machine gun. Might as well just burn up your money in a bonfire and save yourself the trouble. Not only will J-31s be used in the air superiority role, if the PLAN CBG hopes to match the USN CBG in the future it will have a similar number of stealth fighters, i.e. 2 squadrons' worth per naval air wing. I am of course talking about a future where the PLAN can decide exactly how many J-31s it wants in an air wing, and not in the near term where J-31 numbers are constrained by limited production. In the near term USN CBGs are also similarly constrained as far as their F-35C numbers are concerned, so this is a non-issue right now.

RE: Su-35 tech; I still don't see how the Su-35's components would help the PLAN establish their future airwings aside from perhaps the TVC.

I'd like to think China was not dumb enough to buy the Su-35 just to help out the Russians with some cash. There are probably some airframe, avionics, and/or engine advancements in the Su-35 that future iterations of J-15 can benefit from.

 

[SinoSoldier]

Using J-15s against F-35s in the air superiority role is like throwing grunts in front of an enemy machine gun. Might as well just burn up your money in a bonfire and save yourself the trouble.

Sure, but you're defaulting to the assumption that PLAN carriers will be used to engage other CBGs or fight against front-line USN assets. For all we know J-15Bs might be sufficient for the PLAN's near-term goals which mainly revolve around the safety of Chinese shipping lanes. Moreover, as much as the PLAN may wish it had a full complement of FC-31s, financial and production constraints are very real factors that need to be worked around.

Not only will J-31s be used in the air superiority role, if the PLAN CBG hopes to match the USN CBG in the future it will have a similar number of stealth fighters, i.e. 2 squadrons' worth per naval air wing. I am of course talking about a future where the PLAN can decide exactly how many J-31s it wants in an air wing, and not in the near term where J-31 numbers are constrained by limited production. In the near term USN CBGs are also similarly constrained as far as their F-35C numbers are concerned, so this is a non-issue right now.

Again, there is no reason to think that the PLAN has the ambition or the capacity to reciprocate the role & capabilities of an USN CBG, so the air wing composition may not reflect that of the United States. Cost is another issue, so unless another country or PLAAF purchases large numbers of the FC-31 and drives the price down, the PLAN may not be able to afford a 50/50 J-XY/J-15 combination. This is much less of an issue when it comes to the US where F-35 orders are in the thousands.

I'd like to think China was not dumb enough to buy the Su-35 just to help out the Russians with some cash. There are probably some airframe, avionics, and/or engine advancements in the Su-35 that future iterations of J-15 can benefit from.

If there is evidence that China has taken apart a few Su-35 imports or reverse-engineered some of its subcomponents, I'm all ears. So far, it seems that the PLAAF is using the Su-35s to escort its H-6Ks until more capable Flankers (i.e. J-11D or J-16) can enter service in large numbers. Additionally, with the development of TVC variants of WS-10 and multiple AESA radar systems, I don't see how the Su-35 can benefit future J-15 development aside from DACT data, potential airframe lightening/strengthening, and perhaps refinement of battle tactics/strategy.

 

[Iron Man]

Sure, but you're defaulting to the assumption that PLAN carriers will be used to engage other CBGs or fight against front-line USN assets. For all we know J-15Bs might be sufficient for the PLAN's near-term goals which mainly revolve around the safety of Chinese shipping lanes. Moreover, as much as the PLAN may wish it had a full complement of FC-31s, financial and production constraints are very real factors that need to be worked around.

Again, there is no reason to think that the PLAN has the ambition or the capacity to reciprocate the role & capabilities of an USN CBG, so the air wing composition may not reflect that of the United States. Cost is another issue, so unless another country or PLAAF purchases large numbers of the FC-31 and drives the price down, the PLAN may not be able to afford a 50/50 J-XY/J-15 combination. This is much less of an issue when it comes to the US where F-35 orders are in the thousands.

There is every reason to think that the PLAN has the ambition and the capacity to reciprocate the role and capabilities of a USN CBG. To think otherwise is to be blind to the obvious trends in PLAN force structure development. The existence of the PLAN CATOBAR program (the approximate size of the Forrestal/Midway classes) is a blatantly unambiguous herald of the PLAN's intentions in the mid to long term. A carrier like that, with J-15 4th gen fighters, J-31 5th gen fighters, J-15D EW, KJ-600 AEW&C, 055/A cruisers, 052C/D/E destroyers, 054A/B frigates, and 093B/095 SSNs essentially replicates in entirety the ORBAT of a USN CBG in its glory days (when it actually still had Perrys). How is it even remotely possible to think otherwise? This is with 100% certainty where the PLAN is heading.

If there is evidence that China has taken apart a few Su-35 imports or reverse-engineered some of its subcomponents, I'm all ears. So far, it seems that the PLAAF is using the Su-35s to escort its H-6Ks until more capable Flankers (i.e. J-11D or J-16) can enter service in large numbers. Additionally, with the development of TVC variants of WS-10 and multiple AESA radar systems, I don't see how the Su-35 can benefit future J-15 development aside from DACT data, potential airframe lightening/strengthening, and perhaps refinement of battle tactics/strategy.

There is nothing about the J-11B (or any other modern fighter in China's inventory) that makes it incapable of escorting H-6Ks, which makes "H-6K escort" a suspect reason for importing these expensive fighters IMO.

 

[Red Moon]

Sure, but you're defaulting to the assumption that PLAN carriers will be used to engage other CBGs or fight against front-line USN assets. For all we know J-15Bs might be sufficient for the PLAN's near-term goals which mainly revolve around the safety of Chinese shipping lanes.

PLAN's "near term goals" revolve not just around shipping lanes, but also protection of the fleet, and especially submarines. But in either case, who do you suppose they would be meeting up against, if not the US and its CBG's?

In this connection, a couple of months ago a video (in one of the Navy threads, with English subtitles) clearly stated that unlike many other navies, the PLAN primarily trains to fight and win a naval battle, not to battle "terrorism" or for "humanitarian" assistance.

 

[SinoSoldier]

There is every reason to think that the PLAN has the ambition and the capacity to reciprocate the role and capabilities of a USN CBG. To think otherwise is to be blind to the obvious trends in PLAN force structure development. The existence of the PLAN CATOBAR program (the approximate size of the Forrestal/Midway classes) is a blatantly unambiguous herald of the PLAN's intentions in the mid to long term. A carrier like that, with J-15 4th gen fighters, J-31 5th gen fighters, J-15D EW, KJ-600 AEW&C, 055/A cruisers, 052C/D/E destroyers, 054A/B frigates, and 093B/095 SSNs essentially replicates in entirety the ORBAT of a USN CBG in its glory days (when it actually still had Perrys). How is it even remotely possible to think otherwise? This is with 100% certainty where the PLAN is heading.

The assets you refer to (the DDGs, FFGs, etc.) emulate the CBG force structure of the USN because they're necessary for the protection of any naval vessel the caliber & importance of an aircraft carrier, not because the PLAN designed it in a way that purposely imitates an American CBG. That would be akin to claiming that the J-20 has all of its necessary bells & whistles because the PLAAF wants to emulate the F-22. This does not necessarily mean that the airwing composition, which reflects overall PLAN doctrine and long-term goals for its CVs, will be reflective of that of an USN carrier. In a way, the PLAN has already deviated from this path by settling with a heavyweight mainstay fighter (J-15) instead of a medium-weight platform like the Super Hornet.

There is nothing about the J-11B (or any other modern fighter in China's inventory) that makes it incapable of escorting H-6Ks, which makes "H-6K escort" a suspect reason for importing these expensive fighters IMO.

Being capable doesn't mean it is necessarily suitable. If the Su-35K has a bigger range and kinematic performance than the J-11B, which it almost certainly does, then those are reasonable grounds upon which the PLAAF has purchased them.

PLAN's "near term goals" revolve not just around shipping lanes, but also protection of the fleet, and especially submarines. But in either case, who do you suppose they would be meeting up against, if not the US and its CBG's?

In this connection, a couple of months ago a video (in one of the Navy threads, with English subtitles) clearly stated that unlike many other navies, the PLAN primarily trains to fight and win a naval battle, not to battle "terrorism" or for "humanitarian" assistance.

Aside from the Falklands conflict, which wouldn't even be a good example, have there been any carrier vs carrier battles following WWII? Given the disparity between the projected PLAN CV groups and those of the current US Navy, I would be very surprised if the PLAN brass thinks that their carriers would be of any use against their American counterparts.

 

[latenlazy]

The assets you refer to (the DDGs, FFGs, etc.) emulate the CBG force structure of the USN because they're necessary for the protection of any naval vessel the caliber & importance of an aircraft carrier, not because the PLAN designed it in a way that purposely imitates an American CBG. That would be akin to claiming that the J-20 has all of its necessary bells & whistles because the PLAAF wants to emulate the F-22. This does not necessarily mean that the airwing composition, which reflects overall PLAN doctrine and long-term goals for its CVs, will be reflective of that of an USN carrier. In a way, the PLAN has already deviated from this path by settling with a heavyweight mainstay fighter (J-15) instead of a medium-weight platform like the Super Hornet.



Being capable doesn't mean it is necessarily suitable. If the Su-35K has a bigger range and kinematic performance than the J-11B, which it almost certainly does, then those are reasonable grounds upon which the PLAAF has purchased them.



Aside from the Falklands conflict, which wouldn't even be a good example, have there been any carrier vs carrier battles following WWII? Given the disparity between the projected PLAN CV groups and those of the current US Navy, I would be very surprised if the PLAN brass thinks that their carriers would be of any use against their American counterparts.

Carrier vs carrier battles will happen not because the mission of one carrier will be to sink another carrier, but because in order to sink or disable an aircraft carrier a battle group would first need to hinder, erode, or destroy the other group’s complement of missile and air defence ships, and both conducting and defending against aerial strikes are essential to achieving that objective. Carriers don’t operate alone. Defeating a carrier also means defeating its support assets.

 

[SinoSoldier]

Carrier vs carrier battles will happen not because the mission of one carrier will be to sink another carrier, but because in order to sink or disable an aircraft carrier a battle group would first need to hinder, erode, or destroy the other group’s complement of missile and air defence ships, and both conducting and defending against aerial strikes are essential to achieving that objective. Carriers don’t operate alone. Defeating a carrier also means defeating its support assets.

The mission of an aircraft carrier is to project airpower in regions where a country does not have permanent or viable aviation-supporting facilities. Granted, that may include the neutralization of an enemy carrier, but the utility of having that luxury extends far beyond that. Your premise is that a CBG's priority is to eliminate other enemy CBGs, but there are ways to achieve naval objectives without having to engage an opponent's carriers head-on, and if such an engagement is needed, it is not written in anyone's constitution that carrier groups are the way to do it.

 

[latenlazy]

The mission of an aircraft carrier is to project airpower in regions where a country does not have permanent or viable aviation-supporting facilities. Granted, that may include the neutralization of an enemy carrier, but the utility of having that luxury extends far beyond that. Your premise is that a CBG's priority is to eliminate other enemy CBGs, but there are ways to achieve naval objectives without having to engage an opponent's carriers head-on, and if such an engagement is needed, it is not written in anyone's constitution that carrier groups are the way to do it.

The primary mission of an aircraft carrier is to project air power in any situation where it’s either beneficial to or necessary for naval operations and missions. An aircraft carrier is functionally speaking a mobile floating air base. There are more uses for mobile floating air bases than just projecting power into distant geographies.

 

[kwaigonegin]

These days carriers IMHO are far more useful against non peered rivals. WWII was diffent because the naval technology back then precluded the use of many things which modern navies today have access to.

 

[latenlazy]

These days carriers IMHO are far more useful against non peered rivals. WWII was diffent because the naval technology back then precluded the use of many things which modern navies today have access to.

I would caution against using the precedent set after WWII as a reliable reference point. For most of the period between WWII and today the countries that had robust and sizable carrier ops were all on one side, and the one power that had both the pressing need to develop counters and resources to something about it only had to worry about how to counter carriers in the near seas as opposed to the far seas. This reference point also ignores the effect the development of sophisticated naval air and missile defense systems, and now also stealth aircraft and UCAVs, will have on naval tactics and strategies. The world and circumstances in which China has had to develop anti carrier group tactics and strategies is, for the most part, very different from what the Soviets had to contend with (at least for most of the Cold War, as I’ll get into a bit later). I’d argue that the way we’ve seen carriers used to effect the last half century has been more circumstantial than fundamental.

Think about this operationally and tactically. Let’s say you try to attack a carrier battle group with a group composed of cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and frigates, with the primary objective being to erode the battle group’s air and missile defenses enough to deliver a hard kill on the carrier with an ASBM. How are you going to be able to effectively defend against the carrier groups aerial strike capabilities as you’re trying to wear down its defenses enough to deliver your hard kill without your own airwing to neutralize close air threats? Lest we forget, an aircraft carrier’s air complement isn’t just for attacking land targets, but also ships. There’s a reason why when the Soviet Navy finally started to integrate carrier ops into their doctrine in the 80s their initial primary focus was to develop their carriers for CAP missions. This was not a coincidence.