Dear Sirs:
There are numerous credible websites devoted to world-wide nuclear weaponry and technology as well as a number of very informative articles in open publication about China's nuclear weapon program.
A good example of the former would be The Nuclear Weapons Archive and other well-known sites like the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (which provides yearly assessments of the arsenals of the various existing and suspected nuclear powers).
With regards to the latter, one of the most outstanding articles I've ever read was published last year in (IIRC) the September 2008 issue of Physics Today - about China's nuclear weapons program.
As far as China's nuclear materials infrastructure is concerned, it runs the full gamut from plutonium and tritium production reactors to domestic as well as Russian-supplied, Zippe-type centrifuges and conventional membrane-type enrichment plants.
The production capacity of plutonium production reactors is estimated from size of their cooling towers while the enrichment capacities (Separative Work Units - SWU's) of the Russian centrifuges and the numbers sold have been stated by the Russians under IAEA regulations.
While China can and does make its own centrifuges it still chose to purchase the Russian Zippe-type for fabricating its own commercial power reactor fuel.
This clearly indicates that Chinese enrichment technology is still behind that of the Russians (who incidentally are the world leaders in this).
China did make several conventional membrane-type enrichment facilities (notably the one at Langzhou), which due to their size are almost impossible to hide but it is doubtful that they are still being operated.
Centrifuge technology is so much cheaper and efficient as well as easier to hide. A nation the size of China can easily disperse such operations around the country and it would be difficult if not impossible to trace them.
So no one really knows how much weapons-grade enriched uranium the Chinese have produced all these years. Especially so because China does extensive mining of heavy metals, rare-earths and transuranics (actinides).
Uranium for military purposes could be recovered during the processing of such ores. This activity would go unnoticed by the IAEA as no diversion of commercial imported uranium is involved.
Note, Western intelligence assessments that China has produced only limited amounts of weapons-grade plutonium derive from their very own claims that known and identified Chinese plutonium production reactors have not displayed heat plumes from their cooling towers for several decades.
Of course it is possible to make nuclear weapons without using plutonium - as the Chinese did in their 1st test in October of 1964, although plutonium will make the weapon more efficient and compact.
In view of all this, we simply do not know how much nuclear materials and weapons the Chinese really have.
However, the Chinese themselves have stated that among the 5 established nuclear powers they have the smallest arsenal - but with the deployment of a new generation of weapons (DF-31/31A, JL-2, etc.) it is the only arsenal that is growing!
Best Regards,
Dusky Lim