Is the Aircraft Carrier as a Capital Ship already obsolete?
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
How would I look to counter massive naval firepower based on the following three originally unconnected statements:
Norfolk says:
Sampan asks:
BD Popeye says:
I think if I were the strategic rival of a largely Seaborne power, I would look to proliferate large numbers of these ASM's and other related systems to as many countries as possible.
The rational is simple, if the the only kind of environment in which it is deemed secure enough for a CSG to be deployed is a Somali type failed state, two questions are likely to be asked:
1 Is a CSG really necessary just to knock over some local Warlord Jihadi?
2 If they cannot be risked against a more organised opponent, can it be justified to keep these Groups that are so expensive to build, operate and maintain?
In short, a form of technical obsolescence.
If the answer were no, then you would have a very quick and cheap victory by the strategic rival!
Norfolk says:
Sampan asks:
BD Popeye says:
I think if I were the strategic rival of a largely Seaborne power, I would look to proliferate large numbers of these ASM's and other related systems to as many countries as possible.
The rational is simple, if the the only kind of environment in which it is deemed secure enough for a CSG to be deployed is a Somali type failed state, two questions are likely to be asked:
1 Is a CSG really necessary just to knock over some local Warlord Jihadi?
2 If they cannot be risked against a more organised opponent, can it be justified to keep these Groups that are so expensive to build, operate and maintain?
In short, a form of technical obsolescence.
If the answer were no, then you would have a very quick and cheap victory by the strategic rival!
...and, IMHO, you would miscalculate terribly.
If major US interests were at risk, the US would use every option at its disposal (short of nuclear) to destroy the threat. That would inculde land based air, LACMs, and the use of carrier air wings.
The first Gulf War was not a sure thing, nor was it pitched against a "failed Somalia state". At the time, Iraq was the fifth largest military in the world with signficant air assets that were deemed credible and dangerous. Theyw ere felkt to have had very decent Russian technology and (at least it was thought) credibly trained personnel to use it. We thought we were facing a likelihood of thousands of casualties and major losses. Yet, despite those risks (are more likely precisely because of them) five carrier battle groups were deployed and used to supress the Iraqi threat.
The US WILL use carrier battle groups when necessary. If a war broke out over the Taiwan Straits, you can bet US carriers would be involved. Let's pray it does not happen.
Thanks Jeff
Given however, the massive pre-conflict build up of coalition Ground Forces and Land based Airpower in the countries adjoining and indeed surrounding Iraq, GW1 does not fit into the type of situation under discussion here.
Given however, the massive pre-conflict build up of coalition Ground Forces and Land based Airpower in the countries adjoining and indeed surrounding Iraq, GW1 does not fit into the type of situation under discussion here.
But of course it does. The Iraqi military was large and very well equipped. The US expected heavy losses, potentially including air force and naval losses depending on how the Iraqi Air Force in particular committed itself. Yet carriers were committed in any case.
You said earlier:
sampanking said:
I am simply pointing out that that is not the only environment where CSG(s) will be deployed.
Certainly the US has not shied away from sending carrier strike groups into harm's way when the risk of doing so was less than the risk to its forces of not doing so. US carrier operations from WWII to the present Iraq War consistently demonstrate this.
Having said that, the threats faced (from dive bombers and diesel-subs that spent much of their time on the surface, to supersonic strike aircraft and subsonic cruise missiles) were cleary capable of being dealt with by escort ships and carrier aircraft (although nothing of course is perfect). Some of the threats now, however, are both claimed by their developers and at first glance do in fact appear to be consistently capable of penetrating carrier strike group defenses with more or less ease. Supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles that may have US-style terminal dive-attack capability and wake-homing torpedos that may detonate beneath ship's keels are qualititatively different (at the moment) from predecessor weapons not just in their destructive power, but especially in their present apparent ability to defeat the defenses deployed aginst them with consistent ease, as they were purposely designed to do. It appears that many or most Western anti-missile defenses simply may not have sufficient time to take down more than a small proportion of incoming supersonic cruise missiles launched in mass attacks, never mind preventing submarines from closing to missile (or perhaps even torpedo) launch range in the first place given that carriers no longer carry fixed wing ASW planes.
And, as to their alleged destructive power, whilst I would imagine that it would take at least half a dozen hits by such weapons to reduce to an inoperable hulk or even to sink a large carrier given their great weight, internal arrangments, and damage control prowess of their crews, I maintain that in the case of the Moskit/Sunburn supersonic cruise missiles at least, that may be sufficient as compared to previous weapons. Much of their killing power is claimed to be from the sheer force of their impact at speed, in addition to the warhead (more substantial than that of Exocet and Harpoon, though smaller than Tomahawk TASM) and whatever unspent fuel is left in the missile. This is not the case with most other cruise missiles, which are not only considerably smaller, but possess less than half the speed.
My proposition is that until there is solid wartime experience that clearly demonstrates that either this is so or it is exaggerated, aircraft carriers and their escorts should be used sparingly in comparison to past and current practice, even if this means that many power-projection operations consequently can not be undertaken. Only grave necessity should justify the deployment of carrier strike groups to areas of potentially grave exposure to Russian-type "carrier-killer" weapons and mass attacks using same (such as in the Persian Gulf, the North Sea/Arctic Ocean approaches to the Kola Peninsula, etc., and the Taiwan Straits), when the very survival of the country or its allies is at stake.
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I do not believe that such a statement can be made. There is no true imperical evidence or experience, training or otherwise, that indicates this. Just the word of the developers and their tests...which are of course going to say they can so that their sales are not impacted...just as the tests of the developers of the defenses are going to show. Except in the US, with freedom of the press and freedom of information, you are MUCH more likely to know of failures in this regard than in other more closed societies...so there is some degree of greater reliance on those tests by the public at large than in those other societies IMHO.
On the other hand, we have the US and virtually every other nation that can afford them, moving towards naval aviation vessels and the escorts to protect them, all of them leaning towards the types of AEGIS or AEGIS-like vessels that the US has employed. They are not doing this in a vaccum or in an environment where all data (or even a significant minority of it IMHO) points towards these systems being outdated. No, common sense dictates that all of these nations are doing it precisely because the data indicates otherwise.
I disagree. Given the realtive levels of technology on both sides (WWII carrier defenses vs. WW II carrier attack) I would say that the relative strengths and weaknesses are, if anything, closer to the same. The fact is there were carriers lost to both the air threat and the sub-surface threat...even to the naval gunfire threat off Samar. Today's threat is greater...much greater...but todays defenses are also much better. And, as I said, there is no evidence whatsoever that these threats have the capability, as you said in the post, "to defeat the defenses deployed aginst them with consistent ease."
To the contrary, there are just as many training exercises, developments, and experience to show that the CSG defenses can defeat these same threats as there are to indicate that the threat can get through.
I believe threats can be developed that can get to carriers. I also believe that the current threat level is not only no more dangerous than the WWII threat, but that it is actually less so. The expenditure required to over come a fully outfitted CSG operating on full war footing would be far greater than what it took (relatively) in World War II.
Even if a very significant threat were developed, that there was little direct defense for, the US and others would continue to use their carriers in a full scale conventional war. They would shift their tactics to try and avoid the threat while still bringing the power projection to bear. I discuss all of this in great detail, particularly about carriers, in my novel.
A very significant threat is developed that is very successful in sinking several US supoer carriers. Yet the US and allies must continue until defenses against it are developed, which there are. Throughout the conflict a technology war over this very issue then see-saws back and forth.
The point is...the nations losing carriers continue and percivere in that horrible threat environment...and at great cost. Just like they did in WWII on boith sides.
Again, here is no imperical evidence of this whatsoever. Just supposition based on the claims of those designing the systems. You can listen equally well to those people designing the defenses and base your assumptions on that and come to a different conlcusion. A mass attack by missile against a US CSG will require the expedniture of huge resources that very few countries have the ability to muster. Finding the carrier, tracking the carrier, targeting the carrier, and then getting sufficient resource on the carriert to overwhelm its defenses are ALL huge tasks. Do not think that after the shooting starts that these nations will have satellite coverage either...they very likely will not.Nprfolk said:
I am not saying it cannot be done, or would not be done...but charging into the anti-air defenses of a CSG are going directly against its strength. not impossible...but very, very difficult and very very expensive.
The sub-surface threat is credible...but it too has to do the same things as the air attack. Find, target, and prosecute. A CSG moves fast and in a war footing will be very buttoned up. To begin with there will be the escorts and their helos, which will not be bunched up around the carrier. They will be hunting subs on the threat axis...as will at least two very capable US attack subs. Very quickly in that setting, I am betting you would see the S-3s back on the carriers too.
And on this we disagree. By so doing, tacitly, those adversarily weapons and the threat of their use will have already won the victories. No, the US will continue to use its assets as it deems necessary...as it is doing today. Not unwisely or in a manner that exposes them to unnecessary or unwise risk...but clearly in a way to allow them to fulfill the duty they were created for.norfolk said:
In so doing, the US will force its adversaries to put up (not the other way around)...at far greater potential risk to themselves and their war making capabilities, rather than for the US to not use what they have already invested great treasure in developoing and protecting.
But that's just my opinion.
You are only taking into account the hard kill capabilities of the anti-missile defenses of a carrier battlegroup. You do not take into account the defensive capability of the carrier airwing.
You advocate that the biggest threat to a carrier is a mass saturation attack. This attack needs a "critical mass" in order to punch through the defences. You need extremely mature command and control to ensure that each weapon arrives at the same time or else it won't work.
This is where the carrier airwing comes into play. One of the main tactics of defensive air combat is to messed up the attackers timing. By threatening the strikers, you can make them jettison their payload, waste time in defensive manuevers, etc. This tactic will lessened the weight of the attack. There is a huge difference between 100 missiles arriving at the same time and 10 missiles arriving every minute for 10 minutes.
IDonT sez;
I've let this type converstaion go on without me because of my bias in favor of the CV...
However this statement is right on point..Once the Us turns on it's ECM from E/A-6b's, Ticos abd Arliegh Burkes havoc will be reaped upon any enemy as their electronic equipment starts to malfunction. This is a factor that cannot be discounted
I've let this type converstaion go on without me because of my bias in favor of the CV...
However this statement is right on point..Once the Us turns on it's ECM from E/A-6b's, Ticos abd Arliegh Burkes havoc will be reaped upon any enemy as their electronic equipment starts to malfunction. This is a factor that cannot be discounted
Quote: Jeff Head -
Just supposition based on the claims of those designing the systems. You can listen equally well to those people designing the defenses and base your assumptions on that and come to a different conlcusion. A mass attack by missile against a US CSG will require the expedniture of huge resources that very few countries have the ability to muster. Finding the carrier, tracking the carrier, targeting the carrier, and then getting sufficient resource on the carriert to overwhelm its defenses are ALL huge tasks. Do not think that after the shooting starts that these nations will have satellite coverage either...they very likely will not.
I am not saying it cannot be done, or would not be done...but charging into the anti-air defenses of a CSG are going directly against its strength. not impossible...but very, very difficult and very very expensive.
- Unquote
You're right Jeff, we pretty much have only the claims of the developers and arms merchants that such weapons are capable of such-and-such - none of them have ever even so much as arranged a demonstration of their weapons' reputed capabilities for Western experts. And I won't argue that carrier strike groups could be very hard to locate, let alone track prior to launching an attack.
Quote: Jeff Head -
By so doing, tacitly, those adversarily weapons and the threat of their use will have already won the victories. No, the US will continue to use its assets as it deems necessary...as it is doing today. Not unwisely or in a manner that exposes them to unnecessary or unwise risk...but clearly in a way to allow them to fulfill the duty they were created for.
In so doing, the US will force its adversaries to put up (not the other way around)...at far greater potential risk to themselves and their war making capabilities, rather than for the US to not use what they have already invested great treasure in developoing and protecting.
- Unquote.
Yes, in effect the West would already have conceded defeat in present areas of threat and would be expected to concede in the future, thus only encouraging hostile staes and other actors whilst progressively weakening the West. The West would be thrown back upon a strategy of appeasement, and we all know how that turned out the last time.
Quote: IDont -
You advocate that the biggest threat to a carrier is a mass saturation attack. This attack needs a "critical mass" in order to punch through the defences. You need extremely mature command and control to ensure that each weapon arrives at the same time or else it won't work.
This is where the carrier airwing comes into play. One of the main tactics of defensive air combat is to messed up the attackers timing. By threatening the strikers, you can make them jettison their payload, waste time in defensive manuevers, etc. This tactic will lessened the weight of the attack. There is a huge difference between 100 missiles arriving at the same time and 10 missiles arriving every minute for 10 minutes.
- Unquote
This is a critical point, and many countries, China among them, very much seem to be lacking anything like effective and cutting edge command, control, and communications, and might be hopelessly lost in trying to coordinate saturation attacks upon very elusive targets, such as a carrier strike group, which, moreover, is a model of professional command, control, and communications.
Quote: bdpopeye -
Once the Us turns on it's ECM from E/A-6b's, Ticos abd Arliegh Burkes havoc will be reaped upon any enemy as their electronic equipment starts to malfunction. This is a factor that cannot be discounted
- Unquote
It does seem a tad unlikely that even the Russians, let alone others, could counter US ECM and the like with sufficient effectiveness and consistency (especially considering that one of the Russians' preferred approaches to doing so, at least in the past, was simply to turn up the juice and burn through Western ECM).
Very well, my arguments have largely been countered point by point, and in most cases effectively so - and last, but certainly not least, by some people who are either practitioners or are otherwise more or less in the know, and that latter category does not include me, at least with regards to naval warfare.
I still maintain a few reservations about carrier strike groups operating in the manner in which they do at present, and these still principally revolve around my fears of their potential vulnerability to submarines. I have repeated ad nauseum my deep concern, almost panic over the disappearance of carrier-based fixed-wing ASW leaving a potentially critical gap in the defenses of carrier strike groups, and many of you have shared that same concern, to a greater or lesser degree.
The other is the simply awesome effort and expense that goes into the creation and maintenance of carrier strike groups, and the potential corresponding scale of loss if something should go wrong - while I reject the notion that the submarine can replace the aircraft carrier, I still believe that submarines should be given priority for resources over aircraft carriers to the extent that once sufficient resources have been made available for a submarine force capable of defending one's coasts, only then is it time to allocate the resources necessary to develop power-projection capabilites based upon carrier strike groups. This is an especially important rule of prioritization for lesser powers, who, under normal circumstances tend neither to possess the resources nor perhaps the need or even desire for power-projection forces much beyond their immediate environs. Power-projection, under normal circumstances, is played in the big-leagues, by the big-league players.
Finally, I still consider the clearest, truest measure of any approach, system, or implement of war to be its actual performance in intense and sustained warfare. Even the best professional advice before the fact may turn out to be wrong after the fact. To date, some of what we have been discussing and arguing has not been subjected to this test. That said, I take the practioners at their word, and their arguments have been cleary laid out. Their word is certainly the best we have and I am in the main both convinced and reassured by their arguments; nevertheless, a part of me still considers the possibility that things may prove differently in a real war, though I now suspect that that may be unlikely.
Just supposition based on the claims of those designing the systems. You can listen equally well to those people designing the defenses and base your assumptions on that and come to a different conlcusion. A mass attack by missile against a US CSG will require the expedniture of huge resources that very few countries have the ability to muster. Finding the carrier, tracking the carrier, targeting the carrier, and then getting sufficient resource on the carriert to overwhelm its defenses are ALL huge tasks. Do not think that after the shooting starts that these nations will have satellite coverage either...they very likely will not.
I am not saying it cannot be done, or would not be done...but charging into the anti-air defenses of a CSG are going directly against its strength. not impossible...but very, very difficult and very very expensive.
- Unquote
You're right Jeff, we pretty much have only the claims of the developers and arms merchants that such weapons are capable of such-and-such - none of them have ever even so much as arranged a demonstration of their weapons' reputed capabilities for Western experts. And I won't argue that carrier strike groups could be very hard to locate, let alone track prior to launching an attack.
Quote: Jeff Head -
By so doing, tacitly, those adversarily weapons and the threat of their use will have already won the victories. No, the US will continue to use its assets as it deems necessary...as it is doing today. Not unwisely or in a manner that exposes them to unnecessary or unwise risk...but clearly in a way to allow them to fulfill the duty they were created for.
In so doing, the US will force its adversaries to put up (not the other way around)...at far greater potential risk to themselves and their war making capabilities, rather than for the US to not use what they have already invested great treasure in developoing and protecting.
- Unquote.
Yes, in effect the West would already have conceded defeat in present areas of threat and would be expected to concede in the future, thus only encouraging hostile staes and other actors whilst progressively weakening the West. The West would be thrown back upon a strategy of appeasement, and we all know how that turned out the last time.
Quote: IDont -
You advocate that the biggest threat to a carrier is a mass saturation attack. This attack needs a "critical mass" in order to punch through the defences. You need extremely mature command and control to ensure that each weapon arrives at the same time or else it won't work.
This is where the carrier airwing comes into play. One of the main tactics of defensive air combat is to messed up the attackers timing. By threatening the strikers, you can make them jettison their payload, waste time in defensive manuevers, etc. This tactic will lessened the weight of the attack. There is a huge difference between 100 missiles arriving at the same time and 10 missiles arriving every minute for 10 minutes.
- Unquote
This is a critical point, and many countries, China among them, very much seem to be lacking anything like effective and cutting edge command, control, and communications, and might be hopelessly lost in trying to coordinate saturation attacks upon very elusive targets, such as a carrier strike group, which, moreover, is a model of professional command, control, and communications.
Quote: bdpopeye -
Once the Us turns on it's ECM from E/A-6b's, Ticos abd Arliegh Burkes havoc will be reaped upon any enemy as their electronic equipment starts to malfunction. This is a factor that cannot be discounted
- Unquote
It does seem a tad unlikely that even the Russians, let alone others, could counter US ECM and the like with sufficient effectiveness and consistency (especially considering that one of the Russians' preferred approaches to doing so, at least in the past, was simply to turn up the juice and burn through Western ECM).
Very well, my arguments have largely been countered point by point, and in most cases effectively so - and last, but certainly not least, by some people who are either practitioners or are otherwise more or less in the know, and that latter category does not include me, at least with regards to naval warfare.
I still maintain a few reservations about carrier strike groups operating in the manner in which they do at present, and these still principally revolve around my fears of their potential vulnerability to submarines. I have repeated ad nauseum my deep concern, almost panic over the disappearance of carrier-based fixed-wing ASW leaving a potentially critical gap in the defenses of carrier strike groups, and many of you have shared that same concern, to a greater or lesser degree.
The other is the simply awesome effort and expense that goes into the creation and maintenance of carrier strike groups, and the potential corresponding scale of loss if something should go wrong - while I reject the notion that the submarine can replace the aircraft carrier, I still believe that submarines should be given priority for resources over aircraft carriers to the extent that once sufficient resources have been made available for a submarine force capable of defending one's coasts, only then is it time to allocate the resources necessary to develop power-projection capabilites based upon carrier strike groups. This is an especially important rule of prioritization for lesser powers, who, under normal circumstances tend neither to possess the resources nor perhaps the need or even desire for power-projection forces much beyond their immediate environs. Power-projection, under normal circumstances, is played in the big-leagues, by the big-league players.
Finally, I still consider the clearest, truest measure of any approach, system, or implement of war to be its actual performance in intense and sustained warfare. Even the best professional advice before the fact may turn out to be wrong after the fact. To date, some of what we have been discussing and arguing has not been subjected to this test. That said, I take the practioners at their word, and their arguments have been cleary laid out. Their word is certainly the best we have and I am in the main both convinced and reassured by their arguments; nevertheless, a part of me still considers the possibility that things may prove differently in a real war, though I now suspect that that may be unlikely.
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