Responding to this because of #1484
This basic scenario already happened three times before, and at a time when the difference in capabilities was much less or even non-existent. Israel won, partially because of the inherent advantages of defense, partially because of a huge difference in the level of motivation, and partially because of extreme incompetence and disorganization among its enemies. There is no reason to think any of these have fundamentally changed, while the capability differential has grown enormously.
IDF is the single most mythologised military formation and popular understanding of history of Arab-Israeli wars is based on manipulations, fabrications and outright lies.
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1948 war was decided by mobilisation potential and force organisation.
Israel began in May 1948 with ~30k and finished in March 1949 with ~100k.
Arab coalition began with ~26k and finished with ~60k of which:
- Egypt - 20k
- Transjordan - 10k
- Iraq - 15k
- Syria - 5k
- Lebanon - 0,5k
- Arab Liberation Army (from Lebanon) - 6k
- Saudi Arabia, Yemen - 2k
Neither side had proper armour. Egypt deployed one battalion of light (Mark VI) and medium (Matilda) tanks and 24 guns (87,6mm and 57mm). By the end of the war Egypt had 135 tanks and 90 guns. Jordanian forces were of best quality thanks to British training and command and they only had armoured cars and ~40 guns.
Neither side had also proper air force. For example Egypt had 30 Spitfires at the beginning of the war.
Organisation of the Arab coalition was non-existent. While nominally fighting on one side and against common enemy every country fought for its own goals and the war plan represents individual goals rather than coalition goals.
Note how Arab forces have almost no concentration and attack along the entire front which makes defending easier because not only significant portion of Israeli defenses are in difficult terrain but they also retain force concentration and shorter logistical routes. Also all the Arabs who left their homes in Israeli territory only made the defense easier
So while the result of the 1948 war was a surprise to the public it shouldn't be:
- Israel started with a parity of force and ended up with twice the enemy force.
- Israel fought in defense of territory and any gains that Israel made were the result of counter-offensives into weak enemy positions.
- The textbook force proportion for offensive success is local minimum of 2,5-3:1
Arabs should have either concentrated their force or mobilised 200-250k to have reliable chance of success.
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1967 war was decided by Israeli surprise attack on 5 June.
Israel attacked pre-emptively due to their relative weakness:
- Israel - 260k total force with 100k deployed, 800 tanks and 300 aircraft
- Arabs - 550k total force, 2500 tanks and 900 aircraft
Successful neutralisation of Egyptian air force during the first hours of the attack put IDF in full control of the skies. Because of that Israel was able to dictate the terms of engagement.
During the first two days they focused on Sinai front, where Egypt had no prepared defenses and West Bank. After initial losses Egyptian command ordered a poorly-advised general retreat which was completely disorganised and was responsible for the majority of Arab losses in the conflict. Without air cover Jordan wasn't able to properly supply its forces in the West Bank and withdrew across river Jordan.
Map:
Compare upper bound of losses:
| KIA | POW |
Israel | 900 | 15 |
Egypt | 15000 | 5000 |
Jordan | 700 | 500 |
Syria | 2500 | 600 |
Syria planned for only small scale offensives at the north-eastern tip of Israeli territory and was surprised by Israeli attack into Golan heights during the sixth day, which was supported by full strength of Israeli air force.
Once Egypt withdrew behind Suez Canal, Jordan withdrew behind Jordan and IDF captured Golan Heights Israel had no ability to pursue further offensive operations on the ground.
Again the general public was surprised by the outcome but they shouldn't be because the most meaningful territorial gain was in West Bank during 2nd and 3rd days while Sinai was vacated by Egypt to avoid Israeli air force attacks. It was less of a Israeli victory as it was poorly planned Arab retreat.
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1973 war was the only one decided by skill and experience of IDF
- Israel had 400k total force, 1700 tanks and 400 aircraft.
- Arabs had 1000k total force with 350-450k deployed, 3500 tanks and over 400 aircraft.
Again however Israel was defending in prepared positions - there was so called "War of Attrition" between 1967 and 1973 - and retained control of their own airspace. Arab forces did not have the necessary advantage in quantity and IDF maintained advantage in organisation and force quality.
Jordan did not participate making defending Golan Heights significantly easier. Egypt was attacking across Suez which meant exposed logistical lines for all forces crossing the canal.
The war ended after three weeks in tactical stalemate which was resolved diplomatically with Israeli gradual withdrawal from Sinai.
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This is a table I made that lists generations of soldiers, officers and generals serving in the IDF which should explain how institutional knowledge and culture is preserved and transmitted. I put in bold the generation which fought in first intifada for reference.
conflict | start date | recruit date of birth
(18 y.o.) | officer date of birth
(36 y.o.) | general staff member date of birth (54 y.o.) |
independence | 1948 | 1930 | 1912 | 1894 |
six day | 1967 | 1949 | 1931 | 1913 |
Yom Kippur | 1973 | 1955 | 1937 | 1919 |
first Lebanon | 1982 | 1964 | 1946 | 1928 |
first intifada | 1987 | 1969 | 1951 | 1934 |
second intifada | 2000 | 1982 | 1964 | 1946 |
second Lebanon | 2006 | 1988 | 1970 | 1952 |
Protective Edge (Gaza) | 2014 | 1996 | 1978 | 1960 |
Swords of Iron (Gaza) | 2023 | 2005 | 1987 | 1969 |
Yom Kippur war was IDF's peak of capabilities with generals having experience from 1948-1967, officers from 1967 and recruits coming from a well structured military system.
Currently IDF is in its entirety staffed by personnel that has no experience in full scale peer or near-peer conflict. The generals of general staff were recruits during the first intifada.
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Israel's security is consequence of economic weakness of the main, traditional opponent - Egypt - which is further exacerbated by growing population and worsening environmental conditions. Israel also is dependent on economic support but it is possible to make it somewhat sustainable due to small population of only 9,5m compared to 100m in Egypt. Israel has also managed to transform its economy into high-tech industrial (26%) and service (71%) sectors which makes supporting it easier.
Other than Nasser's political ambitions under Pan-Arabism there was no strategic purpose in capturing Israel. For Egypt Israel with current borders is more convenient than inconvenient, because it bottles up instability to the north and east. The most potent motivation for capture of Israel is a religious one which threatens Egypt because religious war in Palestine empowers Islamic radicals in Egypt.
Jordan was in no position to fight already in 1970s and Syria is thoroughly devastated after a decade of war.
Air/missile war isn't going to impact Israel long-term. Only ground warfare can change situation.
The only scenario where Israel is directly threatened on the ground is if simultaneously:
- Iran and proxies take over Syrian and Lebanese fronts and begin offensive operations and
- Egypt abandons neutrality to secure its own interests in Gaza and
- West Bank commits to an uprising
However there are also no meaningful gains for any country other than Palestine to be made by capturing Israeli territory so the war isn't worth the cost for both Lebanon or Syria.
The reality is that Israel was a problem for decolonisation and Pan-Arabism. Once those were resolved by 1970s it's not a problem anymore, except for those pesky Palestinans that were inconvenient then, and are nothing but a problem now. Syria needed an external enemy to prop-up Assad regime, otherwise they'd too normalise even at loss of Golan. Even Iran doesn't care about Israel as anything else than a convenient geopolitical tool.
In 2023 this conflict really is irrational in nature because it's little else than a venue for psychological warfare. There's nothing meaningful to be gained other than shifts in emotional states of large amounts of idiots on this side or the other. Even the Palestinians would be better off accepting the bad offer in 2000, then exercising revanchisme 3-4 decades later.
It's stupid. All of it.