Is the PLA vulnerable to pre-emptive strike now and in the near future?

Interesting analysis. And I definitely agree some of what a couple of you say. I have some of my own opinions. And I ask others to keep the discussion from being turned into a futile flame fest. There's absolutely no need for that. If any of my remarks are illegal by Sinodefenceforum standards, I ask any moderator to delete them, and send me a message telling me which ones so it won't be repeated.

I can't see any scenario where the USA would launch pre-emptive strikes out of the blue, unless they felt that it was a life or death situation. That would be a totally extreme scenario for sure. If mobilizing for conventional pre-emptive attacks, I totally agree with your assessment that such a mobilization of U.S. assets could not be moved without it being noticed. China would easily see that coming and be prepared for it. I have tried in the past to explain this same thing regarding any potential Chinese first moves. Including a Taiwan invasion. China could not mobilize forces for a Taiwan invasion without notice. In this case, the USA just couldn't put the resources in place without PLA leaders saying "why are you massing your weapons?". In regards to a nuclear first strike though, U.S. SSBN's can launch without any warning. And time of flight to impact can be less than 6 minutes depending on where they launched from. That's the nature of SSBN's. And the way US SSBN's are currently deployed, there are approx. 840 (475 Kt.) warheads available in the Pacific at this time. That's enough to be totally devastating even to a country the size of China. And even Atlantic assets are within reach, but the problem is those Atlantic based missiles would have to overfly or come near Russia depending on where they were patrolling. Not a very good idea. So yes, PLA is currently vulnerable, And will continue to be so as long as the USA has these SSBN assets. But the U.S. is vulnerable to a counter-attack to a certain degree. Right now those variables are, how many missiles China could put in the air, and how many the USA could knock down (if any) or destroy prior to launch.
China is currently unable to launch a sizable long-range attack. And the USA is working on the ABM system, and so far tests have shown good results. But it's still inconclusive how an ABM would work in the field. But regardless, I still believe China most likely would be able to do some damage in return. To the US mainland? I don't know. Maybe. Maybe not. To East Asian allies. Yes, definitely. And this assumes the US did not find all Chinese launchers prior to attack and did not totally eliminate their C & C in control of those launchers.

I've mentioned this before, and I'll mention it again. The USA's goal would not be to destroy the innocent population of China as a primary goal. The goal would be the elimination of leadership, military, industrial, and any other target of strategic value. The goal is to leave China leaderless, without a way to communicate, without a military, and without a means to recover or secure resources for future recovery (loss of industrial capacity and military). And that is doable with the number of Pacific fleet SSBN's currently. Before they shifted these assets to the Pacific 3 years ago, I would have had my doubts too. It is a shame that China puts alot of strategic targets into population centers. About using everything in the arsenal. I doubt the USA would need to even tap into many of the 500 Minuteman III's, I'm sure most of those would be needed to stave off a Russian attack. Russia would never fire anything on the USA if even 100 Minuteman missiles are left and 2 or 3 SSBN's are still readily available for use. I certainly hope none of you think russiaa's going to come to China's rescue. Nope, they have nothing to gain except destroyed cities themselves. I've done a count of Chinese cities, naval bases and airbases of known strategic value. There are 436 cities, 142 airbase, and 32 major naval bases and shipyards. That's a total of 610 targets. That would leave 230 remaining warheads to totally destroy remaining leadership, food supplies, the three gorges dam, fuel supplies, and comm/transportation infrastructure. And still there are 500 remaining Minuteman III's. China has no way to do the same to the USA.

Sure, China could strike back to a degree. While DF-31A's are not in service, nor is JL-2, initial DF-31's are primed to do some mutual damage. How much is hard to gauge as there aren't a whole lot of them. I'm not convinced DF-5A's are going to be a factor. But again, I'll concede, that's an unknown. But I have my doubts for a reason.

And while destroying a few U.S. cities would be painful, the USA could still absorb it, and the USA would still have its military and infrastructure largely intact. But yes, the financial costs would leave the U.S. economy in deep water. The USA could recover, but it would be painful. So yeah, I'm hoping it never comes to this also. New Orleans was totally destroyed by a hurricane, and it's hardly a ripple in the economy.

And please don't flame me, but I believe China could not survive at all in this war scenario due to the fact that the USA could put over 1,000 warheads on target in any initial strike. And still have secondary and tertiary strikes available. China also has no way to totally eliminate the US military like the USA could do to the Chinese military. Having a military would be key to recovery. Maybe the addition of DF-31A's will change this if PLA adds enough, and US ABM isn't reliable. Those are future considerations though as neither U.S. ABM nor DF-31A's are in service yet. But still, you can note that the DF-31's that are in service right now are capable of hitting targets in CONUS. So yeah, it's feasible that U.S. will see losses in any normal exchange. The US launching surprise first strikes, maybe not. On the same note, the U.S. does have a limited unknown number of interceptors. But alot of unpredictable variables we see here.

So you're right. There is so much unpredictability in it, I don't think either side would ever want to resort to it. Let's at least hope it never does.

@USAalltheway - Hi USAalltheway. I do have to say that you talk/write/think like no DoD personnel I've ever dealt with. I worked on inter-operability issues in the military, and one of the groups I reported directly to was an office in DoD. These people were civilian analysts, and most were PhD level. These people could write volumes dealing with strategic issues. I can't imagine any of those people I dealt with coming into an Internet forum to discuss military issues like this. What office in DoD did you supposedly work for? Were you civil service or military? I'm not sure I buy your story.

@Roger604 China has no stealth aircraft. Neither does Russia. And the anti-stealth capabilities inherent in S-400 are merely speculations. Neither of them have ever had to face B-2's and F-22's in combat.

Dear Sirs:

The chief unknown about Chinese strategic nuclear retaliatory capability is the number of operational missiles deployed of the CZ class and the number of nuclear warheads the Chinese made. The best open source of information about Chinese rocketry is Mark Wade's excellent Encylcopaedia Astronautica. For information with regards to China's nuclear infrastructure there is the Federation of American Scientists website and the High Energy Weapons Archive.

We know that in October of 1964 the Chinese tested their first fission weapon. We also know that they tested their first full-scale multistage fusion weapon in 1967 - it was air dropped by an H-6 bomber and therefore can be considered a deployable weapon - the yield was 3.3 - 3.5 megatons.

We also know that China launched her first satellite in April of 1970. It was on a CZ-1 launcher (two-stage liquid propellant design, using storable propellants unsymmetrical di-methyl hydrazine fuel and di-nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer). The satellite was the heaviest 1st with some 350 to 400 kilograms in mass.

To the present China still uses the basic core vehicle to conduct all their space launches - the CZx series. China has made over 85 launches with this vehicle. In the process of developement the CZ (Long March) series has become one of the most reliable and capable launchers in the world.

This brings several questions to mind:

1) if you had previously made a huge investment in a nuclear materials and weapons industry over 40 years ago would you just shut it down and let it rust? Or would you continue to at least keep it running (and perhaps when your economy developed further) modestly expand it and modernize it?

All the while you would be accumulating nuclear weapons material of course. You need not neccesarily assemble the material into weapons immediately, merely stockpile it - just in case.

2) having developed an ICBM and later turned it into a satellite launcher would you be able to incorporate all of the improvements made in the continuous developement of what is the same basic missile into a better military one as well? What would keep you from doing so?

3) That knowing in the history of missile deployment, that the original ballistic missile (the German V-2) was intended to be launched from a road or rail deployable system (the Meillerwagen) not one of which was ever successfully attacked, whereas the other system (designed by Hitler) of launching from a bunker (similar to a silo system) was constantly attacked from the air, you would make the decision to silo deploy your missiles? And knowing that this would also help your enemies count the missiles?

My point? Just because you didn't see them or you can't count them doesn't mean they don't exist. A prudent man looks at capabilities. How much would it really cost China to make a lot of Long March rockets? I submit it will be a hell of a lot cheaper (as is typical of almost everything the Chinese make) than anybody else's. Similarly with respect to nuclear materials China has had the factories for them for more than 40 years!

Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger argued that the key point in having nuclear weapons was to ensure that your enemies were convinced that you could destroy him (and that you would destroy him) even if you were destroyed yourself - a situation referred to as mutual assured destruction (MAD). Because of this he would have no incentive to attack and neither would you and because of this deterrence - a uneasy form of peace would exist.

Because we know the Chinese capabilities and do not know their exact arsenal, we are unsure - hence we are deterred from attacking. Which was the whole point of having the arsenal in the first place.

Best Regards,

Dusky Lim

duskylim said:

My point? Just because you didn't see them or you can't count them doesn't mean they don't exist. A prudent man looks at capabilities. How much would it really cost China to make a lot of Long March rockets? I submit it will be a hell of a lot cheaper (as is typical of almost everything the Chinese make) than anybody else's. Similarly with respect to nuclear materials China has had the factories for them for more than 40 years!

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With all due respect. Of course this logic means that Japan or Taiwan could also have nuclear weapons. Japan might have over 1000 weapons ready to use. Japan has alot of nuclear fuel. And they know how to build rockets and guidance systems. Just because you can't see the warheads and missiles, doesn't mean they don't exist. Maybe Taiwan has 20-25 bombs? We do know they had a program to do this at one point. Perhaps India's nuclear weapons capability is greater than we know. And perhaps the USA's ABM system really has over 5,000 interceptors in place. Ready to intercept a couple of thousand missiles if need be. Just because you can't see it, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. We do know the USA has been putting forth alot of effort to this end. And Interceptor missiles are much cheaper than any ICBM. So if you use that line of reasoning, it goes both ways.

MAD only works if both sides know that the other side has N weapons. While i do belive both Japan and Taiwan have at least some kind of programme that'd enable them to develop/acquire N weapons on a fairly short notice - and perhaps even have a small stockpile - those nuclear arsenals are clearly not large enough yet / efficent enough yet, otherwise they'd be made public. Perhaps not officially, but at least unofficially, like with Isreal. But so far there's been zero information about them, which makes them useless as a deterrance. (though retaining retaliation value)

With china being secretive...well, wrong word, being closed up about its internal military affairs, we really can only guess the scope of its N arsenal. As analysts do and that how we get wildy different analysis. All that being said, it would appear that china's arsenal is still lacking, both in total numbers but more importantly in numbers of quality delivery systems, able to survive a preemptive strike. With new gen sub and mobile platforms that is going to improve but it might take a decade to make a significant difference.

Sea Dog said:

With all due respect. Of course this logic means that Japan or Taiwan could also have nuclear weapons. Japan might have over 1000 weapons ready to use. Japan has alot of nuclear fuel. And they know how to build rockets and guidance systems. Just because you can't see the warheads and missiles, doesn't mean they don't exist. Maybe Taiwan has 20-25 bombs? We do know they had a program to do this at one point. Perhaps India's nuclear weapons capability is greater than we know. And perhaps the USA's ABM system really has over 5,000 interceptors in place. Ready to intercept a couple of thousand missiles if need be. Just because you can't see it, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. We do know the USA has been putting forth alot of effort to this end. And Interceptor missiles are much cheaper than any ICBM. So if you use that line of reasoning, it goes both ways.

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Your example are flawed.

Japan has great technology. But we haven't seen any warhead tests. We haven't seen any rocket system that is particularly adapted to military use, rather than civilian use. (They do have a lot of nuclear fuel.) Chances are they can build a workable nuclear deterrent in a fairly short period of time, but it's not a guarantee since civilian rocket systems are not perfectly suitable for military purposes.

We don't even know if Taiwan has sufficient know-how to build nuclear warheads. I think Taiwan has some low-end ballistic missile capability though.

We know where India stands because they tested nuclear warheads, but haven't perfected the Agni-III (though I'm sure they'll get it eventually).

We know where USA stands in terms of ABM. It's still a technology in its infancy. Many physicists say it's theoretically all but impossible.

But China is totally different

China has the W88 warhead. China has tested the DF-31A and JL-2. Even the Pentagon says the DF-31A will be deployed by 2007, and the JL-2 could be deployed as early as 2007. Chinese sources say the DF-31A entered service as of beginning of 2006, and Type 094 entered service as of middle of 2006. Even the Pentagon could not think they can find dispersed, mobile launchers.

How many missiles need to survive to launch a second strike? Look at how urbanized USA is. (Edited to add: population density map of the USA)



Even 5 missiles, each with 2.5-3 megaton yield, targeting the five biggest US cities would be unacceptable to the United States. The US would instantly become a second-tier power at best.... sort of like Australia.

If 100-150 missiles are launched, it would pretty much destroy any population center that can be classified as a "city." Probably only 20-30 million Americans would survive (after a year of radiation), and they would be mostly American Indians and Amish people.

Just to add to Sea Dog's scenario-

I would assume that in the minutes after missles from SSBNs and silos in the US hit China bombers would deliver the second wave. The US could move B-2s, B-1s and even B-52s to Guam and Kadena in relative secrecy. I doubt that it would put China on alert, especially if they were moved months before the attack. Anyway, it would be easy for the US to time its strike so that the bombers would already be inflight before the missles had even hit their targets. The Chinese air defence system, or what was left of it, would not have time to recover. Of course the USAF would suffer losses but when you look at the overall picture (China is hit with a massive nuclear strike, a few minutes after the impacts bombers fire nuclear cruise missles at their targets and turn around, possibly with F-22 cover for many of them) the picture does not look good for China.

There would obviously be PLAAF pilots and planes, SAM operators and batteries and radar operators and arrays that survived, but I doubt that if you used a one two punch strategy like that, with the second strike coming on the heels of the first strike, that China would be able to defend itself effectively. It still could fire back though, but I think that any DF-31s out there would have very short amount of time to fire in that scenario, from the time the Chinese radars detected the Ohios firing to the time that the second wave fired their conventional and nuclear cruise missles.

These bombers..... are they going to look for mobile launchers in Xinjiang deserts? How about Tibet mountains? I didn't think so.

That's where the DF-31A's will be. With just 60 missiles (source: Defense News), China can send the US back to the colonial era. Heck, it probably even target rich areas and leave poor areas alone so that the survivers would be the disenfranchised poor, ethnic minorities and so on. And you can imagine what would happen next.

Finn McCool said:

I would assume that in the minutes after missles from SSBNs and silos in the US hit China bombers would deliver the second wave. The US could move B-2s, B-1s and even B-52s to Guam and Kadena in relative secrecy. I doubt that it would put China on alert, especially if they were moved months before the attack. Anyway, it would be easy for the US to time its strike so that the bombers would already be inflight before the missles had even hit their targets. The Chinese air defence system, or what was left of it, would not have time to recover. Of course the USAF would suffer losses but when you look at the overall picture (China is hit with a massive nuclear strike, a few minutes after the impacts bombers fire nuclear cruise missles at their targets and turn around, possibly with F-22 cover for many of them) the picture does not look good for China.

There would obviously be PLAAF pilots and planes, SAM operators and batteries and radar operators and arrays that survived, but I doubt that if you used a one two punch strategy like that, with the second strike coming on the heels of the first strike, that China would be able to defend itself effectively. It still could fire back though, but I think that any DF-31s out there would have very short amount of time to fire in that scenario, from the time the Chinese radars detected the Ohios firing to the time that the second wave fired their conventional and nuclear cruise missles.

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Yeah. Obviously I was speaking from more general terms. But the issues are still the same. Yeah, the USA also has heavy long range bombers, cruise missiles, and other ways to deliver nuclear weapons. But looking at the cities of strategic value, the industries within, military bases (both air, army, and naval), leadership, and infrastructure, US Pacific Fleet SSBN's have enough firepower on their own to totally do this. And as of this time, China has no credible way to do the same to the US in return. Sure the USA could go further, and probably would to assure destruction of the country as functioning nation. But as I've said, the average Chinese peasant or farmer would not be the target of destruction.

China has no heavy bombers with global reach, China has no real LACM capability, and even if they did, they lack the submarines and surface ships (short range with no sea logistics) to deliver them. And DF-31A's, JL-2's, do not exist as operating components. And there's no conclusive proof that Type 094's have even been cut yet. DF-5(A)'s would take too long to prep to be of much use. And they may already be destroyed outright. So right now, China's only mean to hit is DF-31's which we know only have the range to hit the Western CONUS if they target from Northeastern China. I'm hoping that the US would have the targeting info to take them out before they struck. Or if the regional situation was deteriorating, I'm hoping they would work around the clock to keep their positions known. Sure it would be difficult to find them but not impossible. And only SSBN's have the true ability to remain totally hidden. And China only has one with limited characteristics.

So yeah, PLA is totally vulnerable at this time. In the future, there are variables that are still inconclusive. I do believe at some point China will field DF-31A's as a credible asset. But on the same note, the US's ABM system will be fielded. and we don't know how many assets will be in place, nor do we know how reliable that ABM system will be. I'm thinking it will be reliable enough to stop any aggression before it starts.

Dear Sirs:

Roger pretty much answered your questions as to why not speculate whether Japan or Taiwan has nuclear weapons and/or capabilities... neither of the two has ever tested a nuclear weapon nor anything that looks like a functioning ballistic missile.

This is in contrast to China which tested thermonuclear weapons 39 years ago! So they actually have the nuclear weapons.. are you denying this? They tested the predecessor CZ-1 back in 1970 - 36 years ago... every succeeding launch of a Long March rocket (now one of the most reliable launchers ever made) serves to test their basic ballistic missile design.

So there really exists a capability there... all that is required is to mass produce the weapon. Incidentally the old SS-11 (Soviet designation UR-100), the backbone of the Soviet missile force (which is functionally equivalent to the Minuteman) was designed to be storable and used the same propellants - unsymmetrical dymethyl hydrazine and dinitrogen tetroxide.

The SS-11's designer, Vladimir Chelomei, concieved of a family of universal rockets the UR series, of which the UR-100 was the most widely manufactured. Incidentally its true capabilities were only discovered after the fall of the USSR not before - despite its initial deployment in 1966.

The unique feature of the UR-100 (as opposed to the American Titan II, which shared very similar propellants) was that it was truly storable and was designed as a "certified" round - capable of being launched at a moments notice.

The initial specification called for a missile that could be stored in a fully fuelled condition for a minimum of 5 years (later extended to 17 years)!

Here is the write up from Mark Wade's Encyclopaedia Astronautica -

"Intercontinental ballistic missile. Year: 1966. IOC: 1966. Family: UR-100. Country: Russia. Status: Hardware. Other Designations: RS-10. Department of Defence Designation: SS-11 Mod.1. ASCC Reporting Name: Sego. Article Number: 8K84. Manufacturer's Designation: UR-100. Launch System: 15P784. Complex: 8K84. Missile: 15A10.
The UR-100 lightweight ICBM was the Soviet answer to the US Minuteman and was deployed in larger numbers than any other in history. It remained an enigma outside of intelligence circles in the West until after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It allowed the Soviet Union to match, and then surpass the United States in strategic deterrent capability. As such it was Vladimir Chelomei's crowning legacy to his country.

Official go-ahead for development of the 8K84 was on 30 March 1963 (Russian sources say the 8K84 missile put into production was not related to Chelomei's original actual UR-100 design. However this correlation came into general acceptance retroactively). The decree called for a silo-launched missile that could be stored in a fuelled condition for at least five years as a 'certified round', ready to be launched at short notice. Submarine-launched and anti-ballistic missile versions of the missile were also to be designed, but no pad-launched variant was envisioned. Chelomei had already been working on the missile for several years, with tests of the planned radio-guidance system starting in 1962. The 15P784 silo was designed by Spetsmash.

Such was the urgency to overcome the massive US superiority in ICBM's, surveys were already underway to identify suitable sites for missile silos accessible by rail spurs. The teams consisted of geologic and geodesic specialists under the leadership of Yevgeniy Yevtigneyev. Their missions were so secret they used the cover and resources of Uralgaz and the leader could only identify himself as a 'general from Moscow'. The teams travelled by train, truck and horse to reach the potential silo locations. Construction of launch silos at the selected locations all over the Soviet Union began in 1964 even before the missile was tested. This was a huge industrial enterprise, the construction of the 1130 silos for the UR-100 and 308 for the R-36 occupying a peak workforce of 650,000 until 1973. Construction of these silos involved a total cost of one billion roubles and the removal of 120 million cubic metres of earth.

There was an enormous amount of completely new technology to be mastered. This included not just the sealed missile (which had to resist corrosive propellants 20,000 times more aggressive than those used previously for many years), but the integrated transport/storage container and silo ejection technique. Production of the missile itself was conducted at three factories -- the Khrunichev facility in Moscow; Factory 166 (later PO Polyot) in Omsk; and Factory 47 (later PO Strela) in Orenburg.

One prototype command point and ten missile silos were built at Baikonur for the flight tests. 60 trials flights were conducted from 19 April 1965 to 27 October 1966, with the first silo launch on 17 July 1965. The first regiments at Bershet and Drovyanaya became operational on 17 July 1966, before the test series was completed. 90 silos were operational by the end of 1966 and the missile and silo were accepted for military service on 21 July 1967.

In field deployment a single hardened command point controlled ten silos. The silos could resist an over-pressure of 20 atmospheres, equivalent to explosion of a one megaton bomb 1300 metres from the silo. Deployment rose to 540 by 1968, 840 by 1970, and 940 in 1961. By 1974 the peak of 1030 UR-100 silos were in operation. By that time 106 UR-100's had been launched in trials flights and another 54 flown from military bases. The last UR-100 was withdrawn from service in 1988. However UR-100's were replaced in their silos by UR-100M's, UR-100K's, UR-100N's, UR-100NU's, and even MR-UR-100's by another manufacturer, proving the worth of the containerised missile concept.

The UR-100 was the first Soviet ICBM with a three minute reaction time - from key turn to lift-off - a huge accomplishment for a liquid propellant vehicle. To make this reaction time possible the vehicle stayed fuelled throughout its guaranteed storage lifetime of five years (extended to first 8, then 10, then 17 years based on in-service tests). This was achieved by encapsulation of the missile in a container in which this missile stayed from production until launch. The container was designed by OKB-52 Filial 2, weighed 14.4 tonnes, had a diameter of 2.7 meters, and a length of 19.5 meters. The missile was mounted on rails within the container and internal plumbing necessary for start-up of the missile was sealed within the container.

The 8S816 first stage and 8S817 second stage were powered by Kosberg and Izotov engines, respectively. Since terminal velocity at the end of second stage burn was only 7.12 km/sec the UR-100 was never adapted for space launches. The missile was produced in three optional configurations (not modifications - only the payload was changed to convert from one configuration to another):

ICBM with range up to 11,000 km with a light (770 kg) warhead, re-entry vehicle designed by Kocaryats at VNIITF and warhead by Arazamas-16.
MRBM (up to 4000 km) with a heavy (1750 kg) warhead, designed at VNIITF with warhead by Chelyabinsk-70.
ABM vehicle 'Taran' with range not less than 2000 km
The guidance system by Kuznetsov and inertial navigation system by Pilyugin were designed to work with any of these configurations and the vehicle could be converted from one to another within 24 hours. Missiles could be programmed for launch plus or minus 30 degrees from their standard corridor. The Palma countermeasures suite by Gerasimenko at NII-108 was fitted to spoof enemy anti-ballistic missile defences.

Propellant tanks were constructed of AMG-6 aluminium alloy. The rocket was normally painted white, and the light warhead version had a strict conic shape. The heavy warhead was longer, but with the same base diameter. The first five launches of the missile from Baikonur used radio-inertial guidance with a radio-command correction system by Ryazinskiy. Later testing gave the military confidence that the pure inertial guidance was precise enough, and the radio receiver was removed in production models.

Work on the Taran ABM version began in 1962-1963. The concept was ingenious, in that offensive missiles could be turned into defensive missiles in response to changes in enemy posture. For use as an ABM the launch complex need some additional equipment and the missile carried a 10 megaton warhead. Incoming missile tracking for Taran would be provided by the TsSO-S radar system located 500 km from Moscow. Taran would be used with the shorter-range A-350 missile developed for the defence of Moscow as part of a layered defence. However Taran could defend, from a single basing area, the most heavily populated area of the Soviet Union, from Leningrad to Moscow. However after the fall of Khrushchev, Chelomei's patron, further work on the Taran system was abandoned.

In total, 12 Strategic Rocket Forces divisions were equipped with the various models of the basic UR-100 (UR-100, UR-100M, UR-100K, UR-100U). Production of these versions extended from 1964 to 1974. There were a total of 162 test and operational test launches of these models. Of these, 67 were tests of the UR-100U. UR-100 artefacts may be found at Orevo, which has a complete sectioned missile, and Baikonur, which has models and photographs.

Manufacturer: Chelomei. Launches: 282. Failures: 21. Success Rate: 92.55%. First Launch Date: 1965-01-01. Last Launch Date: 1984-01-01. Launch data is: incomplete. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). Liftoff Thrust: 785.000 kN (176,475 lbf). Total Mass: 41,410 kg (91,290 lb). Core Diameter: 2.00 m (6.50 ft). Total Length: 16.93 m (55.53 ft). Span: 2.00 m (6.50 ft). Standard warhead mass: 770 kg (1,690 lb). Maximum range: 11,000 km (6,000 mi). Number Standard Warheads: 1. Standard RV: 15F842. Standard warhead yield: 500 KT. Standard warhead CEP: 1.40 km (0.80 mi). Alternate warhead mass: 1,750 kg (3,850 lb). Maximum range with alternate warhead: 4,000 km (2,400 mi). Number Alternate Warheads: 1. Alternate warhead yield: 1,100 KT. Alternate warhead CEP: 1.00 km (0.60 mi). Boost Propulsion: Storable liquid rocket, N2O4/UDMH. Boost engine: RD-0216. Cruise Propulsion: Storable liquid rocket, N2O4/UDMH. Cruise engine: 8D423. Guidance: Inertial+Radio correction. Total Number Built: 790"

Just because the US did not develop a rapid-launching storable liquid propellant missile doesn't mean nobody else could. I am asking you therefore could it be that China couldn't replicate the storage and rapid launch technology of the Russians for the CZ series? The US didn't have to because it went on to solid propellants.

Notice that the newer Chinese ballistic missiles are always displayed in a container? Could it be that they too have used the Chelomei solution for readiness? Wouldn't that get around the problem of readiness? Hmmm

As to the accuracy of some Western estimates, I keep reading about the capabilities of Israel and North Korea, but both countries have never tested a nuclear weapon... what gives?

Food for thought.

Best Regards,

Dusky Lim

duskylim said:

Dear Sirs: your questions as to why not speculate whether Japan or Taiwan has nuclear weapons and/or capabilities... neither of the two has ever tested a nuclear weapon nor anything that looks like a functioning ballistic missile.

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Hi Duskylim. Actually, nuclear tests are capable of being done on high speed computers without an actual physical nuclear test. And there could be many ways that Japan could have a current clandestine nuclear capability. The USA took out of service a whole arsenal of Minuteman warheads and replaced them with the ones on Peacekeeper. Maybe the USA gave those to Japan secretly. And yes, the Japanese do have rockets. Just because they don't look like ballistic missiles doesn't mean they can't be used in that role. Adapting them for use as nuclear ballistic weapons wouldn't be difficult. If you can't see them in this role, it doesn't mean they don't exist. And also, the US may actually have SM-3's on all sea based assets numbering in the hundreds. Perhaps they work better than advertised. Just because you don't actually see them in the launchers doesn't mean they don't exist. As I've said before, you can argue this way all day long. But there are two sides to arguments like this. Speculation like this is usually not very accurate.