Infantry Combat Equipment (non-firearm): Vests, Body Armor, NVGs, etc.

Blitzo said:

I actually think it does pass the smell test, because we aren't talking about whether the PLA's procurement of its tools are a reflection of the PRC's manufacturing prowess, but rather about the PLA's procurement priorities in context of their needs.

Very few, and this is exactly the point which I am making.

Western military forces during GWOT had significantly refined their infantry, small unit and air support tactics and procedures in permissive environments, while allowing their high end air-naval-missile warfare capabilities and high end ground warfare (artillery, fires) to wither (or at least, to not advance at the same extent).

Over the last few years I've written things along the lines of "who cares about infantry gear" in relation to the PLA, and that isn't only because PLA infantry gear remains relatively backwards.
It is because we know what the PLA is prioritizing instead of infantry gear.

At the marco, military level they are prioritizing the cream of the crop in terms of technology and systems and training for air, naval, and missile forces, versus ground forces. At the individual service level for the PLAGF, they are prioritizing long range fires (large rocket artillery, tube artillery), ISR and networking, and logistics, followed by certain AFVs, and at the very last, individual infantry gear.

The idea that the PLA would procure individual infantry gear like NODs may be less viable or capable than foreign counterparts, makes a lot of sense when we consider the reality that infantry gear is at the bottom of the list of priorities for the PLAGF, when the PLAGF is at the bottom of the PLA's military services as well.
Then if we consider that funding for a military service also influences the ability for you to robustly train, upskill, do capable R&D, versus western military forces who spent nearly a couple of decades conducting war focused on infantry gear (to the detriment of funding their high end air/naval/missile/ground warfare capabilities) --- then yes it is not only reasonable to me, but it is the only conclusion that should be logical, to believe that the PLA's relative lack of prioritization for infantry gear, as well as relative lack of funding for infantry gear, means that procurement will be relatively suboptimal and unrefined and below other leading military forces with substantial infantry gear.

We are specifically talking about PLA infantry gear and the factors that feed ingo the procurement of such.

The PLA has not been focusing to fight a war requiring ultra high end infantry,

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Index said:

My point is that we should not assume extra gear means "ultra high end infantry".

I would rather say that "high end infantry" describes infantry that can survive, take ground and win in high intensity combat. And I think China has its own ideas and takes on how high end infantry should be kitted out.

Remember, gear is always competing for the soldier's attention and stamina. If an unit has optimized equipment to massacre barely armed people, that does not necessarily make it a high end unit for real warfare.

Compared to a riot police or a knight in plate armor, the protection kit of Korean war soldiers seems to be backwards. But if you put the whole PVA in modernized plate, I'd bet the war probably goes a lot worse for China. Through this point I'm just trying to say that simplicity should not be conflated for backwardsness.

Especially when we haven't seen that having all these heavy western (or China's versions) gear helps soldiers much in the only major conflict since Vietnam.

Overall the Chinese command I'd think is open minded, they have access to high quality combat info from allies, and they defintely have the resources to build the type of soldiers they want. So I wouldn't outright dismiss their observations and decisions. It'd be another thing if research/experience widely showed that western style gear is the gold standard in high intensity warfare.

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