Yeah , now you guys are also coming out with excuses for China's performance just like the
@kwaigonegin has been doing. You are doing the same thing you guys have been criticising him for doing. lol
Thing is China's objective was to prevent Vietnam from invading and occupying Cambodia and removing Polpots regime who was one of China's strongest allies back then. However, China failed to save polpots regime and failed to stop Vietnam from occupying Cambodia and installing a Vietnamese puppet government. Lol China had to pull out as well after severe losses and not being able to make Vietnam pull out from Cambodia or come to Cambodia's aid. So many will also argue China lossed, some will say it was even more critical for China was fighting a medium neighboring country just a step away from its land border while the US was fighting far way from its homeland in a foriegn continent far away from her territory.
As I said before, it depends on what we also define as loss. Lol
Some will argue both the US/France and China all lost in Vietnam. Others will argue they didn't really lost militarily per se but politically, others will say it was a complete loss where rhey couldn't sustain the war etc etc. All depends on the target audience and where the bias lies in I guess.
We can acknowledge that the Chinese Army suffered more losses than the Vietnamese.
But at the same time, the Chinese goal was not a long war.
If China's goal was to conquer Vietnam and China was stuck there for years, then yes, China would undoubtedly be the "loser".
But by making it a short war, they could declare victory.
This is unlike the examples of the USA stuck in Afghanistan and Vietnam for years. Or the Russians stuck in Afghanistan. Or indeed, the Vietnamese Army stuck in Cambodia for a decade.
Sources below.
asiatimes.com/2023/03/the-us-cannot-afford-to-repeat-the-mistakes-of-1979
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The Sino-Soviet split and deepening relations between Moscow and Hanoi throughout the 1970s worried the Chinese leader. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 only confirmed his fears that China was being “encircled” by hostile powers and needed to “punish” the Vietnamese in a preventive war.
Deng demonstrated his political acumen by visiting the United States to secure indirect support for his war against Vietnam. In his January 1979 meeting with Carter, Deng emphasized that China had to teach Vietnam a “lesson” for invading Cambodia, aligning with the Soviets, and endangering China.
To link Beijing’s and Washington’s security interests, Deng argued that “the Soviet Union will make use of Vietnam to harass China.… Our general view is that we must disrupt Soviet strategic dispositions.… We need your moral support in the international field.”
Despite this admission, Carter still proved conciliatory toward Deng’s concerns, replying, “I understand you cannot allow Vietnam to pursue aggression with impunity.”
Carter’s response signaled to Deng that their mutual suspicion of the Soviet Union and Vietnam meant that he could launch a brief, limited war against Hanoi without losing the US as a partner. By winning the diplomatic front with Washington, Beijing could focus exclusively on the Indochina war without fearing an American response.
Two weeks later, 300,000 Chinese troops and 400 tanks invaded Vietnam. The Carter administration pushed Deng’s national-security aims for a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia in the United Nations while halfheartedly condemning the Chinese invasion.
Showing its support, the US opened an embassy in the PRC while the Sino-Vietnam War raged on, demonstrating that the Carter administration did not view the conflict as a threat to the status quo or American hegemony.
And just two days after hostilities broke out, Carter’s cabinet considered a “security relationship” with China if the Soviet Union got involved and prioritized its “bilateral relations” with Beijing over any strong condemnation for the blatant act of aggression.
After all, the Vietnam War was still fresh in the administration’s mind and China’s invasion would disrupt Soviet power in Southeast Asia. And since the war was confined to a regional border conflict, Carter “acquiesced” to the view of China as a non-threat to the international order.
Deng came out of the 1979 war the clear winner. He successfully “punished” Vietnam, headed off a Soviet encirclement, and made a new economic and strategic partner in the United States. The US-China partnership gave Beijing the opportunity to focus on economic modernization with the support of a superpower as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
By positioning himself as an ally willing to cooperate with Washington against the USSR, Deng secured his eastern flank to fight a peripheral war against Vietnam.
As the Chinese leader later admitted, “If we look back, we find that all of those [Third World countries] that were on the side of the United States have been successful [in their modernization drive], whereas all of those that were against the United States have not been successful. We shall be on the side of the United States.”
...
Deng Xiaoping purposefully made his war with Vietnam a limited one that would not spiral into a global conflagration, reassuring Carter that “the lesson will be limited to a short period of time. Thus the problem of a chain reaction is mainly the question of the North.… It is not conceivable for the Soviets not to react at all. But we do not expect a large reaction.”
Source
