The political and logistical possibilities for Russia to support Syria are very much better than for Serbia and Libya. Also the Russian military have improved markedly since 2008.I always said Putin will never allow Assad to fall and it's coming true
Soviet Union did not forget that Assads father gave USSR place on Mediterranean during Cold War that was Latakia, Hafeez also had good long standing ties with Russian and since Putin is ex-KGB he knows the game well
Putin does as he wishes but with Assad he will stand by him no matter what even if it's means Russians soldiers dying he will pay it for Assad
Saddam, Gaddafi and even the Serbs did not enjoy the type of support, but Syrian is a all together a different game
Putin thinks if Assad falls somewhere that is a Russia loss !? Why I don't know but that's just the way it is and Putin will not allow Russia to loose
Russia just demonstrated to the world that it can infront of everyone launch and target locations from the sea using cruise missiles, that is a hell of a statement
though i agree with your analysis as an overview of past-practice, there is a recent report which details that contemporary Syrian coalition tactics, both regular and militia are, in fact, responsive to rebel tactics and contemporary circumstances. they describe their slow-going tactics as reconnaissance-by-battle, and the logic thereof is impeccable, as the progress is slow but significantly less costly. i'll find and post the link.SAA (regular Syrian army) has relatively lots of heavy equipment, but never had the skill to use it properly. That is something that haunts them from Israeli-Arab conflicts in previous century . They also lack infantry . Sunnis are majority of Syrian population, and for obvious reason SAA does not trust them . Even if they are conscripted in the army, they need constant monitoring and are generally unmotivated to fight properly (especially in offensive). Assad prefers to use militias like NDF and Hezbollah as infantry force, but obviously they are not well coordinated with SAA to use combined arms tactics against rebels .
Therefore, instead of large mechanized thrusts covered with artillery and airstrikes to break front lines and encircle enemy , we only witness small scale actions with disjointed parts of Assad's forces . Russian air supports helps them in some situations to achieve certain success, but overall progress is slow and costly . Of course, at least they are not in defensive position anymore , and rebels certainly suffered heavier casualties (mostly from Russian bombs) in past month.
fromSyria is no Blitzkrieg
Original by Dmitriy Steshin and Aleksandr Kots published by
; translated from Russian by J.Hawk
[...] The militants came to Kharasta three years ago. They at once cut the main road connecting Damascus and Homs. There was one other bypass route. Narrow and inconvenient. It would seem that the militants considered Kharasta to be a jumping-off point from which one could cut off the last communications artery uniting the country’s north and south.
Their tactics are simple and proven, says the operation’s commanding general Salman Eisa. As soon as they occupy territory they immediately fortify and dig themselves in, build tunnels and earthen bunkers. But here there’s one additional twist. One of the Syrian Army HQs was located here, it is deep underground and is heavily fortified. When we start pounding them with artillery and aircraft, they simply hide in the bunker. Then we form small detachments and gradually retake the territory, squeezing out the militants. As you can see, in the last month we’ve liberated considerable territory.
We are sitting in a destroyed multi-story building from which one can view the battlefield. A DShK 12.7mm machine-gun is firing from the adjacent room filling the floor with fumes. The gunner is correcting his aim, and in a few minutes an extremist bunker catches fire. It’s ammunition storage–red tracers are exploding and dancing above the parapet. The machine-gunner is not in a hurry. It seems that nobody here is in a hurry.
To the left of us, a tank occupies firing position, hiding behind an unfinished garage, and fires at a target one kilometer away. Two MiGs come one after another and drop bombs on the Peugeot and Mercedes workshops–the militants have been dug in there as well for the last month and a half. It’s a mystical coincidence. In Donetsk, one of the strongpoints of resistance was also a car workshop, this time belonging to a Swedish automaker. Small assault groups are moving forward in order to take up new positions. We run after them on the huge parking lot with hundreds of burned cars and find ourselves behind a former ceramics factory which was only just taken by Syrian troops. About 50-300 meters separate us from the enemy. Soldiers are fiercely firing through slits. Soldiers are preparing homemade supercaliber mortar bombs which are launched from ordinary 120mm mortars. The bombs are huge, they are made from old gas cylinders, and they fly so slowly one can observe them with naked eye. Very inaccurate, but the blast is so powerful that it terrorizes everyone around. Through the roof windows we see a monstrous shell unhurriedly sail over us, the explosion is such that it rocks the walls. Artillery immediately joins in and the militants again hide themselves underground. There is time to evacuate the wounded and drink tea. The tea is a must here.
The majority of our readers, thank God, see the war on TV and in the internet. Or in the movies where epic multi-month battles take no more than two hours of screen time. Their questions are understandable and logical: “Why is it going so slowly?”, “Why didn’t Russia’s help transform the situation?”, “Where are the tank wedges, carpet bombings, breakthroughs to the depth of 100km with the outflanking of demoralized enemy forces?”. Where? In reality everything is more complicated. Deep breakthroughs can be cut off at the root and victorious offensives quickly become humiliating cauldrons. Once again, remember the Donbass. The enemy is still not demoralized, like the Germans were in early 1943 at Stalingrad. The enemy is confused, bloodied, but he his fighting for every trench, for every bunker, for every rathole.
The fighting’s trends are not favoring the militants, we’ve seen that with our own eyes. The Syrian Army is implacably liberating captured territories. Kilometer after kilometer, hundred meters after hundred meters. It’s advancing like a steamroller. The Syrian Army has been terribly bled in the five years of war. Bled by unsuccessful operations, poorly prepared assaults. [The army’s core has been severely roughed up, manpower reserves are close to exhaustion, and the Chinese “human wave” tactic is simply not appropriate here. They’ve decided to advance carefully, with the understanding that the militants have spent years building their defenses on key sectors of the front! We’ve seen how the Syrian Army fights for ourselves at Kharasta. It’s advancing carefully, which means it spends at least a week on identifying and suppressing firing positions. First visually, then by inviting return fire. Then they move up the assault teams. That’s what we call “reconnaissance by battle”–depending on the situation, they may fortify themselves on their new positions.] Or they may retreat. The groups identify concealed firing positions, reserve positions, but they take losses. Which are naturally much lower than they would have been in an unprepared, head-on assault. And this process is repeated dozens of times, for weeks. Meter after meter. Considering that the militants’ manpower reserves are also not endless and their logistics have been interrupted by the Russian aviation, this tactic will sooner or later bring about a strategic success. Although there already are tactical successes–the army is moving forward, and its losses are minimal.
One of the things that I feel have been lost in discussions here and pretty much all over including national policy makers is the fact that Russia needs a place to hedge and fight proxy wars.
Syria as outlined by many here is it. Unlike other regional hegemons, Russia's rise in the last few years has afforded it the ability to conduct such operations.
While it's military capabilities and influence is a far cry from the 80's, the current batch of leaders including comrade Putin himself is a product of Cold War mentality. Syria under Assad and it's geographical proximity to Russia is a 'must hold' territory under Russia's strategic initiatives.
I believe they will do everything in their power to maintain status quo and unless NATO/US is willing to go to war with Russia directly, it would be extremely difficult to wrestle Syria from Russian influence.
There are a lot more forces at play here than just Islamic militants. They are mere pawns in a global powerplay.
I don't think the Obama policy towards Syria has anything to do with attempting to diminish Russian influence. It is simply a policy that is ill conceived based on "regime change" and then backed by even less commitment in making it happen. It is simply a narrative with no backbone behind it. it is coming to a head now because there is more resolve with the Russians in policy execution. The US policy on Syria will simply fade into the background as long as Obama is in the WH and the Russians will dominate the agenda and continue to maintain the initiative.
I think for the greater good of Syria and the refugees, the US should work with the Russians on the ISIL threat and not hold on to the "Assad must go line". As Sec. Gates recently commented to that effect (my words), get real or get out of the way.
I am not sure I would phrase or couch it that way.Keep in mind, to US policy makers the mujaheedeens were once considered moderates.
And it shows. So this has given space for Russia to come in and help the local forces do it instead. As such, Putin is representing his own interests ably while the US has, willfully...stepped to the side.